



Holistic Education

An Analysis of Its Ideas and Nature

Scott H. Forbes

Foreword by JOHN WILSON

H O L I S T I C E D U C A T I O N

An Analysis of Its Ideas and Nature

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To my parents

Foreword

I am very pleased to be able to commend this book to what I hope will be a very wide range of readers. It took its origins from a doctoral thesis for which I supervised the author, and from which—as commonly with supervisions, not only at Oxford University—I learned at least as much as I taught. It is, to the best of my knowledge, the best (perhaps the only) attempt to give the idea and practice of holistic education a serious philosophical underpinning, and it may be worth saying a little about why that is important.

Educational theories have always been generated by various feelings, attitudes and intuitions entertained by theorists and practitioners, from Plato to Dewey and beyond. The list is almost endless: Socrates and Isocrates, Locke, Kant, Montessori, Steiner, Freire and many others. Various schools and other educational institutions have risen, and fallen, based upon such intuitions: A.S. Neill's school Summerhill is a contemporary example. Their rise and fall has been largely a function of their appeal or lack of appeal to contemporary culture and society, in which certain vaguely-formulated ideals become fashionable or salient: "back to basics," or "progressive education," or "inclusion," or (in the UK) "the comprehensive ideal" (now much less fashionable than it was in the 1960s). There will be talk from time to time of "liberation" or "freedom," of "behavioral objectives" or "basic skills," of "education for change" or "education for the new millennium." These fashions or climates of opinion come and go; and it has to be admitted that philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and other academic theo-

rists do little (one may sometimes feel, hardly anything) to stabilize the position. There is no established corpus of educational knowledge, as there is such a corpus in natural science, so that educational theory seems not much more than a plaything for partisan prejudice.

Holistic education arose in part from a reaction against certain types of schooling, which were seen as too narrow, or too fragmented, or in some way failing to take due account of the student's real or inner self. As this book shows, that general reaction goes back a long way, at least as far as Rousseau. But if it is to be more than just a reaction of protest, defining itself only negatively and by contrast with some enemy (perhaps "traditional schooling"), it has to be shown that it represents a coherent ideal which can be justified in the light of reason. That is what I take the main message of this book to be: to show that holistic education is not just a practice that happens to appeal to people of a particular temperament, but something which is required for doing justice to the concept of education itself.

That involves, first of all, giving a coherent definition or account of what holistic education is, or what "holistic education" means: no easy task, but one which the author manages to accomplish. A clear account of this kind is worth infinitely more than any general talk of "freedom" or "spirituality." We can now, whatever our personal feelings, confront an educational ideal which is adequately described and circumscribed, and which is based on more than mere intuition or some general feeling of dissatisfaction with contemporary schooling. The author puts together the various insights of past and current thinkers into a manageable package which can be evaluated. That in itself is a considerable step forward: at least we know what we are talking about.

The author then tries to demonstrate, in my judgment successfully, why this ideal must commend itself to any serious student or practitioner of education. That requires a good deal of hard philosophical argument, which will at least free the reader from too narrow an interpretation of the concept marked by "education." The door is thus philosophically opened to allow us to enter on the more substantive questions of just what holistic education consists of, both in theory and practice: in particular, what findings of psychology and social science shed light on it. That then sheds light on and makes sense of the actual practices of holistic education, practices which might otherwise appear diffuse and unfocussed, but which can now be seen as representing a coherent ideal.

That kind of methodology or heuristic procedure is required for any educational theory or ideal; and the author's deployment of it would

be valuable even if he had not made out an overwhelmingly strong case for this particular ideal. For that reason even those antagonistic to the notion of holistic education may profit by it: even an extreme traditionalist would need to employ a similar methodology in order to defend his position coherently. At least the author shows what is required to make out an intellectually respectable case for any educational ideal or theory; and that may, in one way, be at least as important as the particular case he makes.

As the author would himself be the first to admit—indeed, to emphasize—no single book can make such a case complete. That is because books in themselves can only do so much. There is, inevitably and rightly, an interplay between the theory of holistic education and its practice. The theory sheds light on the practice: it enables us to identify, via the use of certain general concepts, just what features of the practice are important. But equally the practice itself generates experiences and insights which shed light on these general concepts, and modify and enlarge them. As Kant puts it, “Experience without concepts is blind, and concepts without experience are empty.”

That has important practical consequences. Now that we have—I believe, for the first time—a clear account of what holistic education is, we have something which can be seriously researched. Empirical research tells us little or nothing unless it is geared in the first place to a clear set of concepts, which is why such research has not availed to advance our educational knowledge and practice to any great extent. (To take an obvious example, empirical research into moral education, however interesting in itself, has to be geared to a clear account of what “morally educated” means, and hence to the logically necessary goals of moral education: otherwise it appears merely as a series of dislocated facts or “findings”) So it is to be hoped that this book will spark off a considerable number of empirical research projects, which will tell us in more detail exactly what the results of holistic education are in terms of student outcomes.

It is also to be hoped that politicians, administrators and other policymakers will take the ideal of holistic education on board, and facilitate it in practice: again, not just as a fashionable “movement” or “school of thought,” but as a coherent ideal which has to be taken seriously. That is asking a lot: politicians and administrators are not naturally open to educational ideals in general, being more concerned with (as people say) more “practical” issues, usually financial or economic. But they need to remember something often forgotten: the fact that billions of dollars are spent on education, yet without any real

assurance that they are well spent, or that people are any better educated than they were. The ultimate test of any educational system must be in terms of values and ideals, which is why they need serious inspection.

That point is relevant not only to educationalists. For inevitably the ideal of holistic education is based ultimately upon a certain picture of human nature and the human condition; and that is relevant to the life of any and every human individual. It is, by and large, an optimistic picture; and if I diverge from the author at any point, it is that he sometimes seems to make insufficient allowance for certain endemic difficulties in the human condition from which we may never be entirely able to break free. A dose of St. Augustine, or the classical Greek tragedians, or perhaps of Freud might be salutary here; but I shall not pursue the point. For on any account an immense amount can be done, as now it is not done, to educate not only our students but ourselves holistically: and that must at least give grounds for some optimism. It is not too much to say that we can learn to live holistically, both within ourselves and in our personal relationships; and that is something to which any individual needs to pay attention.

Rightly the author makes no attempt to brainwash or indoctrinate the reader into an acceptance of holistic education, as if it were a kind of religion that depended on blind faith. He uses the tools of reason and not of rhetoric. In our ongoing discussions over the years neither he nor (I hope) I have tried to convert, but only to persuade. That style of interaction (whether or not we always succeeded in adhering to it) is perhaps of more fundamental importance to educational theory—indeed to most human enterprises—than anything else. To share one's views and debate them with rigor and without personal animus is a precondition for any serious intellectual advance: without that, we have only the blind confrontation of one ideal with another—what Plato distinguishes as “eristic” rather than “dialectic.” It is perhaps that, at bottom, which has prevented much progress being made in such human enterprises as education, morality, politics, and religion: we cling to our own intuitions rather than take the responsibility of subjecting them to the discipline of reason and the criticism of other people. This book may serve as an exemplar of that procedure, as of much else. I hope it will meet with the success that it richly deserves.

—John Wilson, Senior Research Associate
University of Oxford Department of Education

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Note to the Reader

*T*his book is arranged so that it can be read in different ways for different purposes. The three sections can be read separately if the reader has only an interest in a general overview of holistic education (Section I), only an interest in the philosophical precedents of holistic education (Section II), or only a sociological analysis of holistic education (Section III). There is a very extensive appendix for Section II as the authors of the intellectual precedents are wonderfully articulate, and many of their works, or works about them, are now quite rare, so that the inclusion of these quotations could be of interest to a scholar of holistic education. These quotations are not necessary, however, for an understanding of the authors, so they have been excluded from the main text to leave it less cluttered for the casual reader.

Introduction

There is no doubt that holistic education exists (at least in name) as a widespread institutionalized endeavor. Over the last several decades the number of education initiatives that describe themselves as holistic has dramatically increased as parents, students, and educators feel that an alternative to mainstream education is needed. While thousands of schools have been created world-wide that describe themselves as alternative or holistic,¹ there are uncounted special programs claiming to be holistic which are called into non-holistic schools so that students can engage in learning that these schools do not normally cover. There are still more education initiatives which describe themselves as holistic outside of schooling altogether (out of school hours, out of term times, or as substitutes for schooling, e.g., homeschooling).

To describe and promote holistic education, several journals have emerged (e.g., *Holistic Education Review*, *ΣΚΟΛΕ*, *Paths of Learning*, etc.) and University departments have been created (e.g., Holistic and Aesthetic Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at The University of Toronto, The Holistic Teaching/Learning Unit at The University of Tennessee at Knoxville). There are many books describing education programs or schools which claim to be holistic, one book which traces the origins of holistic education,² several books which describe holistic curricula,³ and many which describe the need for a more holistic approach to education; but there is no book which attempts to construct a coherent account of all these initiatives and ideas.

WHAT HOLISTIC EDUCATION COVERS

Unfortunately, this field is extremely diverse and there is no element of which one can say, 'If it has X it is holistic; and if it doesn't, it isn't'. As no consensus exists as to what 'holistic education' means, my task is to give it a clear meaning by identifying a clear group of elements—beliefs, feelings, principles, and general ideas (hereafter called 'notions')—which seem basic and central to holistic education. Some of the elements would exist to some extent in all schools and programs claiming to be holistic, although in few (if any) schools or programs would we see all of them. In this, what will be examined is similar to what philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein described as 'family resemblances'.

...we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.⁴

Wittgenstein gave as an example of family resemblance the notion of games. There seems to be no single criterion which determines if an activity is a game (e.g., there need not be competition—there are cooperative games, there need not be different sides—there is solitaire, etc.); but rather an overlapping set of characteristics, any combination of which may be present in a game.

In trying to elucidate the elements of the family resemblance of holistic education, one must take one step back from any particular expression of holistic education to see if we can understand what *most* people engaged in holistic education will mean *most* of the time when they use that expression. It might then be possible to pick out elements of schools or programs that are holistic in nature; and, still further, perhaps it would be possible to see in what way a school or program could be changed to make it more or less holistic.

Holistic education frequently claims that it wants to, 1) educate the whole child (all parts of the child), 2) educate the student as a whole (not as an assemblage of parts), and 3) see the child as part of a whole (society, humanity, the environment, some spiritual whole, etc.) from which it is not meaningful to extract the student. This seemingly simple

statement hides an extraordinary number of complexities and ambiguities: e.g., what is the whole child? (what parts does the child contain?); what does it mean to educate those parts?; how could such education occur?; if a child is part of a whole from which he or she can't be meaningfully extracted, where does the child end and the non-child begin so that some boundaries to the educational intention can be established?

While it will take the whole of this book to describe and elucidate the field of holistic education, some brief comments may be needed to orient the reader who knows nothing of this approach to pedagogy. Arguably, most forms of education have as their *raison d'être* either enculturation or preparation for work. Holistic education has as its goal the fullest possible human development (described more fully beginning on page 17) with fitting into society and vocation having secondary importance. If such full development is seen as including 'right' relationships to the environment and consciousness (as is the case with many New Age paradigms) then ecology and meditation have importance in approaches to holistic education arising from those paradigms. If the paradigms are more Christian (as was the case with holistic educators of two hundred years ago or Montessori), or Theosophical (e.g., Rudolf Steiner), or some combination of Eastern and Western theologies (e.g., American Transcendentalists of the mid 1800's) then their views of full human development and consequent approaches to holistic education reflect those paradigms.

ACCOMPLISHING THE PURPOSES OF THIS BOOK

To accomplish the purposes of this book, which is to construct a coherent account of holistic education that would include as many of its various forms, initiatives and ideas as is possible, a two pronged approach is taken—examining both the thoughts and actions of holistic educators. Any attempt to individually elucidate the various forms of holistic education would be inadequate and instantly obsolete as they are too numerous, new ones are continuously being created, and existing forms often change radically. How then is one to begin to establish the “family resemblance” of holistic education?

As with many living organisms, establishing the *genus* of holistic education can be assisted by examining its principal elements. For educational approaches, there are two broad categories of elements that one could choose: the *thinking* in and of an educational approach, or

the *doing* in and of an educational approach. It seems appropriate in trying to establish a new *genus* of pedagogy that both categories be examined. Hence, in this book the *thinking* of holistic education is examined through a philosophical exploration of its intellectual precedents, while what holistic education *does* is explored using the discipline of sociology. Section I of this book gives an overview of holistic education. Section II explores what holistic education *thinks* by examining its intellectual precedents. Section III explores what holistic education *does* using some tools of the sociology of education as propounded by Basil Bernstein.

There needs to be some organizing principle for Sections I and II because the educational notions contained therein have spanned almost two and a half centuries, several languages, and even more countries. I believe there are three principal questions which can be useful for organizing the notions of any educational approach and which, consequently, also serve as a convenient basis for organizing the educational notions in Sections I and II. They are: 1) What does an educational approach claim is the goal of education? 2) What does an educational approach claim needs to be learned in order to achieve its goal? 3) What does an educational approach claim facilitates or causes the needed learning?

In Section I these three questions will serve to elucidate a presentation of the principal notions in holistic education. These principal notions are only put in very general terms as an attempt to describe what *most* adherents of holistic education claim *most* of the time for holistic education, and with the understanding that these adherents are many and extremely varied. These principal notions presented in Section I also serve as a summary of the notions for the authors of holistic education's intellectual precedents, which follow in Section II. This may at first appear to be a backward way of proceeding—first a summary of the intellectual precedents, and secondly details of what has been summarized. However, on reflection there seems little choice, as we must have a clear general overview of what we will be examining in the intellectual precedents before we can examine these particulars.

This approach should also serve the purpose of establishing the *genus* of holistic education. Like the biological sciences, which observe categories of elements in several species (e.g., the flowers of several plants), attempt to find similarities, then trace their ancestry back to a common source and in so doing establishing a *genus*; so must we proceed. We can use the three organizing questions to establish general notions of holistic education, trace the notions back to their origins

and see how they have changed over time. Hence the importance of holistic education's intellectual precedents for establishing holistic education as a distinct and legitimate form of pedagogy. Some present forms of holistic education will find resonance with early enunciations of a notion, while other forms will find later expressions of that same notion to more closely represent their approach to education. However, in seeing the theme of which they hold variations allows a family resemblance to begin to be established and thus the *genus* of holistic education to be established.

In Section II holistic education's intellectual precedents are traced through the works of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Jung, Maslow and Rogers. These authors (excluding Jung) are the most often cited and quoted by holistic educators as the originators of the central notions of holistic education, and a good case has been made for the influence of their work on the current thinking in holistic education.⁵ These men, as a group, will from here on be called the "Authors," not just because their writing has been so widely cited, but also because they are often seen as the authorities on which these notions rest. However, not all the work of these authors is relevant to holistic education.

While some advocates and writers on holistic education agree with the inclusion of Jung in this list, to others this may seem curious. There are several reasons why Jung should be on this list: Jung was, if not the first, then at least the popularizer of the notion that the locus of the religious is the psyche; a notion widely held in holistic education. Jung was also the popularizer of notions linking Eastern religions, Western religions and the psyche, allowing him and others since him to see what they claim are 'larger truths' behind the dogma and culturally bound expressions of religion. The importance of this to holistic education is discussed in several of the following sections of this book. Jung also saw and inspired others to see biological, psychological, and religious 'evolution' as merged and a human imperative. This imperative lies behind much of the fullest possible human development that many holistic educators feel is the goal of education. In short, Jung's work lies behind much in the views of what it means to be human that are held by proponents of holistic education, and views of what it means to be human are central to views of education.

Some readers may find it curious that educators such as Montessori, Steiner, Dewey or some others are not included amongst the Authors, but these others cannot be counted as philosophical originators of key notions in holistic education. Maria Montessori was certainly original in her creation of teaching technique and even the development of

size appropriate school furniture, but she was an inheritor of the educational philosophies of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel. Rudolf Steiner was original in both his philosophies and techniques of education, but he has had little to no influence on other forms of holistic education, and cannot therefore be considered part of holistic education's intellectual precedents. While John Dewey said many things that seem to have come directly from Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel (whose work he read, knew, and quoted) he also put forward many other ideas that were original. However, these original notions of Dewey are not relevant for holistic education, and consequently his work is not included.

The Authors are not assumed to be the first people to have had the ideas examined here; in fact, they almost certainly were not. Obviously, there is no way of knowing who first thought of something, and tracing these notions as far back into the past as possible risks being a pursuit of the ideas for its own sake and a sterile intellectual exercise. The Authors are selected because they are acknowledged by most advocates of holistic education to have been highly influential in creating the principal notions in holistic education. So, Rousseau is seen as a source for the thinking in holistic education, yet Rousseau himself refers to and gives credit to Plotinus, Plutarch, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, etc., for many of the ideas admired by holistic educators. However, it was Rousseau who assembled the various thoughts and presented them in a form that holistic educators feel speak to them. It is Rousseau, therefore (rather than Plotinus, Plutarch, etc.), who is considered as providing part of the intellectual precedents for holistic education.

Similarly, tracing the intellectual precedents for what are called "democratic schools" need not pursue the idea of democracy back over two millennia. These schools (which sometimes describe themselves as holistic) take as their precedents the New England town meetings in colonial America, and they model many of their features on such meetings. One could trace the notions of democracy to Pericles, and indeed some of the colonial Americans would have been familiar with Pericles and democracy in ancient Greece. However, there seems little point in tracing the thinking in democratic schools back to ancient Greece since this is not something that the schools themselves usually do.

There is also another important factor in determining whom to acknowledge as a source of current thinking in holistic education, and that is whether the advocates wish to be associated with a potential

source. For example, it is arguably true that Hitler popularized vegetarianism in Germany during a certain era, but present-day German vegetarians may understandably not wish to acknowledge Hitler as an inspiration for their beliefs. Similarly, holistic education, which usually tries to distance itself from particular creeds or religious dogmas, may not want to acknowledge some important Christian thinkers, even though these thinkers said things with which holistic educators would agree and these Christian thinkers clearly had an influence on the intellectual climate in which the Authors lived. The exceptions to such lack of acknowledgement by holistic educators are some mystical Christian writers like St. John of the Cross, Jan Van Ruysbroeck, Julian of Norwich, or the anonymous author of *The Cloud of Unknowing*.

The notions examined in Section II need to be seen as both a collection and an evolution. For example, Pestalozzi was such an ardent admirer of Rousseau (who he claimed was “the turning point between the old and new worlds of education”⁶), that his early attempts at education were almost a “paint by numbers” application of Rousseau’s *Emile*. He even named his only son after Rousseau. Froebel was a student and early promoter of Pestalozzi, even though he eventually broke with him. Yet,

...far from merely echoing what was said before them, each of these [Authors] subjected existing ideas to scrutiny and modification... Any criticism, however, was designed not to reject the basic proposition, but to ensure that this new approach to education was soundly based or wisely interpreted.⁷

In this sense, there is an evolution.

Yet there is also the fact that three distinct disciplines (philosophy, pedagogy, psychology) are represented by the Authors and at least the psychology cannot be seen as evolving from the first two. At the same time, many of the holistic educators who take up the notions examined here will never have read the Authors except in decontextualized quotes or small excerpts. Consequently, the very real differences that exist in the works of these Authors tend to disappear within the everyday understanding held by holistic educators about the Authors’ original works. A collection of similar sounding notions that seem to echo each other remains; and it is in this sense that it is a collection. This is especially important to remember as holistic education does not exist in a single form. As mentioned earlier, holistic education can be iden-

tified, like Wittgenstein's "family resemblances," through a collection of characteristics not all of which will always be present, but which, as a collection, are distinct.

The task of examining the thinking in holistic education in Sections I and II seems methodologically *sui generis*, although it is not without parallel. It has a parallel in making sense of movements or styles of thought such as 'romanticism' or 'socialism', and in this sense is similar to an examination of the history of ideas. Yet, the task here seems a bit more complex as the notions central to holistic education are a confluence of several notions from different eras and different disciplines, and have only fairly recently been called 'holistic education'. Thus, while the task is similar to that of asking, "What is romanticism?" or "What is socialism?" it is also quite different for several reasons. Perhaps most notably, movements like 'romanticism' or 'socialism' 1) have fairly distinct historical starting points, 2) have been called 'romanticism' and 'socialism' from fairly early on in their existence, and 3) the main contributors to those movements felt they were engaged in 'romanticism' or 'socialism'. Holistic education has no such luxuries.

Nonetheless, the present task has resonance with Isaiah Berlin's examination of romanticism, fascism, utopianism,⁸ etc., and is therefore a philosophical task in the way it was proposed by Berlin. This book, however, does not attempt to critique the ideas as they appeared in history, as this would not serve to elucidate the nature of present day holistic education.

Like many of the early adherents of 'romanticism' or 'socialism', advocates of holistic education often identify themselves through opposition—what they are against, or what they are not—and their writings are often polemicized. One needs to get beneath the rhetoric (e.g., equality, fraternity, authenticity, naturalness, etc.) to see the characteristics of the fundamental notions. Perhaps the only criteria for the success of this task is analogous to those of psychological or literary interpretation: 1) That its adherents (like the patient in psychotherapy) acknowledge the interpretation as being a fair representation of their experience or view, and 2) That the notions described are reasonably coherent, thereby making sense of the rhetoric and laying it open to criticism.

Despite Section I being about holistic education in general, examples of what is being said will often be taken from the Authors rather than from the literature of holistic education. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Authors as a group are wonderfully articu-

late and took great pains to make their thought explicit. Unfortunately, this does not always characterize the writings of modern holistic educators whose ideas, while often just as valid, are frequently less clear. Secondly, this book is most interested in establishing the *genus* of holistic education, and reference to those who generated its notions (the Authors) seems more useful than any particular modern expressions of those notions. Thirdly, despite my efforts to know as much as possible about the various present-day forms of holistic education, many such forms are in continuous flux, and anything that may be valid at the time of writing may be inaccurate by the time this goes to press.

Sociology was developed as a social science to understand how groups of people and institutions act. Sociology of Education, as a separate branch of sociology came into its own in the latter half of the twentieth century, and probably one of its most controversial and thought provoking proponents was Basil Bernstein. His last work serves the task of this book particularly well in that it serves as a basis for understanding how the institutions of holistic education act. Section III, therefore, stands apart from the more philosophical Sections I and II in that this third section uses the tools of sociology. Section III also stands apart from the first two in that I had the great good fortune of being able to consult with the authority (Basil Bernstein) on many occasions for this book, while no such checking with the six preceding Authors of Sections I and II was possible.

THE EMIC (OR INSIDER'S) PERSPECTIVE

The criteria for success mentioned above are also held by Yvonna S. Lincoln in describing what is required for social research on "nonmainstream concerns and issues" of "individuals and groups...described as marginal..."⁹ Certainly holistic education is, by virtue of it being a form of alternative education, such a nonmainstream group. Clearly, in view of the number of students exposed to some form of holistic education and the dearth of research on holistic education, holistic education has been marginalized; and participants in holistic education usually feel themselves to be outside the mainstream. Lincoln makes the case that marginalized groups are often "defined and circumscribed by texts which take as their point of departure the 'normal'"¹⁰ and, as a consequence, fail to understand or accurately represent the very group they purport to study. Lincoln concludes her remarks with the view that without the views of the marginalized groups,

“we will probably not have a full critique of the social order”¹¹ which impoverishes society as a whole. Lincoln proposes that for the study of such marginalized groups, the emic (insider) perspective is preferable to the etic (outsider) perspective, and that all accounts should seek internal validity through validation by those who are the object of the research.

The philosophic importance of an emic perspective in social science was emphasized by Peter Winch as early as 1958 by making the case that

even if it is legitimate to speak of one’s understanding of a mode of social activity as consisting in a knowledge of regularities, the nature of this knowledge must be very different from the nature of knowledge of physical regularities.¹²

Studying the activities of an engineer, he gives as an example, is not the same as the engineer studying an engine. One must be inside the “mode of social activity” to understand it.

As someone who has worked for more than thirty years in holistic education, speaking with those attracted to it (e.g., parents, students, interested guests, etc.) I believe I can justifiably claim the emic perspective. The school at which I did almost all of my teaching and served as principal was founded by J. Krishnamurti who, along with Rudolf Steiner and Maria Montessori, are the founders of the oldest continually existing schools considered by most to be holistic. The first school founded by J. Krishnamurti that continues to exist was started in 1924. As the Brockwood Park Krishnamurti Educational Centre (the holistic school at which I worked) was the only one founded by Krishnamurti between India and California, and because he resided there for almost six months of the year (during twelve years of my tenure), it attracted a great diversity of people interested in holistic education from all over the world. It was especially a magnet for European interest. This gave me contact with a far greater number and variety of people than a teacher or principal in comparable private schools might enjoy, and demonstrated the extent (both in number and geography) of the growing interest in holistic education.

During my twenty years at Brockwood, I came to know a great many holistic education initiatives. The feeling amongst those involved with such initiatives was similar to those of the staff in my school; namely, that what we were attempting was very experimental and therefore fragile, and the glare of publicity or research was best avoided.

The small experiences of publicity or research, which many of these holistic schools had, reflected Lincoln's contention that marginalized groups see such publicity and research as being unable to accurately represent their views and experiences. Consequently, almost no one outside of these schools knows what such education is thinking or doing. Often even the existence of such schools is unknown to those who live in the same area. Frequently those who work in holistic schools only know in any depth about other schools of the same variety, e.g., Steiner schools of other Steiner schools, Democratic schools of other Democratic schools, etc. Therefore, some work seems needed that would allow holistic education to be located within the field of education as a whole, and which would give a basis (e.g., the family resemblances) for holistic schools to compare and contrast what they think and do which is not tied to the rhetoric of their normal presentation.

Holistic education is, as explained above, not a single initiative, but a broad range of initiatives that share family resemblances. Having witnessed the increase in both variety and number of holistic education initiatives, including journals and university departments dedicated to the subject, it seems clear that an attempt to make coherent what these initiatives are thinking and doing as a generic form of pedagogy is long overdue. An intellectual work is needed for this field in which most people involved have only a sense or 'feel'.

To avoid the dangers of too personal a perspective, I have sought confirmation of my work (as a form of triangulation) with five other people who have a longstanding involvement with holistic education. The confirmation by these individuals (founders of holistic schools, writers on holistic education, holistic school head, and a university professor) has been important to me in satisfying Lincoln's criterion that work on the 'silenced' be felt by them to be an authentic 'voice'.

SOCIAL ISSUES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN HOLISTIC EDUCATION

This book does not deal with many of today's social issues (gender, race, disability, social injustice) which some readers may feel are concerns of holistic education. This omission is partly because such issues do not appear in any illuminative way in the writing of those authors quoted for the intellectual precedents nor do they appear in the sociological analysis of Basil Bernstein referenced in Section III. Some so-

cial issues do appear in the Author's works in ways that were relevant for the time in which they wrote, but present-day readers would not be satisfied by these approaches to such issues. For example: 1) Rousseau addressed the education of girls in ways that are an anathema to most people concerned with the education of girls today, but they were revolutionary for his time; 2) Pestalozzi spent most of his life creating schools for the poor, seemingly out of compassion, and felt their education should be like that of the more advantaged children, but he never addressed corrective measures of economic inequity and social justice; and 3) Bernstein gives attention to the identity constructions of minority groups in his referenced work, but only to describe them—a process activists dismiss by likening it to the description of water for someone drowning. The omission of today's social issues in this book is also partly because these issues form a negligible part of most holistic education literature, a fact that has been repeatedly criticized by a frequent contributor to conferences and articles on holistic education, David Purpel.¹³ Perhaps this is because many supporters of holistic education today believe that 'the greater encompasses the lesser', i.e., that there can be no social justice without a sense of morality, and there can be no morality without an adequate notion of Ultimacy (see page 17); so that education for social justice without a prior education for Ultimacy puts the cart before the horse. Many modern supporters of holistic education also contend that with the respect for the individual which holistic education advocates, education is necessarily sensitive to the situation of each student. Consequently, issues arising from stigma, disadvantage, or personal trauma are met at the level at which each victim must meet them rather than at the level of social activism.

Finally, it also seems important to explain some of the terminology that follows. While the word "man" is used in many quotes and some of the text referring to the quotes, it does not necessarily refer to gender. Rousseau did specifically state that the education he proposes in *Emile* is for boys, although his brief discussion on education for girls makes many similar points. For Rousseau then, "man" sometimes referred to males and at other times to humankind. Pestalozzi and Froebel were concerned with the education of both sexes and very little of their work (and certainly none of their fundamental concepts) distinguishes between genders. In their work, the word "man" does mean "humankind," and as all of the translations of their work predate concerns with sexism in language, and as I wish to rely heavily on quotations in order to allow the Authors to speak for themselves, some of the text in this book may appear to show a similar lack of concern.

This, however, is not true, and efforts are made, whenever it doesn't detract from the Authors, to be sensitive to this important modern issue. There is also use of the word "race" in many of the quotes from Pestalozzi and Froebel, but in all instances they are referring to the human race. The twentieth century Authors, having become sensitized by history to race issues often used the word "specieshood," but this term was not in use at the time of most of the translations of the earlier Authors.

SECTION I

Ultimacy As the Goal of Education

*T*he goal of holistic education is best encapsulated by the term “Ultimacy.” First coined by Paul Tillich,¹⁴ “Ultimacy” as a term has been used by several writers but often in slightly different ways. “Ultimacy” will be used in this book in its broadest sense meaning both: 1) the highest state of being that a human can aspire to, either as a stage of development (e.g., enlightenment), as a moment of life that is the greatest but only rarely experienced by anyone (e.g., grace), or as a phase of life that is common in the population but usually rare in any particular individual’s life (e.g., Maslow’s peak-experience); and 2) a concern or engagement that is the greatest that a person can aspire to (e.g., being in service to something sacred). These two meanings can overlap or intertwine, sometimes causally (e.g., being concerned with the sacred might be seen as bringing about a religious state, or entering an ultimate state might be seen as service to the sacred). This description of Ultimacy does not have the details that many readers might like to see. In this, we are probably best served by Maslow who, describing the many terms modern psychology uses to convey what we are calling Ultimacy, felt that it is not only impossible to define very exactly what is meant by the ultimate state, but that such definitions are also not desirable,

...since a definition which does not emerge easily and naturally from well known facts is apt to be inhibiting and distorting rather than helpful, since it is quite likely to be wrong or mistaken if made by an act of the will, on a priori grounds. Its meaning can be *indicated* rather than defined, partly by positive pointing, partly by negative contrast, i.e., what it is *not*.¹⁵

More details will emerge in the following chapters with which the reader can flesh out this rather austere description.

The term “Ultimacy” is not just convenient for our purposes. It also seems necessary to use a slightly unorthodox word for the following reasons: A term is needed that denotes both an end-state and a process, not just interchangeably but also as both.¹⁶ A term is also needed that can encompass religious as well as psychological notions. Ultimacy for holistic education is often at least quasi-religious, if not overtly religious, and yet usually the notions belong to no particular religion. Many aspects of Ultimacy also fall within theories of human development, and are therefore psychological. Finally, most terms in common usage that denote what we are calling Ultimacy are already part of a tradition (often very rich) that has promoted one particular view. Such common terms are, therefore, connotatively loaded in a way that is not helpful to the present task of creating a new understanding.

NOTIONS OF ULTIMACY IN HOLISTIC EDUCATION

That there are notions of Ultimacy in most (if not all) cultures and subcultures seems a fairly simple assertion. Without such notions it would be impossible for a culture to have heroes, saints or human exemplars, and most (if not all) cultures seem to have at least one of these. The nature of a culture’s exemplars reveals a great deal about that culture. They indicate the values in that culture (e.g., exemplars by virtue of wisdom, goodness, religiosity, physical beauty, abilities in war, capacities to accumulate wealth indicate that those qualities are valued), as well as have pronounced determining effects on that culture (i.e., members of a culture tend to emulate their exemplars). It has been argued that our modern Western cultures have particularly impoverished exemplars.¹⁷ Whether the details of the Authors’ notions or the various holistic education notions of Ultimacy are ‘true’ cannot be a subject for this book, even though such ‘truth’ was of great concern to

the Authors and their critics and is of equal concern to the various proponents of holistic education.

In most forms of holistic education and in all of the Authors' writings, there is a fusion of ends and means, as will be evident in all the aspects of Ultimacy examined in the following pages. It is similar to the fusion that is sometimes found in religions (e.g., an act is "charitable" only if performed in a "charitable" way, doing "good" is being "good," etc.). As such, notions of Ultimacy often bridge (or perhaps blur) the distinction between the process of achieving the endpoint, the experience of the endpoint, and the endpoint itself.

THE IMPORTANCE GIVEN TO ULTIMACY IN HOLISTIC EDUCATION

Even if all that has been said of Ultimacy above is true, one could rightly ask, "What difference does it make? Can't we just get on with living and ignore Ultimacy? There seem to be many adherents of religions (who therefore accept, at least implicitly, notions of Ultimacy) who don't appear to give Ultimacy that much importance in their daily living; why does holistic education give Ultimacy such importance in daily life?" These questions, indeed, *should* be asked as all the Authors felt that achieving or approaching Ultimacy is not only arduous but often onerous. For example, "He [Jung] liked to quote Thomas á Kempis to the effect that suffering is the horse which carries us fastest to wholeness."¹⁸ Some modern notions of Ultimacy initially appear to contend that approaching Ultimacy is not arduous or onerous but rather "natural" and effortless. Yet, usually upon questioning as to why, then, is Ultimacy so rarely achieved, the answer (echoing Rousseau) is that what is "natural" and therefore *should* be effortless is corrupted, constrained, or prevented by social or cultural forces (like conditioning). In this argument, the arduous and onerous qualities are simply displaced to being what is necessary to counter these inhibiting factors, but they are nonetheless present.

If it is true that achieving or approaching Ultimacy is onerous or arduous yet necessary, then the importance of achieving or approaching Ultimacy can only lie in the view that *not* doing so is somehow worse. If *not* achieving or approaching Ultimacy is worse than achieving or approaching it, then it must be worse for our health, our psyches, our "spirits," our material success, something completely outside

of ourselves but which affects us (e.g., the environment, society), or for some combination of these. If our well-being (of health, psyches, etc.) is what gives importance to Ultimacy, then either: 1) there is something about the nature of well-being that is best served by approaching Ultimacy, despite its arduous or onerous nature (like the well-being of physical fitness requires arduous and, some might say, onerous exercise), or 2) there is something about human nature which requires Ultimacy, and without it our natures or purposes are thwarted with subsequent suffering of some sort. The first position, which seems to be held by many people today, begs the questions as to why approaching Ultimacy serves well-being. The answer to this could lie in the second proposition, which was adopted by all the Authors.

In this second view Ultimacy is seen as central to human nature so that ignoring it is to ignore a major (perhaps *the* major) and integral part of ourselves. From this it follows that if we do not develop Ultimacy, we do not develop into what we are meant to be—we never develop fully, but remain only partial entities. This would be analogous to an acorn seedling (a metaphor used by both Pestalozzi and Froebel) always being cut or lacking the nutrients and never becoming more than some small bush. The acorn never becomes what it was intended to be, never plays out its natural part in the environment, and never comes to full fruition. Normal healthy development is seen as thwarted without Ultimacy and the result is deformity, sickness, stunted growth, and/or chronic flaw. If success in human life means achieving what we were meant to achieve or the most we are capable of achieving, then success in life is blocked with such stunted growth. It is acknowledged that achieving some worldly success may be advantaged by such mal-development (hence the deliberately stunted growth in the past of people destined to be chimney sweeps or jockeys); however, in what the Authors consider to be success at what it means to be a human being, such lack of development is a hindrance. Hence, to approach being a saint or a hero of virtue (as opposed to heroes of race tracks, chimneys, war, or making money), with all the “healthy” success that is consequent to that approach, requires a concern for Ultimacy. There is a social aspect to this position. For those who give primacy to Ultimacy, full human development is seen as not only needed for an individual, but for society as a whole. Societies need fully developed humans, because it is the heroes of virtue (rather than the heroes of any function, e.g., sweeping chimneys or conducting war) who are seen as the well-spring of cultural and social renewal.

In these issues the Authors seem to have ignored or simply denounced a contention made by Hume in his “Treatise on Human Nature” (and supported by many subsequent philosophers) that an *ought* cannot be derived from an *is*; that what is desirable for humans cannot be discerned from facts about their nature. It is only Maslow who directly addresses this issue even slightly (but without mentioning Hume) and might provide a perspective that at least puts this issue aside if not resolves it. (See the discussion on page 184.) This is an important point for most proponents of holistic education, because they usually start with claims about the nature of people (either from experiences of ‘self-discovery’ or from conviction) and from such claims move to views of Ultimacy.

The nature of the importance given to Ultimacy by the different Authors reveals characteristics of their notions of Ultimacy that are often only implicit. Sometimes one gets the impression that, for the Authors, these characteristics are self-explanatory (e.g., for Froebel, Ultimacy had a direct connection to Christian salvation—which was not true for the modern Authors), while for other Authors there is the impression that explicating their notions of Ultimacy is a distraction from their educational concern. Aside from the above generalizations, it is difficult to make a more substantive case for the importance of Ultimacy without first establishing more about human nature and the characteristics of human well-being, as well as establishing some of the characteristics of Ultimacy that correspond to these.

ULTIMACY IN RELATION TO VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE

While there is reason to assume that other entities may share aspects of Ultimacy with humans (e.g., plants and animals in the wild faithfully follow “nature’s call”—one of Rousseau’s aspects of Ultimacy¹⁹), Ultimacy *in toto* is seen as uniquely human. It is not, however, just being unique to humans that gives Ultimacy its normative function (humans are also the only entities that drive cars, play violins, etc.). Ultimacy is seen as describing the best, the most, the finest, etc., which *only* humans can be; the maximum development of those capacities that together make up a human being. As such, Ultimacy defines what it means to be human for the Authors; which, however, does not imply

that humans, as they usually live, achieve the best, the most, etc. Instead of defining the human condition as it is daily lived by most people, Ultimacy is seen more as an end point on a continuum of qualities along which humans live. However, as approaching Ultimacy is seen as generating well-being, and as all species are seen as naturally tending towards their well-being, Ultimacy ends up as the goal towards which all people are naturally drawn. By establishing the goal of humanity, Ultimacy also indicates the trajectory of a purposeful and natural development, and hence its importance for education.

This understanding of human nature goes against the dominant traditional view of the Western world. If Ultimacy defines the goal 1) toward which humans are naturally going, 2) is natural to humans (at least as a potential if not a latency), 3) is driving the force of development of our species, and 4) is objectively and unequivocally good (as it is seen by the Authors); then it follows that humans are naturally good and tending toward the good, and not sinful and tending toward evil. Furthermore, if goodness is innate, then humans are not dependent on intervention from any outside agent (either metaphysical or human) to have contact with goodness or Ultimacy. For many, it naturally follows that a person need only listen to or be sensitive to that which is within. Such listening and sensitivity is usually seen as an individual activity that cannot be engaged in for one person by someone else. The question then arises, "Will everyone who hears correctly and senses accurately, hear and sense the same thing?" The answer, according to the Authors and most forms of holistic education, seems to be "yes" and "no." There are general features of Ultimacy which all people have in common (e.g., discovering more fully who one is), but each person is also unique (e.g., each person's talents are different); therefore what each person discovers is both the same and different. This militates against education to fit an externally derived model of who a person *should* be, and sees the teacher as helping students find and actualize who they *are*. The Authors, in different ways, contend that this point has implications for questions of authority, freedom and the social order, as well as for damage to full human development which they all felt is associated with prescribed learning.

There are two important implications of this perspective of Ultimacy in relation to human nature. These implications are usually only implicit in much holistic education literature, and just as usually explicit in all the Authors.

1) As Ultimacy refers to some absolute or end point, if the challenges of Ultimacy are satisfied, then the lesser challenges are seen as

automatically satisfied. It amounts to saying that the greater encompasses the lesser (e.g. by understanding the way a whole engine works, one understands the role each separate part plays). The converse is not true; taking care of the lesser things does not necessarily add up to taking care of the greater ones. This may take the form of understanding the greater things so that lesser things can be undertaken more meaningfully (if not, in fact, better) which, in turn, makes a greater contribution to the performer's well-being as well as society's. There is also an implication that the more the whole is understood, the easier it is to make sense of the parts. In this there is a similarity to Systems Theory and Gestalt Psychology.

2) Ultimacy is seen as being reflected in what we might think of as primary human values (e.g., compassion, integrity, etc.) and these values are always good. There are also secondary human values (e.g., efficiency, hard work, etc.) that can and should be good, but are not necessarily so as they are context dependent. However, secondary values in association with primary values ensure that the secondary values are good (e.g., with compassion, efficiency will not be ruthless, which it might otherwise be). This implies that even the smallest of human or social activities must be approached with Ultimacy in mind, and by extension, with reference to education, that all education must be approached at the level of Ultimacy rather than at more superficial levels. The Authors do not suggest that what one might call non-ultimate concerns can be neglected (i.e., learning a skill or technique does have its own importance), only that, without Ultimacy, non-ultimate concerns will most likely have very little meaning (e.g., learning to write beautifully but having nothing to say).

ULTIMACY AS AN ASPECT OF RELIGIOUSNESS

As discussed above, the Authors saw Ultimacy as having extreme importance in people's lives—perhaps (after the needs of survival) penultimate importance. Mention has been made in the discussion above about the religious nature of some notions of Ultimacy, and this calls for further elaboration. To pursue this, a distinction needs to be made between *religions* and *religiousness*.

The Authors all felt that religions (as generally practiced, and even generally conceived) are too removed from the religiousness they felt is an aspect of Ultimacy. Consequently, the Authors (in different ways and to different extents) felt the need to create new senses of reli-

giousness to get away from the inadequacies of traditional religions, including the limitations and conflicts they saw generated by and inherent in religions.

The new senses of religiousness the Authors discuss, however, are in all cases claimed by the Authors not to be new at all, but to be closer to the religiousness that lies at the origins of the “great and true” religions; a religiousness which has been forgotten, lost, or corrupted over time. As such, they felt that they were not being schismatic or contradicting the truths of existing religions, simply being truer to them than convention. This is probably the claim of most heretical and schismatic movements in history.

Such sentiments are certainly evident in many holistic education contentions having to do with what is usually described as “spiritual.” Many proponents of the “spiritual” in holistic education eschew attempts to clarify or define too exactly what they mean by that term. They often claim that such attempts narrow or pervert a *sense* of what is “spiritual” into an *idea* of what is “spiritual,” a trap that has corrupted most religions. In this they are true descendents of the Authors.

The early Authors distinguished *religiousness* from *religion* by allying themselves with what they believed to be the divine in nature—what they took to be naturally divine, and therefore in existence before humans. All of the early Authors are lamentably vague on exactly what they meant by *divine*, but we can deduce from their work that they believed the divine to be inherent in humans as it is inherent in all of nature. The divine seemed to have been for these early Authors more evident in nature than in people, although perceiving the *divine within* was the responsibility of each individual. The twentieth century Authors allied themselves with that which is in individuals that can sense, experience, or perceive the divine. The aspect of humans that can sense the divine is, in itself, seen as related to that which is divine—which these later Authors generally see as associated with the psyche or consciousness. This aspect amounts to the manifestation in humans of the divine which acts as a bridge to that which is divine and not in humans.

As the Authors claimed they were concerned with that which lies at the origins of all religions, and that which is in humans that is related to the divine, they made universal claims which they felt are beyond the limitations of time and place inherent in religions.

Holistic education’s current attempts to also make claims about *religiousness* that is beyond any single *religion* have a new imperative. Our world is seen as having become so global and so pluralist that a person

versed in only one expression of religious values is viewed as ethically and metaphysically inarticulate, and this is a potential problem. Religious wars are seen as wars over expressions rather than over fundamental “truths.” Holistic education often promotes what some have called “secular-religiousness”—“secular” in that no religion is followed, but “religious” in that what is “sacred,” or “divine,” or “spiritual” is given great importance. Any ritual, ceremony, rite or icon from any religion has equal importance to those of any other religion or to any created by participants themselves. The importance of ritual, ceremony, rite or icon comes from the role these play in helping an individual approach Ultimacy rather than from their relation to dogma. Consequently, an icon created by an individual that plays a significant role in what that individual perceives to be an experience of Ultimacy is far more important than a culturally revered icon that plays no such role. To proponents of any single religion, this seems like heresy, a problem faced by all the Authors.

All of the Authors stated or implied that they came to their notions of religiousness from their own experiences and not from speculation, belief, or persuasion. It was a direct experience of religiousness that they felt gave them their authority to speak about it. Furthermore, they felt that other people (for some Authors, all other people) can experience this religiousness themselves. Such universality of potential acquisition was fundamental to the Authors, and is fairly common in holistic education—no one is inherently more likely to have a religious experience, and no single approach to Ultimacy which is suitable for one person is necessarily suitable for another.

An important aspect of the religiousness of Ultimacy rests in the notions of wholeness or oneness that are seen to lie at the origins of humanity. These notions seem to exist in three general forms:

1) Chronological notions. These presume that there was a time in history when people lived in wholeness or oneness. This historic state is our original state and, as such, is truer to our natures than the non-whole or multiplicity of states in which we currently generally live. This is supported especially by Rousseau and Pestalozzi.

2) Etiological notions. These claim that our individual origins, or each of our first causes, lie in a non-manifested state (or pre-manifestation state) of oneness or wholeness (e.g. God, Atman, etc.) and that we become fragmented either at birth or soon thereafter. This view was principally held by Froebel, Pestalozzi and Jung.

3) Ontological notions. These argue that wholeness or oneness was, is and remains the foundation of our being and therefore the

fundamental state of our being; we just don't generally know it or live it. Jung, Maslow and Rogers expressed this point of view.

These categories are not mutually exclusive (as indicated by some Authors being listed in more than one category). For example, both Jung and Maslow were fascinated by the religiousness of pre-modernized indigenous peoples which they felt revealed the religiousness of the pre-modern world and, therefore, of the major religions (which all have pre-modern origins). This would be a chronological notion which Jung and Maslow do not otherwise display. Nevertheless, the primary thrust of the notions of wholeness or oneness of the Authors do, in the main, fall into one, or at most two, categories. In most holistic literature concerned with "spirituality" all three of these notions are generally conflated.

As the state of wholeness or oneness is seen as more original, truer and more authentic than non-whole or non-one states, and as people who experience such states confirm this perspective (as the Authors themselves attest), it naturally follows that there is a value in regaining, retaining, or re-perceiving such wholeness or oneness. This is usually spoken of with words that derive from *union* (e.g., unity, unite, unification, unison, etc.) or in terms that connote an ending of fragmentation (that results in union). These notions seem to exist in two forms:

1) Unification *of*. This involves the unification of different parts or aspects; e.g., faculties (Rousseau, Pestalozzi), "head, heart, and hand" (Froebel), the conscious and unconscious (Jung), feeling and thinking (Maslow and Rogers).

2) Unification *with*. This involves the unification of the individual with something outside of themselves or that is part of a larger self; e.g., with God (Froebel, Pestalozzi), with humanity at large (all of the Authors), *Unus Mundus* (Jung, Maslow).

In all cases, the wholeness or oneness that results from the unification conceived was seen by the Authors as an aspect of Ultimacy and as a form of religiousness. This unification for advocates of holistic education is even implied in the word "holistic" and which is often spelled "wholistic."

There is a complexity in examining notions of union which stems from the fact that terms deriving from "union" exist as nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Consequently, these terms describe states of being, actions, and qualities; and the relationships between these are anything but easily enunciated. For example, there are claims that the pre-existing unity thought to exist within a person must be seen by the person in order to bring about unification. One might ask, "If unity or whole-

ness already exists, what new unity or wholeness is there after such unification?" Similarly, there is thought to be a oneness of the universe, yet people seeing that they are one with the universe are seen as bringing about a oneness in themselves. Again, this can be seen as paradoxical. Although there are such paradoxes (which have been dealt with in some traditional esoteric literature), there are not necessarily any substantive contradictions. Close readings of the Authors' works show them often deliberately resolving these potential contradictions. The problems arise partly because there seem to be aspects, or what might be thought of as levels, of union (e.g., oneness with family, society, or humanity; a consciousness of unity is seen as different from the inherent unity that exists without that consciousness, etc.), and partly because of the problems inherent in any discussion in which ends and means are not entirely distinguishable.

What Needs to Be Learned

*I*t seems safe to say that education is about learning and that learning involves the acquisition of knowledge. However, as Rousseau said, we can't know everything, we can't even know everything that is known to other people, so we need to choose what knowledge to acquire. It follows from this that we need to ask if all knowledge is of the same nature and, if not, do the different kinds of knowledge have different values? The answer to the first question for the Authors was clearly no; all knowledge is not the same.

One thing that distinguishes the Authors is that they did not categorize knowledge by its contents or by the mental processes that different contents require, unlike many modern philosophers of education. Knowledge of numbers was not seen by the Authors as different in any important sense from knowledge of words. However, the Authors did distinguish knowledge on the basis of how and why it is acquired.

The Authors and holistic education have two kinds of knowledge which they feel have preeminent importance: experiential knowledge and competence. Conceptual clarity about these two forms of knowledge was only clearly enunciated in the last half of the twentieth century, so that the early Authors and holistic educators have struggled to explain (often with limited success) what they mean. To understand, therefore, what holistic education feels needs to be learned, we must take the time to fully understand these two concepts of knowledge.

EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE

The Authors considered knowledge acquired from experience to be fundamentally different from knowledge acquired through abstractions or representations. Consequently, knowledge of how to sail a boat and knowledge of how to ride a bicycle, if both sets of knowledge are acquired only from books, are seen as fundamentally the same; while knowledge of how to sail a boat from a book is seen as fundamentally different from the same knowledge contents when acquired through experience. In holistic education this distinction is sometimes made using terms such as “authentic learning,” “situated learning,” or “experiential learning.”

One of the claims made for experience is that it is the only way in which some kinds of knowledge can be acquired. While it is easy to understand this for some mundane examples (e.g., knowledge of colors²⁰), it is more difficult to understand it for others. Knowing love may be a good example. A person may know *about* love from books, movies, other people’s accounts, etc.; but they can only know *of* love from experiencing it. While this distinction is made by a few modern philosophers (e.g., John Wilson) it is as common in holistic education as it is foreign to mainstream education. What gives this distinction such importance for holistic education is the perception that experiential knowledge has a relation to Ultimacy. Such a relationship of knowledge from experience to Ultimacy is certainly made by the Authors—the “the divine within,” “compassion,” “*Unus Mundus*,” “Being,” etc., can only be known from experiencing them. As Ultimacy for holistic education has extraordinary importance, and most knowledge needed for Ultimacy can only be gained through experience, experiential knowledge as a class of knowledge assumes great importance; and this begins to answer the question as to the relative value of different kinds of knowledge for holistic education.

Experiential knowledge usually also distinguishes itself from the types of knowledge found in mainstream education on the basis of why that knowledge is acquired. An impulse to learn arising from within the learner (e.g., out of interest, or need) was seen by the Authors as resulting in a fundamentally different kind of knowledge from that which is acquired due to a secondary motivation (e.g., a reward or fear of punishment), even though both kinds of knowledge may ostensibly appear similar in the description of their contents. Consequently, knowledge of how to measure the angles of a triangle learned out of curiosity was seen by the Authors as fundamentally different from the same

knowledge acquired in order to pass a test. This is partly due to the way in which curiosity is seen. Curiosity is not seen as generally being about disjointed information, but is instead interwoven with aspects of a student's life or world that have meaning to the student. Therefore, in the example above, curiosity about the angles of a triangle comes because a student wants *to do* something with that information or that information is part of some larger understanding that has meaning for the student. As such, it is part of the child's experience of the world.

The ascendance of experience (over the representative) for holistic educators is often justified by them in terms which clearly echo the early Authors whose position was seen to have been at least partly a "revolt against the traditions of the Renaissance or Revival of Learning ... [which] had led to the enthronement, in all schools, of *book knowledge*."²¹ For Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel, book knowledge is not knowledge that happens to be in books, but rather knowledge acquired from books. It is knowledge acquired from representations of things, rather than from direct experience of the things themselves. For the Authors, as well as for many holistic educators, "the word is not the thing,"²² and to know the words which represent something is not the same as experientially knowing that thing itself. Because representative or abstracted knowledge was seen by the Authors as removed from the actual world (by virtue of its representative nature), it is not only different from knowledge that stemmed from "engaging with, and constructing, the world,"²³ it also plays a different role in life, and consequently has a very different value.

The values of the different kinds of knowledge seem derived from two criteria: the relation of the kind of knowledge to Ultimacy, and the usefulness of the knowledge in meeting the challenges of living. As mentioned briefly above, some knowledge necessary for Ultimacy can only be acquired from experience (e.g., Pestalozzi's "divine within," Maslow's "Being-knowledge," etc). Another kind of knowledge that is important for Ultimacy can be categorized as knowledge of the use of capacities required for Ultimacy (e.g., the capacities to see, sense, and listen 'within'—to either the divine or the psychological; being present or the capacity to only "exist where we are"²⁴). It could be claimed that these are capacities rather than knowledge of the use of capacities, but 'competence' as a knowledge concept (as elucidated by Basil Bernstein, described below) bridges this seeming divide.

Experiential knowledge was also more valuable for the Authors because they perceived it as having greater pragmatic value. Even though knowledge from experience and knowledge from representations may

appear to be the same on the basis of their contents (e.g., how to sail a boat from experience or from books) the Authors stated or implied that knowledge which originates in life can move to abstractions or concepts and then easily find application in experience again; whereas knowledge acquired from abstraction is difficult to apply to life, tending to remain only as abstractions. Therefore, all abstractions used to communicate knowledge (e.g., books, maps, numbers, and even words) were eschewed by the Authors for experiences that could lead to the same knowledge content. Modern holistic educators find support for this in the work of Montessori, Dewey, Piaget, and constructivist learning theory in which children are given materials and opportunities to learn something specific, but are left to discover what there is to learn rather than instructed in what to learn. It is only after learning from experience has occurred that the knowledge should be articulated by the teacher; a process which adds a representational knowledge dimension to the experiential knowledge base.

Of course, few holistic educators and none of the Authors would deny that children must be prepared to function in society, which implies acquiring certain academic skills and non-experiential knowledge. Some knowledge simply cannot be learned experientially (e.g., the square root of three). However, apart from Jung who seems not to have addressed this issue, all the Authors believed that such knowledge is of a much lower order than either experiential knowledge or competence; and they implied, if not stated, that acquiring representational knowledge occurs easily if the kind of learning they cared most for is given priority. It is a case of the greater encompassing the lesser.

COMPETENCE

The second kind of knowledge that holistic education promotes is called competence, and has been most effectively discussed by Basil Bernstein. This kind of knowledge should not be confused with what commonly passes by that name but which Bernstein feels is nothing more than a collection of generalized skills and which, therefore, would be more accurately called "generic performances."²⁵ A more complete discussion of competence occurs in Section III, but a small introduction is required here in order to understand holistic education.

Bernstein claims that competence as a knowledge concept solidified in the 1960s as a result of the work of Chomsky, Piaget, Lévi-Strauss, Garfinkle, Dell Hymes, and Wittgenstein.²⁶ However, the con-

cept is evident, at least in an embryonic form, in the work of all the Authors and so goes back two hundred years before Bernstein feels the concept was explicated. In brief, competence refers to knowledge which is “the acquisition of...procedures”²⁷ rather than facts or ideas, and is of a general nature. Bernstein claims that competence has three essential characteristics: 1) it contains “procedures for engaging with, and constructing the world,” 2) it is “intrinsically creative and tacitly acquired in informal interactions,”²⁸ and 3) it adheres to five elements of social logic described by Bernstein (and discussed beginning on page 218.). The examples Bernstein gives of competence as a form of knowledge are the linguistic competence of Chomsky, the cognitive competence of Piaget, the cultural competence of Lévi-Strauss, the members/social competence of Garfinkle, and the communicative competence of Dell Hymes. If holistic education also promotes a form of competence, it will be necessary to describe what kind of competence that is.

For Bernstein, competence as a kind of knowledge is an important consideration as he wishes to distinguish what he feels are two very different kinds of education: competence based pedagogy and performance based pedagogy. Interestingly, all of the Authors (and subsequent supporters of holistic education) similarly contrast their approach to pedagogy with the mainstream pedagogy promoted in their time and place. Essentially they saw mainstream education as performance based pedagogy, in which students are expected to master certain performances (of reading, writing, math, etc.) with the display of performance as the basis for assessment. Competence based pedagogy involves the much more difficult to assess “procedures for engaging with, and constructing the world” which are “intrinsically creative and tacitly acquired in informal interactions.”²⁹

It may be easier for the reader to grasp the difference between performance based pedagogy and competence based pedagogy with the use of a metaphor. Consider the traditional education of Australian aboriginal children. Their instruction was informal but rigorous. It was acquired tacitly by engaging with and constructing their world aided by adults. The procedures they needed to learn were not broken up into performances which were abstracted from real life and learned separately. Assessment was not of a display of performances. Rather, when the child came of age and the adults thought the child was ready, the aboriginal child went alone into the desert on a “walk-about” for six months or longer. Survival was proof that the child had learned what was needed, and the child “graduated” into adulthood.

While all the Authors and the major branches of holistic education promote some procedures unique to their particular vision of competence, there is a core of procedures that most of them seem to share. This core of procedures unites the Authors and unites holistic education, and it is this core of procedures which makes the competence of holistic education distinct from that of Chomsky, Piaget, etc. While these procedures need to be discussed separately, it is a mistake to see them as separate. The Authors certainly saw these procedures as interdependent, often as two faces of the same coin. While each Author (and many forms of holistic education) has slightly different versions of these procedures, they generally have the following characteristics in common:

1) *The exercise of good judgment.* This involves a complex and subtle relationship to the world. It involves being able to see clearly the matters about which a judgment is to be made as well as the context of those matters. It also requires having sufficiently comprehensive and coherent values which serve as a basis of judgment. The exercise of good judgment also involves the quality of “resilience,” an ability to make good judgments in bad circumstances. It has only been in the last ten years that the word “resilience” has been used to describe a quality or capacity that educators and child psychologists have tried to define and study. Nevertheless, versions of this capacity have long been recognized (and called by a variety of other names) and have been a central concern of holistic education. Resilience involves being able to face setbacks, overcome obstacles, persevere when success is not in sight, etc. This quality is evident in certain people, seems to be acquired, and should be a concern of education since dealing successfully with the substantive challenges of life seems to require it. All of the Authors gave it (by other names) prominence in their view of what education should help children learn, and saw it as related to having good judgment.

2) *The ability to be free.* While there are certain political connotations to the freedom promoted by the Authors and holistic education, it is not political freedom that is most highly valued. Freedom from psychological authorities is generally discussed in far greater depth, and this generally includes freedom from destructive conditioning, habits, and opinions (even one’s own). Consequently, there is a correlation between such freedom and what is often translated as “liberation” in many Eastern religious texts.

3) *The ability to discover and refine values.* The emphasis in this is on “discovering” and “refining.” To simply absorb or take on the values

of another person, religion, culture, etc. is thought of as counterproductive. Values are not thought of as arbitrary or relative, but as rooted in either the nature of humans, life or something more universal. As values are thought of as having such roots, they are able to be discovered, and being discovered have a far greater meaning to the discoverer. Also, acquisition of values through discovery avoids the impingement of freedom which the imposition of values (through training, conditioning, etc.) necessarily involves.

Learning to love was seen by all the Authors and is generally acknowledged by holistic education to be a cornerstone to discovering and refining values. While romantic love played an important and separate part in Rousseau's approach to education, for the most part holistic educators promote love in a more generalized form. Love of one's family, of children, and of fellow humans (or even all other sentient beings as in Buddhism), and compassion are seen as indispensable to a real understanding of the world and of oneself. Many of the early holistic educators presaged a modern understanding of social development: that love is related to empathy, and empathy is necessary for social development and an internalization of values needed for prosocial behavior.

As will be seen later, love is also the foundation for the pedagogic relationship of holistic education; rather than the respect, admiration or even fear many teachers have tried to engender.

4) *Meta-learning*. This refers to learning how to learn, and more specifically, learning how oneself, as an individual, learns. People are seen as learning in a variety of different ways, and one needs to understand one's own learning processes in order to be responsible for learning. This is seen as essential for becoming an independent learner and the much-trumpeted 'life long learning'. It is only by being responsible for one's own learning that a person is seen as being able to learn judgment, have freedom, discover and refine values, etc.

5) *Social-ability*. This is not sociability and does not indicate conviviality. It refers to ability in social contexts, with "ability" indicating successful negotiation of the context while simultaneously living according to one's greatest truths (i.e., approaching Ultimacy). Social-ability also does *not* refer to, what are often called, "social skills," which generally implies artfulness with the semiotics of a culture and therefore great immersion in that culture. The Authors indicated that social-ability implies being *in* a society but not *of* it; a distinction which the Authors felt most people do not maintain. Many of the Authors, when they indicated a stage of development in which such social-ability can

be learned, felt this is learned later in life than the other characteristics of competence. Before it is learned, the Authors felt, a child must be protected from being overwhelmed or taken in by the very social elements through which they will eventually need to learn to negotiate with integrity. Social-ability seems to have features that are unique amongst the other procedure of holistic education competence. It is the only procedure that is not predominantly intrapsychic, referring instead to a person's relationship with the extrapsychic. However, that relationship was perceived by the Authors to be determined by the intrapsychic. As such, social-ability is seen as determined by the other characteristics previously listed.

As these core procedures of a competence envisaged by the Authors and holistic education have similarities (though they can not be said to be identical), it seems appropriate to propose a term to denote this particular kind of competence. All of these views of competence are linked to common notions of "wisdom" and are seen as significant to approaching Ultimacy. For this reason, it would seem reasonable to call this form of competence "sagacious competence," indicating its nature and to distinguish it from the other competences (e.g., Chomsky's, Piaget's, etc.) mentioned above. It is the Authors' link between sagacious competence and Ultimacy that gives their work importance for today's holistic educators to the extent that it is those aspects of the Authors' work (i.e., the link between sagacious competence and Ultimacy) that are most referred to in holistic education literature. None of the Authors are adopted completely by holistic education today, and the list of what holistic educators do not try to emulate in the Authors' work would be long.

More detailed discussion of the distinction between performance based pedagogy and competence based pedagogy is reserved for Section III. It must suffice for now to say that the five procedures of holistic education competence listed above cannot be construed as performances; cannot be learned through any combination of skills, facts, or concepts; and cannot be assessed through any single or series of performances. They were seen as being learned only through experience, and exposure to them through representations (e.g., maxims, precepts, aphorisms, etc.) prior to an experience of them was thought by the Authors to inhibit the development of competence. As a consequence, pedagogy based mainly on the transfer of information, skills or concepts, was seen as more than merely inadequate; it was seen as inhibiting the needed learning. While there can be experiential knowledge which does not lead to sagacious competence (e.g., learning how

to ride a bicycle), the Authors insisted that sagacious competence cannot be acquired without experiential knowledge. Therefore, the relationship between experiential knowledge and competence seems in significant ways to be synergistic; they derive their importance to the question of “what needs to be learned?” from their existence as a compound entity that has relevance to approaching Ultimacy.

What Facilitates the Needed Learning

*F*rom the examination of what holistic education believes needs to be learned, the question naturally follows: “How does such learning come about?” For the Authors this is not a question about what *causes* the needed learning, as the causal dynamic seems rarely to be implied. Rather it is a question of what *facilitates* the needed learning. This distinction is important. The answer to what might facilitate the needed learning seems two-fold, as there are two major categories of facilitating factors: 1) aspects of the students, and 2) aspects of the teachers. Some educators may find it curious that neither facilities nor learning materials are seen by the Authors as necessary to facilitate the needed learning, although two of them (Pestalozzi and Froebel) saw some materials as helpful. There is technically a third factor that facilitates the needed learning; namely, family members, especially mothers. This is especially marked in the work of the early Authors as they were writing at a time when there was very little early childhood education except by mothers. There was no public education and only the wealthy could turn their children over to nannies and tutors. However, what is said of teachers in this analysis is also said of parents and other family members as well, so that leaving out aspects of family as a separate category does not exclude anything important.

In general, most of the aspects of the students that facilitate the needed learning are seen as fixed by nature, while most of the aspects of teachers that facilitate the needed learning are the result of the teachers' agency. The students have inherent learning processes (including stages of development fixed by nature), and intrinsic motivation (also fixed by nature), although the more mature elements of motivation are seen to be partly of the students' agency. Yet even such agency is not entirely left to the students as the Authors see, for the most part, that it is up to the teachers to inspire such motivation.

The aspects of the teachers that facilitate the needed learning are more complex, and for the most part involve both the teachers' understanding, and their acting on such understanding. Teachers are seen as needing to understand four elements: 1) the individual students and their needs, 2) the correct pedagogic process, 3) the correct pedagogic relationship, and 4) the importance of their own self-development. The only aspects of the teachers that facilitate the needed learning that are seen as partially fixed by nature are some subtle and often esoteric elements of the correct pedagogic relationship, although it is within the agency of the teacher to act in ways which engage those aspects.

In examining holistic education there is a frequent conflation of elements. We can't, for example, discuss the learning process without some discussion of the learner. In exploring what facilitates the needed learning, much that is in both of the previous two chapters (Ultimacy and what needs to be learned) is necessarily interwoven. One sees, for example, that one can't very well discuss what facilitates the needed learning without reference to what needs to be learned or what the goal of that learning is. All of the Authors have this same problem, which reflects the holistic nature of their approach to education.

It is in the discussions by the Authors of what facilitates the needed learning that the Authors most frequently juxtaposed their notions of education with what they felt occurred in the mainstream education of their time. For many holistic educators, this is interesting because much of what the Authors were against has remained part of mainstream education to this day. The Authors often seem to use this juxtaposition as though they could only fully show what they were for by indicating what they were against. This 'location through opposition' is also true for many people involved in holistic education today; however, unlike the Authors, many in holistic education do not 'positively locate' their pedagogy by spelling out what they are for. To say simply that "we are against grades" or "we are against coercion" doesn't say what is being promoted.

ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING

The Authors claim that the aspects of the students that facilitate the needed learning are inherent. There are two such aspects which all the Authors discuss: 1) an inherent learning process, and 2) inherent motivation. The Authors felt that learning is not an alien activity, but rather a capacity which people are born with and which develops as people mature. The various Authors see both the inherent learning process and inherent motivation slightly differently, and these differences are reflected in different approaches to holistic education, but these differences provide little conflict. Similarly, one can find in a single holistic school the learning process described in Piagetian terms as well as Vygotskyian terms—real differences with no necessary conflict. However, in general the inherent learning process is seen as moving from the simple to the complex, and doing so in stages. Inherent motivation is seen as originating in the simple need to survive and developing through social needs to a “natural” need for Ultimacy (discussed previously).

Inherent Learning Process

All the Authors agree that humans have inherent learning processes which develop until at least early adulthood (with the later Authors contending it is life-long) and that these inherent learning processes can be utilized, ignored, or violated by education. Unsurprisingly, the Authors feel that education should utilize these inherent processes.

While there are some differences between the Authors as to the nature of the inherent learning processes, they agree that wanting to learn is so much a part of being human that it forms part of the definition of what it means to be human. The Authors also seem to agree that the inherent learning processes develop in stages, although they have different descriptions of these stages, and different ages at which the stages occur. This difference in descriptions of the stages has to be seen in the light of the Authors living in very different historical contexts and having different foci. While all of the Authors have Ultimacy as their goal, they focus on different elements in a child's development to identify the stages. Consequently, although the stages of development identified by the Authors differ, they are not contradictory. For example, Rousseau largely identified the ability to form different kinds of concepts (e.g., geometrical vs. historical concepts) as the basis for

the stages of development. Pestalozzi and Froebel agreed with Rousseau but added some abilities to engage in certain kinds of academic operations (e.g., singing, drawing, writing, etc.). Jung, Maslow and Rogers principally identified elements of the developing psyche. Similarly in holistic education, those who look at neurological development see the stages of development differently from those who look at “spiritual” development.

What is agreed upon is that the inherent learning processes follow laws that are both general and particular. The stages of development of the inherent learning process have a sequence that is common for almost all people (i.e., stage one comes before stage two, etc.) and this sequence constitutes a general law. However, the laws are also particular to each individual in that these stages proceed at idiosyncratic paces, and often have idiosyncratic expressions. No two children just because they are of the same age should be expected to have their inherent learning processes at the same stage of development, and no two students whose learning processes are at same stage of development should be expected to express those stages in the same way. Hence, in many holistic schools, students are grouped by perceived learning stage (and, therefore, with a learning process affinity) rather than by chronological age.

Another point of agreement between the Authors is that if either the sequencing or the pacing of the student’s inherent learning processes are violated, damage to the student occurs—perhaps lasting damage. Long before Freud, Froebel warns:

Wounds and lacks in childhood are never recouped and remain wounds. Look to the scars on our own souls to see the truth of this.³⁰

What is important to the Authors is that the inherent learning processes in the students have a chance to develop fully, and all of the Authors contend that how this is to be done cannot be known beforehand. They also seem to agree that any information acquired as knowledge is very much of secondary importance to the development of the learning processes.

From the above it follows that the curriculum planning and grading by age of mainstream education are incompatible with holistic education. What is required instead is a much more tailored form of education that follows and fits the individual child’s development; which all the Authors agree is a far more demanding role for a teacher than that which they perceived to generally exist in mainstream education.

Inherent Motivation

Like the inherent learning processes, the Authors claimed that people are inherently motivated to acquire the needed learning. Also like the inherent learning processes, this motivation can be harnessed or violated, nourished or crippled. The use of secondary motivation (e.g., money, grades, gold stars, public praise, etc.) for all the Authors is either dismissed as ineffectual or denounced as damaging. It is interesting to note the amount of research that supports their view, yet how little impact such research has had on education in general.

From Rousseau's natural *amour de soi* to Maslow's hierarchy of needs and homeostasis, people are seen as being naturally motivated to acquire the needed learning. However, this motivation is seen as being able to operate only under ideal conditions and, unfortunately (due to various reasons depending on the Author), these conditions do not generally exist. These reasons range from Rousseau's belief that man has developed through civilization beyond the reach of natural impetuses and responses, to Maslow's contention that a person's upbringing deafens him to the inner calls.

The conclusion of all the Authors is that the inherent aspects of the students, which should naturally facilitate the needed learning, are no longer sufficient, so that teachers become necessary. There is not unanimous agreement on this conclusion amongst holistic educators. Some (following A.S. Neill) contend that children need only be left to their own devices, and they will naturally come to what is best for them.

ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING

Unlike the aspects of the students that facilitate the needed learning which are inherent, the aspects of the teachers that facilitate the needed learning need to be acquired. The Authors see teachers as needing to acquire different understandings: 1) of students and their needs, 2) of the correct pedagogic practice, 3) of the correct pedagogic relationship, and 4) of the importance of their own self-development.

This topic necessarily intertwines in the Authors' writings with their discussions of Ultimacy, the needed learning, and aspects of the students that facilitate the needed learning. Nevertheless, all the Authors made deliberate efforts to communicate the role of the teachers as all

were involved in teaching teachers (or teaching therapists whose role is educative); therefore all were especially concerned to communicate what they saw as the special role of the teacher in the students' acquisitions of the needed learning.

Teachers' Understanding of Students and their Needs

All the Authors felt that teachers need to understand generalities about students, but they were all adamant that such understanding is only the basis for the more important particular understanding of each student as an individual. The Authors were insistent that education is always of individuals and not of amalgams (e.g., "classes" or "student bodies").

The Authors claimed that each person has an inherent and unique self (at least as a potential or latency). If this is not the case, then the self must be the product of inheritance, or conditioning ("construction," either personal or social), in which case it cannot be related to that which is unconditional (which they all contend is an aspect of Ultimacy). However, if people have unique inherent selves, then it follows that each has a unique form into which that person should develop. Such a unique form, for the Authors, is determined by nature, God, destiny, etc. but never by people. Consequently, any attempt to determine the form into which another person develops is necessarily a corruption. Furthermore, as the unique intrinsic form of everyone is seen as related to the fullest possible development, it is also related to approaching Ultimacy. Consequently, the Authors saw the attempt to determine the form another person should develop into as not just a corruption, but as a sacrilege as well. Other people (e.g., a teacher) may facilitate the development of a student's inherent form or true self, or they can pervert and/or hinder such development.

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process

The teachers' understanding of the correct pedagogic process must obviously be part of what would facilitate the needed learning. Obviously also, from all that has been said, the correct pedagogic process must be determined by the Authors' notions of what needs to be learned and make most use of those aspects of students that facilitate the needed learning.

A distinction needs to be made between notions of a pedagogic *process* and details of a pedagogic *practice*. It is the difference between

the nature of pedagogic activities and the exact form those activities take. Rousseau made this distinction and claimed that the details of practice must vary with each student according to their temperament and context, and were of little importance. He gives the details of his imaginary practice with Emile as examples, but warns that they are not to be imitated blindly. Pestalozzi and Froebel wrote a great deal about both the process and the details of their evolving practices as they were trying to instruct teachers for particular contexts. However, that context no longer exists and it is only their notions of the process that have relevance for holistic education. The modern Authors gave greater emphasis to the processes in their work than to the details of practice. However, all of the Authors felt that the correct pedagogic process was following nature, both human nature in general and the nature of the individual student in particular. All of the Authors also felt that a large part of the correct pedagogic process is simply preventing damage (Rousseau's "negative education") rather than the determining, shaping role they all saw as existing in most approaches to education.

The inherent learning processes are seen as naturally elaborating from the simple to the subtle and complex. The correct pedagogic process must elaborate with the learning process, following it rather than determining it. In this the students are seen as needing to be active co-determiners of the pedagogic practice (and perceive themselves as such) because: 1) such a role facilitates the needed development of certain aspects of students (e.g., responsibility, freedom, self-expression); and 2) it ensures that the pedagogic practice reflects the students' natures, allowing them to unfold. What was important for the Authors is the elaboration of the learning process in the students, not what is learned (although learning what is needed for successful negotiation in society had unquestioned value for them), because it is the elaboration of the learning process that is linked to Ultimacy. Learning something extremely subtle requires a learning process that is extremely subtle. As Ultimacy, for the Authors, requires balance and unity, the learning processes and the pedagogic processes must also be balanced and have harmony as they elaborate. For the Authors this means avoiding over-development in any sphere as the process elaborates. One of the over-developments that all the Authors felt existed in most approaches to the education of their day was an over-emphasis on intellectual development at the expense of the social and emotional. It may surprise some modern holistic educators that this common complaint of theirs has been made for almost two hundred and fifty years.

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Relationship

For holistic education the correct pedagogic relationship is an indispensable part of the correct pedagogic process, yet it is distinct enough to merit a separate discussion. We know from research that certain kinds of mechanical learning, often called training (like the training of animals), can be accomplished with fear. However, for learning that requires internalized understanding, meaning-making, or any kind of creativity, fear cannot be part of the learning process. Not only can fear not be present, but positive feelings of empathy and even affection must exist between the teacher and the student as it is only this kind of relationship which can act as a conduit for our deepest learning. Goethe is often quoted as saying, "We only learn from those we love," and this is echoed by all of the Authors. Besides being a conduit for meaning, affection is also spoken of as providing the security needed for the daring act of really questioning and being vulnerable to new understandings. To "not know" is insecure, but it is also necessary for learning.

Being treated with affection and empathy by a person with far greater social power (e.g., a teacher) is also thought of as the way a student learns to similarly treat others with less social power. As such, the correct pedagogic relationship is seen as laying an important foundation for social life and social justice. The all too common bullying that is found in schools (by the Authors in their day as well as by holistic educators now) is not seen as behavior that is inherent in youth, but as a demonstration of learned social interaction: all too often learned in the pedagogic relationship. The pedagogic relationship is not just part of the context of learning, it is an important part of the content as well.

The correct pedagogic relationship also requires trust in the students' inherent goodness. It would be difficult, at best, to have affection and empathy for an entity seen as inherently evil or sinful (which still exists as a vestige from our medieval European past). It would also be difficult, if not impossible, to give students the freedom they need to unfold into their unique selves (as discussed above) if they can not be trusted. Trust (or distrust) is also seen as generating the same feeling in the other party, and a teacher who isn't trusted is ineffectual.

Part of the way in which teachers show trust is to present themselves honestly (within the bounds of what is socially appropriate), without pretence or affectation. This is much more difficult than it might initially appear. Teaching is a social role; and not "playing" a role,

not projecting an image, not presenting a persona is a real challenge. However, some things can only be learned in relationship, and those things are almost always contained in the relationship (e.g., learning affection from an affectionate relationship, learning to question oneself and being open to change from someone doing those things, etc.). If the pedagogy is to extend beyond the superficial, then the pedagogic relationship must equally extend beyond the superficial.

Unlike many relationships in which the nature of the relationship is seen as the responsibility of all the participants, the correct pedagogic relationship was seen by all the Authors as being only in the purview of the teachers. While this may seem obvious when dealing with infants, the Authors maintained this perspective even for students who are adult.

Teachers' Self-Development

While the Authors all felt that the students' learning processes need to be linked to the correct pedagogic process, they also felt that both of these are linked to the self-development of the teachers. Part of what a student experiences in education is the teacher, and what the student experiences of the teacher is what the teacher actually *is*, not what the teacher pretends or intends to be. It follows for all the Authors that if an important part of the students' experiential learning is their experience of the teachers, then a sure way of improving the nature of the students' learning is to improve the nature of what they experience. This means the improvement of teachers.

Teacher improvement can, however, mean many things. It can mean improvement in teaching skills, and all the Authors advocated this. However, improved teaching skills is not what any of the Authors felt was most important. They all felt that the most significant aspect of teacher improvement was personal development, not unlike the development intended for students.

Notions of self-development for the early Authors seem to revolve mostly around the development of virtue, morals, and religiousness. For the later Authors, notions of the psychological and religious fuse (as seen in the previous discussion on Ultimacy), and notions of development revolve around development of the psyche—a multiplicity of notions of development reflected in various forms of holistic education today. For all the Authors, however, the teachers' self-development was seen as an essential element in the students' education. Like the pedagogic relationship in which the nature of what is commu-

licated is embedded in the nature of the exchange itself, teachers are seen as only being able to accomplish with the students what they are able to accomplish with themselves. This contrasts sharply with training in which the trainer need not be able to accomplish what he is training others to do (e.g., an Olympic swimming coach need not be an Olympic swimmer). There is an implication that, as what needs to be learned is the synergistic compound of experiential knowledge and sagacious competence, teachers should have their own experiential learning of sagacious competence present when engaging with students. The Authors imply that the teachers experiencing their own development is a principal way in which the students (vicariously or by way of empathy) can gain important lessons in development. In its simplest form, this is experiential learning through seeing someone else experience something, but in its more subtle forms this is a communication through sharing experiences in which the teachers directly contribute to the students' development by their own self-development. As love between the students and the teacher is seen by the Authors as a special conduit for certain kinds of learning, so too the teachers' deliberate self-development combined with the natural development of the young generates another important conduit for learning.

Summary of Section I

While the details of what all the Authors felt is the goal of education were different, the notions are all similar in that they can be described by the term “Ultimacy.” These notions seem not to contradict one another so much as reflect the different times in which the Authors lived and wrote. This is seen even in the translations of the same work that appeared at different times (e.g., the earlier translations of Froebel sound more conventionally Christian than later translations of the same piece). Similarly, the different notions of Ultimacy in holistic education often reflect only the culture of their constituency (e.g., Japanese holistic schools versus California holistic schools), current fads (e.g., native American mythology, or EST), or the inclinations of a predominance of the staff (e.g., toward Sufism, or Transcendental Meditation), etc. It is even common for holistic schools to move through a variety of notions of Ultimacy much as an individual might in trying to “find themselves.”

The various notions of Ultimacy are all seen as having great importance by their adherents because Ultimacy is viewed as fundamental to human nature. Humans are seen as constituted so that their well-being (at least psychologically and physiologically if not materially) depends on approaching or achieving Ultimacy. The extent to which a person achieves it is seen by the Authors as determining the extent of that person’s meaningful success in life, or the extent to which that person has succeeded in living meaningfully (an equation most holistic educators would make). This stems from the Authors’ views of “meaning-

ful” and relates to their views of the sacred which, in all cases, is imbedded in a state of being or a religiousness, and not in any particular religion. The latter was felt by the Authors to be bound by time and culture, dogmatic, and (for some) of suspicious origin or intent. Religiousness, on the other hand, was felt by the Authors to be in nature (including human nature), universal, and with no permanent form. The Authors believed that people can come upon religiousness through their own experience (as they felt they had) and that such experiences are ones of unity (wholeness, oneness, or an ending of fragmentation) and harmony or balance. In the twentieth century, Ultimacy within the individual became clearly sited in the psyche, and consciousness was seen as the locus of union, wholeness, and balance that could lead to the universal. Such Ultimacy, because it is related to what is ultimately and universally religious, is beyond the purview of conventional science; and since such Ultimacy is also seen as inherent in human nature, it follows that the study of humans cannot be confined to the limitations of conventional science or logic.

If, as will be shown, the Authors contend that an individual’s relationship to Ultimacy determines that individual’s success in life, then it follows that they would also see Ultimacy as establishing the trajectory of intended development for younger people, and therefore as what should be the principle concern of education. This sets their views of education apart from others who see the principal goal of education as preparation for earning a living, citizenship, or entering a cultural discourse. And this is precisely why the Authors are seen by proponents of holistic education to establish their intellectual precedents. The confluence of the purpose of life and the purpose of education and the link of both with Ultimacy is the cornerstone of holistic education.

The answer to the question, “What does holistic education contend needs to be learned?” is two fold: 1) experiential knowledge, and 2) sagacious competence. Of course, there are also minor answers as well, which some approaches to holistic education would have in common (e.g., the skills necessary for earning a living, relationship skills, etc.) and others which would be unique to a particular approach to holistic education (e.g., Vipassana meditation).

Some things—often the most important—can only be known from experience (e.g., Rousseau’s “man’s estate,” Pestalozzi’s “the divine within,” Jung’s “*Unus Mundus*,” Maslow’s “self-actualization,” etc.). Things which can only be known through representations (e.g., the square root of three, the distance to the moon, etc.) may have pragmatic value,

but they tend not to have as much significance for meaningful daily living or for approaching Ultimacy.

Experiential knowledge was generally seen by the Authors to have greater value than non-experiential knowledge because they saw it as more “real,” “significant,” “meaningful,” “veridical,” etc. The reasons for this greater meaningfulness is that the Authors saw experiential knowledge as: 1) being more easily applicable to life, 2) involving more than just the intellect (i.e., the heart, unconscious, etc.), and 3) resulting from being discovered rather than being received, and therefore connected with more aspects of each learner’s life. These same reasons for the value of experiential knowledge are repeatedly found in the literature of holistic education and are supported by countless anecdotes.

Integrally related to notions of experiential knowledge are notions of self-knowledge. This is partly because it is only through experience that one can know the self, and partly because the self is always what does the experiencing. Perspectives on the nature of self evolved dramatically during the more than two hundred and fifty years that spanned the Authors’ lives,³¹ so it shouldn’t surprise us that there are differences in the Authors’ portrayals of the self. What is surprising are the similarities in their notions. They all felt that the self is essentially inherent and needs to be discovered, not constructed. They also felt that emotional development is an important element of such discovery, partly because emotions were seen as an aspect of the self and partly because the emotions were seen as a gateway to understanding deeper aspects of self. Self-knowledge was also seen as a cornerstone of social development. On the simplest level this is true because people must know themselves to know how they are affected by and affect others. On a more subtle level, the Authors all contended that self-knowledge leads to a lessening of the separation between oneself and others through compassion or a sense of “oneness” with humanity.

Competence is the second form of knowledge which holistic education feels needs to be learned. Competence (as the word is used in this book) is a tacitly acquired compound of procedures. This compound needs to be thought of as a single entity, even though it can be seen to be composed of distinct elements. An example of this is the act of speaking which can be thought of as a single action but which is composed of several elements (e.g., thinking, remembering words, framing sentences, expelling air from the lungs, manipulating the tongue, etc.). The form of competence promoted by holistic education is being called sagacious competence because of its relationship to what has traditionally been thought of as wisdom.

An aspect of both experiential knowledge and competence which has great significance is the manner in which they need to be acquired. Different kinds of knowledge require different forms of acquisition; learning about the atmosphere of Mars can be done by reading a book, while learning how to ride a bicycle cannot be done by reading. Experiential knowledge and competence are such completely different kinds of knowledge to the knowledge that preoccupies mainstream education, that they require a different form of pedagogy; hence the distinction made by holistic educators, all the Authors, and Bernstein between what Bernstein called competence based pedagogy and performance based pedagogy.

The question, “what facilitates the needed learning” rather than “what causes it” avoids causal questions which the Authors eschewed. Like the maxim, “You can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink,” the Authors claimed that a teacher can provide opportunities for meaningful understanding, but can’t make students meaningfully understand. In this regard, the Authors made distinctions between “real” (or situated, concrete, etc.) knowledge and “non-real” (or abstract, representational, etc.) knowledge; between knowing with one’s head and knowing with one’s heart, hand, or, better still, with one’s whole being. This non-causal learning militates against the model of teachers and schools as agents and students as the objects of agency.

Aspects of the students themselves facilitate the needed learning but, this is saying more than that the nature of the vessel determines what can be put into it (e.g., molten metal can’t be put into a porcelain bowl, or fine sand into a rough sieve, etc.). Students have agency in needed learning, and most of what gives them agency is inherent. Students have inherent learning processes and inherent motivation. The inherent learning process is seen as an innate human tendency to absorb information needed for meaningful living, and then to group and characterize such information as generalizations or abstractions. Such a natural formation of abstractions is seen as allowing the application of abstractions to the concrete. An increasing complexity of the learning process (i.e., absorbing information, generalizing, applying generalities to particulars, etc.) develops by stages. While the Authors felt that the sequence in development generally held for everyone, the pacing and expression of stages must, of necessity, be idiosyncratic as everyone is a unique individual.

The motivation which is seen as inherent is intrinsically related to the inherent learning process as this is what motivates the process to absorb the needed learning and organize it. Such motivation (notions

of which were described by all the Authors, from Rousseau's *amour de soi* to Maslow's hierarchy of needs) is part of being human.

Allowing the inherent learning processes and motivation were seen by the Authors as necessary for balanced and natural growth. The imposition of artificial learning processes or motivation (i.e., rewards and punishments) were seen as distorting. To continue the horticultural metaphor favored by the early Authors, a tree artificially stimulated to grow with fertilizers for too long will not have the strength or the root structure to survive when such stimulation is removed or the environment becomes unusually challenging.

Unlike the aspects of the students, the aspects of the teachers that facilitate the needed learning are acquired. What is most important to acquire, however, is understanding not techniques or procedures. In this, the understanding to be acquired by the teachers mirrors the experiential learning and sagacious competence described as that which needs to be learned by the students. While some of what the teachers must understand involves 'head knowledge' (e.g., the stages of development), much of it involves constantly understanding anew, or discovering, the individual student. This constant understanding anew or discovery of the students is seen as important to engage in with the students so that the students can learn to do it by themselves. This militates against trying to determine what a student "should be" (except in the most general terms).

The teachers' understanding of the correct pedagogic process is largely one of preventing damage to the students' inherent learning processes and motivation. It is not a process which has intentions to 'shape'. Like the students' learning processes, it moves from simple to complex. Part of the correct pedagogic process is that the students need to be agents in the process and need to perceive themselves as such. The Authors felt this is the only way students can learn important elements of sagacious competence (e.g., exercising good judgment, freedom, etc.). The correct pedagogic process also ensures balance in development rather than specialization (seen by the Authors as socially sanctioned imbalance).

An essential aspect of the correct pedagogic process is the pedagogic relationship. This is a relationship of mutual affection and empathy, and as such, is part of what needs to be learned. But the pedagogic relationship is a result of what the teacher *is*, which makes the teacher's self-development a major responsibility of the teacher. The Authors all indicate that what a teacher *is* is a large part of what that teacher teaches. A teacher's character is part of what a student experiences,

and in experiential learning, as one wants to deepen what the student experiences, there is a necessary concern for deepening the teacher. As such, the development of teachers both reflects and facilitates what needs to be learned.

SECTION II

*An Analysis of the Ideas
of Holistic Education
Through Examining
Six Founding Authors*

Introduction to Section II

*I*n this section the work of the six Authors who make up the intellectual precedents of holistic education is examined in historical order. No attempt is made at a complete synopsis of their work but only those aspects of their work which have relevance for holistic education. Consequently, for each author, there is an examination only of the notions explicated in the previous section. Hence, for each Author there is an examination of their notion of Ultimacy including the relationship of Ultimacy to human nature and Ultimacy as an aspect of religiousness. In exploring each Author's views of what needs to be learned, there is also an examination of their views of experiential knowledge and competence. In trying to understand what each Author says about what facilitates the needed learning, there is an exploration of the aspects of the students they felt facilitated the needed learning and the aspects of the teachers that facilitate the needed learning.

As we are exploring the intellectual precedents of holistic education, we are looking for the first instance of a notion or for significant variations. Many of the Authors repeat what previous Authors had said (and in fact often quote them), so there would be a tedious repetition if all of their views on the above list of topics were covered. Therefore, only when there is a new variation or a different emphasis is an Author's view explicated. Consequently, more attention is given to Rousseau who formulated the greatest number of original notions with

regard to holistic education. As Pestalozzi developed Rousseau's work, and Froebel developed Pestalozzi's work, subsequent chapters on these Authors are shorter. With Carl Jung, the new discipline of psychology is broached, so that many original notions first appear which find their way into holistic education. There is also a very different approach to psychology with Maslow and Rogers (humanistic psychology), and many new notions absorbed by holistic education are introduced in the Maslow chapter. However, for the purposes of holistic education Maslow was very similar to Rogers, so that, many of the comments which both of them hold are found in the chapter on Maslow simply because Maslow is discussed first. Consequently, the chapter on Rogers (as it follows the one on Maslow) is shorter, but Rogers' contribution to holistic education is at least as significant as Maslow.

All the variations of the notions found in the Authors for the topics listed above can be thought of as the "gene pool" for the "family resemblances" of holistic education. It is the blending of these "genes" which gives modern forms of holistic education their rich variance while still allowing them to be recognizable.

*Jean-Jacques Rousseau*A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
(28 JUNE 1712 – 2 JULY 1778)

*R*ousseau's life combined intellectual brilliance with squandered opportunity, great admiration with relationship failure, longing for stability with continual upheaval. The negative aspects of his life are often a point of criticism to modern commentators, yet this may well be unjust and uninformed as there is every reason to believe he was the victim of a clinical personality disorder which would have been diagnosed today but which was unknown in his time.

Rousseau's mother died at his birth, and he was left in the care of his egocentric and violently tempered father. In fact, from the little we know of Rousseau's father, he also displayed the fury and relationship difficulties that plagued Rousseau and, as such personality disorders often have a hereditary component, the case for Rousseau having something like oppositional-defiant disorder is strengthened. In any event, Rousseau's erratic sometime-watchmaker father had to flee Geneva when Rousseau was about eight as a consequence of threatening someone with a sword (which according to his social class he was not allowed to wear, but which, for the sake of pretence, he often sported).

Rousseau spent the next six years as an unwanted orphan in his mother's family (who despised his father) during which time he was badly treated and humiliated. Rousseau applauds his father's upbringing and education of him because it was mostly *laissez-faire*, and Rousseau remembers his childhood with his father as happy compared to his time with his mother's family. He was an avid reader as a child, but he was mostly self-taught.

Due to his 'bookishness' he was apprenticed to a notary at the age of 14, but this failed for some reason lost to history. He was then apprenticed to a coppersmith who ruled him with iron discipline and harsh punishment. At the age of 16 he escaped from this regime by running away and simply wandered around France and Sardinia.

Although a Protestant, he was eventually taken in by some Catholic priests at Consignon in Savoy (a duchy which included, in Rousseau's time, Sardinia, Sicily, parts of France, and parts of Italy) and was eventually turned over by them to Madame de Warens. She was a Baroness living in Annecy (part of Savoy) with both a remarkable method and a remarkable success rate for converting young Swiss Protestant males to Catholicism. She had herself been a Swiss Protestant, married a Swiss Baron who she fleeced for most of his money before running away to France with the gardener's son where she became Catholic. What is significant about Madame de Warens for Rousseau is not just his temporary conversion to Catholicism, nor the fact that he later returned to her household and educated himself there for eight years, but that he probably first heard from her the views that humans are naturally good and that nature itself is good. As a child Warens had studied with a collection of Protestant mystical ministers who had assembled in Bern, Switzerland, and who were a counter to the stern Calvinists in Geneva. Rousseau held and made famous their views about human nature. Eventually, Rousseau and Warens became lovers (which seemed common with her converts), and she sent Rousseau to study Catholicism in Turin where he converted. However, Rousseau argued with Warens about her sexual activity, which he felt was at odds with her religion, and he left her. This is just one of many relationships with famous people which started extremely well, who could have permanently supported Rousseau, but with whom the relationship disintegrated.

Rousseau became a servant in various households, and he was accused of theft in one of them, but none of these lasted for very long. After more wandering, in 1730 he returned to the household of Madame de Warens who had moved to Chambéry. There he remained for

eight years as a minor assistant in the house, but was mainly a student, studying music, nature, Latin and English languages, French and German philosophy, chemistry, and mathematics.

For several years he seemed to have been a music tutor, and in 1742 he went to Paris to try out his opera *Les Muses Galantes*. Much to his chagrin, it failed. He took a job copying music, and eventually became secretary to Madame Dupin, a Parisian socialite. Through her, Rousseau met and eventually became friends with Diderot, Grimm, and other intellectuals who had gathered in Paris and were writing the *Encyclopédie*. This endeavor was an important arena for political radicalism and anticlerical views, and was famous for attacking the opinions of the establishment. This fit perfectly with the vituperation and scathingly argumentative tendency that marked Rousseau's personality disorder, which combined with his beautiful prose made him a celebrity. His contributions to the *Encyclopédie* were about music, and he was a significant reforming influence in both popular culture and in the court (acknowledged by many important musicians including Mozart). Nevertheless, his proposal for a new system of musical notation was rejected by the Academy of Sciences, which Rousseau took as a personal attack.

For a year and a half spanning 1743 to 1744, Rousseau had the prestigious and lucrative position of secretary to the French ambassador to the doge of Venice, after which he returned to Paris. Leaving such a wonderful position after such a short time, and knowing Rousseau's history, one presumes there was a spat.

In 1749, on a walk to Vincennes to visit Diderot (who was imprisoned there for his anticlerical writing), Rousseau had what he described as an epiphany. He suddenly saw modernity in a way that was the opposite of how he had previously seen it and as it was generally seen. Rather than progress, he saw it as corruption that was ruining humanity. This led him in the following year to write the first of several prize-winning essays for the Academy of Dijon, *Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts* (*Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*). In this essay Rousseau first goes into print with themes that were to reappear in several of his later and more popular works: the virtue of going back to nature, the noble savage, that humans are good by nature and corrupted by society with the more sophisticated societies being the most corrupt.

At this time in Rousseau's life, he had substantial contact with the French court, which only exacerbated his views of human corruption. This contact was mostly due to his work with music, and his popularity increased substantially in 1752 with the success of his operetta, *Le Devin*

du village (*The Village Fortuneteller*). Despite his success, and the ease with which he could have made a living as a court composer, he stopped writing music after, and, perhaps, because of this success.

During this period in Paris he began what was to be his only lasting relationship: an affair with his laundress, Thérèse Levasseur. This was an age in which illicit liaisons with people of much lower social standing were common, usually fleeting, publicly unacknowledged, and illegitimate offspring were not thought of as the children of the father. In this Rousseau was no exception. Rousseau fathered five children with Levasseur, all of whom were put up for adoption. Rousseau has been charged with being heartless by modern commentators, but this is to ignore the convention of the time as well as the poverty, wandering exile, and constant upheaval in which Rousseau lived. What was unconventional for his day about this relationship is that Rousseau eventually married Levasseur in 1768, ten years before his death.

In 1753 Rousseau wrote *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité Parmi les Hommes* (*Discourse on the Origins and Fundamentals of Human Inequality*), his second prize winning essay for the Academy of Dijon which solidified his reputation as a writer and philosopher. In this essay which was of particular interest to Marx and Lenin, Rousseau criticizes the inequalities of society but, unlike his two later admirers, Rousseau did not believe that any return to the original free and happy state of "natural man" was possible.

Rousseau returned to Geneva in 1754 and was welcomed as a prodigal son of the city. He was feted as a famous intellectual, for renouncing the Catholicism to which he had converted and returning to the Calvinism of his youth, and for proudly and publicly proclaiming himself a "citizen of Geneva." He brought Levasseur with him, but he introduced her as a nurse he needed for unspecified medical reasons. This produced whispered comment and knowing glances, but it was accepted as part of the welcome return of this famous man of letters in this otherwise intellectually drab city. His welcome, however, was soon worn out by his personality problems, and in 1756 he had to move and so went to live in a cottage in the woods of Madame d'Epinaÿ who had agreed to support him. There he fell passionately and violently (but unrequitedly) in love with the Countess d'Houdetot which, along with his growing paranoia and acerbic nature cost him his remaining friends and support. Again Rousseau had to move, this time to live in the park of the Duke of Luxembourg at Motmorency where he managed not to offend anyone to the extent that he was able to stay there until 1762. A significant aspect of Rousseau's passion for

d'Houdetot is that it formed the basis for Rousseau's first novel *Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise* published in 1761. This novel about love made impossible by differences of social class was the most popular in his life time, tremendously advanced the cause of Romanticism, and made him a darling amongst the wealthy sophisticated women who were to support him as a fugitive.

1762 saw the publication of Rousseau's most incendiary work, and caused him to become a fugitive from both Switzerland and France. *Du Contrat Social* (*The Social Contract*) begins with the famous lines, "Man is born free, but he is everywhere in chains...." This work which was to inspire revolutionaries in the American colonies and later in France was first burned in Geneva which also issued a warrant for his arrest. *Emile ou de L'éducation* (*Emile or On Education*) written that same year was ordered burned in France by the parliament (under pressure from the church), and a warrant for his arrest was issued in France. This did no good for a man already suffering from feelings of persecution and paranoia. He fled to Neuchâtel in present-day Switzerland, but which was then under the jurisdiction of Prussia. There he remained until the local population (again incited by the church) rioted against him and attacked his house. Rousseau then fled to Isle St. Pierre in Lake Bienne (again in modern Switzerland) which was then under an independent government centered in Berne. Rousseau was there for a short time before he again had to flee when Berne ordered him to leave.

Rousseau was saved by the English philosopher David Hume who offered him refuge in his home and secured for Rousseau a lifetime pension from King George III. Rousseau was now financially secure, respected for his intellectual work, and admired for offending the French. Any sane man would have been grateful, kept his peace with his new supporters, and lived out the rest of his life in the security of his good fortune. But Rousseau's personality disorder afforded him no such luxury. He soon quarreled with and offended Hume and his other new found friends. He saw plots against him everywhere he looked and came to violently dislike everyone around him. After only about a year, he returned to France incognito to be with Levasseur, whom he had come to feel was the only person that he could trust. She was indeed the only person who seemed able to put up with his chronic pathology. The following year, in 1768, they married.

In 1770, Rousseau was officially pardoned and allowed to return to Paris. He had begun autobiographical works when he was with Hume, and these he continued until his death. These works were partly inspired by the work of Montaigne, whom he greatly admired, and partly

to counter the charges he imagined were leveled against him by those he imagined were his enemies. As usual, he eventually offended all his acquaintances in Paris, and in 1778 he fled to Ermenonville as a guest of the Marquis de Girardin, where he died soon after arriving.

ROUSSEAU'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

Of all the Authors, Rousseau was the least explicit about the characteristics of Ultimacy—perhaps anticipating the conflict between the notions of Ultimacy in *Emile* and those of the Church that would soon after its publication cause him to have to flee for his life.

Rousseau's name for a person who is "all that a man should be,"³² or the greatest to which we can aspire is "natural man," without defining exactly what those terms mean. In brief, even though Rousseau felt that modern man had passed the point of no return to a state of pre-civilization, he promoted being "a savage made to inhabit cities."³³ This state of being required emotional development (in a very Rogerian way), full development of our physical capacities, self-reliance, a healthy curiosity, an ability to be *in* society but not *of* it, rationality, judgment, and virtue. Rousseau's various religious conversions did not affect his basic Christian outlook, and he never saw any necessity to explain why a religious life, or God (or Ultimacy) is important.

Ultimacy in Relation to Rousseau's View of Human Nature

Rousseau had no single term to denote Ultimacy, but he equated it with being "a man,"³⁴ and "man's estate." A person, no matter how humble his social status, who "...rises to the station of man, which so few men know how to do,"³⁵ was seen by Rousseau as a far greater being than a social luminary (like a king) who has not so risen. Fulfilling the common callings related to "man's estate" allows all the lesser callings to be fulfilled³⁶ (in keeping with the discussion earlier about the greater encompassing the lesser). He spoke of his fictional student, Emile, as an "apprentice man" and said that this apprenticeship is "harder and longer" than any apprenticeship to a craft.³⁷ Rousseau gave the reader no clear definition of "man" or "man's estate," and no idea of what a person is who isn't a "man" (except that the non-man is corrupted). Instead, we are left to see a picture emerge of the young Emile as he develops and acquires the qualities of "a man." The reader is told that people are, by nature, good because Nature is good³⁸ and that it is

humans who corrupt things. "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man."³⁹ Unfortunately, since Rousseau saw modern humans as creatures of civilization, he believed it was no longer possible simply to leave human formation in the hands of nature⁴⁰—we are conditioned by civilization from the moment we are born. This insight runs contrary to the more radical child-centered holistic educators.

In a remarkable statement that seems to stand out, Rousseau reiterated his view of goodness, but extended it, in a very Buddhist way, to include more than people and nature.

I always return to my principle, and it provides me with the solution to all my difficulties. I study what is, I seek its cause, and I finally find that what is, is good.⁴¹

Rousseau's version of listening to or sensing that which is within is, again, not as clear as one would like it to be. He pleads, "O man, draw your existence up within yourself..."⁴² and he exhorts the reader to study and know the limits of the human condition, and to see and know human passions, but he is lamentably short on how this is to be done. He provides one hint when he exhorts teachers to teach students to engage in what would be called (in modern day meditation jargon) being "aware of the present," which he feels is "nature's order."⁴³ Rousseau gave great importance to this for several reasons. Firstly, he condemns as a form of cruelty,

that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens a child with chains of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know not what pretended happiness...⁴⁴

Rousseau also felt that such education helps to establish, in human existence, one of the greatest sources of misery;⁴⁵ "We no longer exist where we are; we only exist where we are not."⁴⁶ This is only one of many instances of Rousseau having Buddhist-like notions about desire and mental projection.

Ultimacy As an Aspect of Religiousness for Rousseau

Rousseau's religiousness is summed up in what he called natural religion, and which can be seen as related to the "natural law" whose history traces as far back as the ancient Greeks.⁴⁷ As with so many of

the Romantics who followed Rousseau, nature can be thought of as a gateway to the divine; God's word (scripture) is replaced by God's work (nature) as the most reliable and direct communication with the sacred. While Rousseau saw mainstream religions as products of cultures and, therefore, subject to the limitations and misunderstandings of cultures, "natural religion," as he saw it, is free of such conditioning and other forms of authority.⁴⁸ For Rousseau, being free of authority is an important aspect of freedom, which is itself important for Ultimacy. Rousseau felt that a person who would "shake off the yoke of opinion in everything"⁴⁹ (a form of freedom from authority for Rousseau), and who would seek what is universally true rather than simple cultural truisms, has the "good use of his faculties"⁵⁰ to guide him; and reason would lead such a person to natural religion. Rousseau's natural religion is a religiousness more than a religion; it refuses dogma and has a sense of morality rather than a code of one.⁵¹ Rousseau's declarations to this effect were surprisingly strong in view of the fact that heretics were still being put to death in France at that time, and it is not surprising that Rousseau had to flee France after *Emile* was published because of the religiousness the book propounds.

For Rousseau, unification and wholeness take the form of harmony and balance, perhaps as a result of his study of the classics and the emphasis placed on balance by some of the ancient Greeks. This is first evident in Rousseau's claim that we are "formed by three masters,"⁵² namely nature, men and things. Only a child raised with those three in union can be in harmony with himself and the world.

Rousseau especially emphasized the importance of physical exercise for harmony and balance, and would have a gymnasium central to every school.⁵³ He cited support for this from "the ancients," "Montaigne...the wise Locke, the good Rollin, the learned Fleury, the pedant Crousaz" who differed on many other things but who all saw the wisdom of this.⁵⁴

It is a most pitiable error to imagine that the exercise of the body is harmful to the operations of the mind, as if these two activities ought not to move together in harmony and that the one ought not always to direct the other!⁵⁵

Rousseau felt that harmonious physical, intellectual, and emotional development is essential for the individual's development as a whole person in his own right. He saw it as required for material success ("to work like a peasant and think like a philosopher..."⁵⁶), and also for

becoming a good citizen. Rousseau claimed that craftsmen in Paris were trained to use only their hands (which leaves them unprepared to be good citizens and only partially formed as humans), while in Geneva craftsmen also had “training of head and the heart” which are required to become a good person (whom “one can present anywhere”) and to become a good citizen.⁵⁷ Rousseau’s emphasis on “exercising the senses, the mind, and the strength...”⁵⁸ is a theme of unification that was to be substantially developed by Pestalozzi and Froebel.

One final element in Rousseau’s notions of balance is his view that man’s weakness and much of his misery comes from “the inequality between his strength and his desires.”⁵⁹ He believed that keeping desires balanced with strengths and circumstances allows a person to be strong, happy, and wise.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR ROUSSEAU

Rousseau’s View of Experiential Knowledge

Rousseau was alone among the Authors in demonstrating any familiarity with the epistemological arguments that have raged between rationalists (e.g., Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) and empiricists (e.g., Bacon, Locke), and he came down solidly with the empiricists. Rousseau partially took John Locke’s position (to whom he refers in several instances) that knowledge is derived either from experience or from logical deductions from other knowledge. The previous knowledge, however, itself derives originally from experience.

Rousseau’s simple epistemology, stated briefly, is as follows: Before adolescence (for Rousseau, the stage when reason develops), people can directly receive for themselves only sensations or images of actual objects. The relationships that a young person sees between actual objects are “notions of objects,”⁶⁰ and these constitute what he called “simple ideas.”⁶¹ Therefore, the images of horses in relation to images of dogs shows horses to be bigger, and from this is derived the simple idea that horses are bigger than dogs.

At first our pupil had only sensations. Now he has ideas. He only felt; now he judges; for from the comparison of several successive or simultaneous sensations and the judgement made of them is born a sort of mixed or complex sensation which I call an idea.⁶²

Any ideas that a young person has other than these are received ideas, and not known directly; and these, for Rousseau, amount to beliefs rather than knowledge, and they can never be more than pale reflections of what needs to be learned.⁶³ More than even Locke, Rousseau gave primacy to experience; probably one of the reasons he is so often given such importance in the genesis of Romanticism and its cousin in the visual arts, Impressionism.

From Rousseau's notion of the first ideas emanating from sensation he derived his whole epistemology. As sensations or experiences are judged and compared to form ideas, simple ideas are compared and judged to form complex ideas.

It is by the number of these ideas that the extent of our knowledge is measured. It is their distinctness, their clarity which constitutes the accuracy of the mind. It is the art of comparing them among themselves that is called *human reason*. Thus what I would call *sensual* or *childish* reason consists in forming simple ideas by the conjunction of several sensations, and what I call *intellectual* or *human reason* consists in forming complex ideas by the conjunction of several simple ideas.⁶⁴

Unsurprisingly, Rousseau extended his notions of comparing ideas as a basis for reason to using it as a basis for evaluating people's intelligence. "The greater or lesser aptitude at comparing ideas and at finding relations is what constitutes in men greater or lesser intelligence."⁶⁵

Rousseau also distinguished between knowledge that is useful or non-useful,⁶⁶ and between what Pestalozzi will later call "unreal" or "real" knowledge (which for Rousseau means both knowledge of what he considers "real," and knowledge which is "really" acquired, as opposed to knowledge which is just memorized). For knowledge to be really acquired it must be discovered, not given. This naturally affects teaching.

...his [the teacher's] task is less to instruct than to lead. He ought to give no precepts at all; he ought to make them be discovered.⁶⁷

Rousseau felt that children, as part of a healthy self preservation which he called *amour de soi*, naturally want to discover because they are interested in all things surrounding them which affect their well-being. A child's "first study is a sort of experimental physics relative to his own preservation,"⁶⁸ and to divert this proper study with abstractions is to ruin such a proper and natural course of study. The young person should be allowed to develop his natural curiosity and to develop his

senses by developing his interest in the sense relations he has with his world. This is not only what a young person is made by nature to do, it also gives him the only solid basis for the later acquisition of knowledge from reason which is possible at an older age. Without that basis, Rousseau believed, a person cannot really *know* things.

Since everything which enters into the human understanding comes there through the senses, man's first reason is a reason of the senses; this sensual reason serves as the basis of intellectual reason. Our first masters of philosophy are our feet, our hands, our eyes. To substitute books for all that is not to teach us to reason. It is to teach us to use the reason of others. It is to teach us to believe much and never to know anything.⁶⁹

Rousseau's method of using the senses as a basis for forming abstractions is to judiciously put a child in contact with natural objects and events.⁷⁰ As the child gives attention to such phenomena, he naturally (according to Rousseau) becomes curious about them. Rousseau frequently insisted that "to feed his curiosity, never hurry to satisfy it"⁷¹—one of the many errors of the pedant. Not only does this give the child the opportunity to really *know* things, but it has the other very important benefit of helping the child learn to ask and answer his own questions. Knowing how to ask good questions is at least as important as knowing answers. For Rousseau, asking one's own questions also provides a basis for freedom from authority and judiciousness, both of which are aspects of Ultimacy and important objects of education and indicators of competence.

One reason for the importance Rousseau gave to the cultivation of the senses is that he felt the "well-regulated use" of all the senses leads to "a sort of sixth sense called *common sense*"⁷² which he likened to intuition. The sensations of the sixth sense "are perceptions or ideas,"⁷³ but, unfortunately, he does not elaborate further.

As Rousseau gave such primacy to experiences, it is not surprising that he repeatedly pleaded with teachers to give their lessons "more in actions than in speeches";⁷⁴ lessons which a child can more easily remember but also, as discussed earlier, can more easily apply.⁷⁵ This is as true for moral education as it is for intellectual education. Rousseau insisted that, "There is no moral knowledge which cannot be acquired by another's or one's own experience."⁷⁶ A person learns from another's experience through empathy which is vicariously experiencing the experiences of others. After a lesson has been *felt*, a teacher can summa-

size it verbally, and this, for Rousseau, is the proper use of words: they come after the 'real knowledge' of experience to summarize and so form the first level of abstraction. Such an abstraction can then be related to other abstractions (similarly formed) which together form "complex ideas." The foundation, however, is always experience.

Many necessary experiential moral lessons occur naturally in games. So scathing was Rousseau about the possibility of 'real' education being acquired through words in the classroom that he insists that the child learns more in the schoolyard than the class.⁷⁷ Consequently for moral education (as well as physical education), Rousseau called for schools to create "gyms or places for corporeal exercise" which he felt are far more effective than the use of "so many vain and pedantic precepts, which amount to nothing more than lost words."⁷⁸

Rousseau resolved one issue that has caused contention between the more and less radical child-centered holistic educators; he did not feel that students should just be left to their own devices to learn from whatever experiences occurred. He insisted that experiences should be deliberately determined or engineered (to the extent possible) by the teacher as an indispensable teaching tool.⁷⁹ Rousseau would even engineer quite humiliating experiences to have Emile learn the lesson of humility. "Make him feel it, or he will never know it."⁸⁰ Rousseau insisted, however, that he would endure the same suffering with his student and not heartlessly leave him on his own; an aspect of Rousseau's notions of the pedagogic relationship. Knowledge was seen by Rousseau as being very personal (as it needs to be acquired through personal experience), but the teacher is there to determine to a certain extent what experiences are available, and to help the student learn more from the experiences than the student might do if left entirely to himself. For instance, the teacher is able to assist by summarizing with maxims or drawing links to related experiences thereby helping in the formation of abstractions or making connections. The teacher is not there to burden the child with precepts, morals, responsibilities, and maxims that, in any case, Rousseau felt are impossible for the child to comprehend when they are divorced from experience. The teacher is there to see the opportunities in everyday events and conversation that allow the needed learning to be anchored in the student's life. For this reason, prescribed studies are not possible, although a loose curriculum content is. For instance, a teacher might feel that it is important for the student to learn the value of honesty, but must wait for the opportunity to make use of the student's experiences for that lesson to be learned.

Perhaps because he was a writer, Rousseau saw the dangerous power of words and books; especially the danger of confusing the word with what the word represents. He went as far as saying, "I hate books. They only teach one to talk about what one does not know."⁸¹ Rousseau did not condemn books *per se* (he praises them elsewhere), but he pointed to the difference between knowledge acquired from experience and its much inferior surrogate acquired through representations, and he condemned the human tendency to confuse the two.⁸² Rousseau felt that this confusion is especially rife in education in which "we stuff children's heads with words which have no meaning"⁸³ instead of giving them meaningful experiences, with the result that "we produce only babblers."⁸⁴ It is not, however, only words that Rousseau condemned, but any representation used as a basis for knowledge (e.g., maps and globes) when substituted for experience of the real world.⁸⁵

As part of experiential knowledge, the emotional element was also very important to Rousseau who used the words "sentiment," "passions," "desires," and "emotions" interchangeably. He commented that,

...our true masters are experience and sentiment, and man has a good sense of what suits man only with respect to those relations in which he himself has actually participated.⁸⁶

Consequently, Rousseau told teachers to, "make the language of the mind pass through the heart, so that it may make itself understood."⁸⁷ Rousseau felt that this inclusion of an emotional component is necessary because people are not "all mind,"⁸⁸ and the other aspects of people must be engaged in order to acquire what needs to be learned.

Although emotions are an important part of experience, Rousseau observed that actual physical engagement occurs prior to emotions. Simple emotions are available to everyone since, by the end of early childhood, everyone has had the physical engagements necessary to have experienced the emotional components attached to them (e.g., fear from physical pain). Complex emotions require complex experiences (with their emotional components), so that education is "pure stupidity"⁸⁹ when it tries to make students feel sentiments for which they do not have the experiential base. This, Rousseau felt, is what goes on in the mainstream study of art or literature when students are expected to relate to complex adult emotions, for which they do not yet have the experiential basis that would make such emotions intelligible.

Of course, not all emotions are pleasant, and Rousseau does not hesitate to say that suffering is important to experience and that he

would be distressed if Emile “grew up without knowing pain.”⁹⁰ Rousseau would have Emile know suffering (within very defined limits) for several reasons. One reason is that a person’s own suffering is the basis for knowing the suffering of others, which is the foundation of empathy, compassion and social development.

Another reason that Rousseau wanted Emile to know suffering was to learn the “law of necessity.” Rousseau felt that there are immutable laws governing humans as well as matter (e.g., desire, gravity). To ignore these laws brings inevitable disaster, and learning them while young through experiencing the consequences is far better than learning them when older and suffering greater consequences (e.g., falling off small things as an infant is better than falling off large things as an adult). In his discussions of the law of necessity, Rousseau deals with another type of experiential knowledge as well—self-knowledge.

Rousseau felt that the law of necessity was in some matters general (e.g., the passions in everyone follow similar laws) while in other matters it is particular to the individual and his condition. Part of what Rousseau meant by knowing oneself was to know the limits of one’s condition: “study and know these limits,”⁹¹ for no one can be happy who does not know this and subsequently restrains his desires to what is possible within these limits. Rousseau encouraged people to “extend the law of necessity to moral things,”⁹² and championed an asceticism not unlike a Buddhist form of detachment as a basis for values.

Some of Rousseau’s notions of emotions have a curiously modern ring; they are part of the self that must be known, not suppressed or rejected. It is clear from his writings that Rousseau placed great emphasis on his own self-knowledge (increasingly as he grew older—see his *Confessions*).⁹³ Rousseau gave no clear definition of ‘the self’, but he implied enough to provide an outline sketch. Some of Rousseau’s notions of self are evident in the two forms of self-love he held to exist: *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. For Rousseau, *amour-propre* is akin to pride, the kind of self-love which, in excess, is hubris; whereas *amour de soi* consists of the self-love that is the basis of self-preservation and is thus a natural and necessary part of our constitution. Therefore, like all things natural, he felt *amour de soi* is good.

The love of oneself [*amour de soi*] is always good and always in conformity with order. Since each man is specially entrusted with his own preservation, the first and most important of his cares is and ought to be to watch over it constantly. And how could he watch over it if he did not take the greatest interest in it?⁹⁴

The relation of *amour de soi* to *amour-propre* is complex, as is their role in human experiences; but a brief account is necessary to understand Rousseau's notions of self-knowledge. Rousseau felt that, "we have to love ourselves to preserve ourselves; and it follows immediately from the same sentiment that we love what preserves us."⁹⁵ This extends to our loving those who preserve us (e.g., parents, family, etc.) and "this is how the gentle and affectionate passions are born of [*amour de soi*]."⁹⁶

Rousseau felt that when a person gets old enough to compare himself with others, he automatically wants to be superior in such comparison, and this is where *amour de soi* gives rise to pride or *amour-propre*.⁹⁷ Another way in which *amour de soi* generates *amour-propre* occurs when the imagination acts incorrectly, such as when people want to preserve their self-images, confusing these with their real selves.

By itself, *amour-propre* (like emotions, but unlike *amour de soi*) is neither good nor bad, but becomes the one or the other by application.⁹⁸ *Amour-propre* can be of beneficial use (e.g., pride in doing something well, or generating self-esteem). However, Rousseau warns, "*Amour-propre* is a useful but dangerous instrument. Often it wounds the hand making use of it and rarely does good without evil."⁹⁹ He explained that in seeing the suffering of others with *amour de soi*, the self extends to others and compassion is born. Seeing the same suffering with *amour-propre* leads to contempt or to what today is usually called by its German name, *schadenfreude* (happiness at seeing the misery of others).

Rousseau's notions of *amour de soi* also elucidate his understanding of the emotions as part of the self. *Amour de soi*, Rousseau claimed, is "the source of our passions, the origin and the principle of all the others."¹⁰⁰ All the passions we have are modifications of this first and natural passion, which is love of ourselves, and therefore all passions can be said to be natural in origin. Unfortunately, the original natural passion can be so augmented by unnatural forces that it changes into something no longer natural and not good for us. The difference between these passions is simple for Rousseau.

Our natural passions are very limited. They are the instruments of our freedom; they tend to preserve us. All those which subject us and destroy us come from elsewhere. Nature does not give them to us. We appropriate them to the detriment of nature.¹⁰¹

For Rousseau, imagination is another aspect of experience that plays an important role with the passions, and thus also with experien-

tial knowledge. He felt that in nature's order "the senses wake the imagination," while in a sensually corrupt and precocious society "the imagination wakes the senses."¹⁰² Natural passions quite naturally stir the imagination. When, however, imagination is the source of passions, then imagination has reversed nature's order and the passions that result from this reversal are destructive. Therefore, it is not the passions themselves that are wicked; their nature is determined by their origin and application.¹⁰³ Hence, Rousseau did not support the suppression of passion, an activity seen as virtuous in his day.

I would find someone who wanted to prevent the birth of the passions almost as mad as someone who wanted to annihilate them; and those who believed that this was my project up to now would surely have understood me very badly.¹⁰⁴

Rousseau also held that it is wrong to distinguish good from bad passions "in order to yield to the former and deny oneself the latter."¹⁰⁵ Passions are in themselves good because,

Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation. It is, therefore, an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them—it is to control nature, it is to reform the work of God. If God were to tell men to annihilate the passions which He gives him, God would will and not will; He would contradict Himself. Never did He give this senseless order. Nothing of the kind is written in the human heart. And what God wants a man to do, He does not have told to him by another man. He tells it to him Himself; He writes it in the depths of his heart.¹⁰⁶

Yet the problem remains of dealing with the destructive effects of some passions. Rousseau's solution lies with imagination. Rousseau felt that man must have an understanding of natural and right relationship with others; he must then see the role passions have in relationships; and then "order all the affections of the soul according to these relations."¹⁰⁷ The way this ordering is to be accomplished is not through any form of suppression, but through directing the imagination and staying in the order of nature. Part of *Emile's* education was learning such mastery of his imagination.

Learning such mastery is not only valuable because it avoids the destruction that would follow from its absence, it is also valuable because of its role in the acquisition of virtue. For Rousseau, a person can be good without being virtuous. It is in self-mastery (in which

mastery of the imagination plays a part) that virtue is achieved.¹⁰⁸ Rousseau told Emile,

Now be really free. Learn to become your own master. Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous.¹⁰⁹

There is one final role for the imagination in passions, and it broaches the topic of social development. Rousseau claimed that all people experience suffering, and although we may see the suffering of others, “to see it without feeling it is not to know it.”¹¹⁰ It is imagination that allows a person to feel the suffering of others¹¹¹ and this empathy, eventually, can give rise to compassion. Consequently, Rousseau encouraged teachers, as a necessary part of social development, to “arouse the first emotions of nature [*amour de soi*] and to develop his [the student’s] heart and extend it to his fellows.”¹¹²

Competence for Rousseau

Closely related to Rousseau’s perspectives on experiential knowledge as the foundation of what needs to be learned are his descriptions of competence versus performance based pedagogy and the characteristics of the kind of competence he valued.

Rousseau felt that the reason education had come to place so much emphasis on representations (i.e., books and words) rather than real knowledge was because the presentation of knowledge had come to be valued¹¹³ over the acquisition of real knowledge. This distinction is mirrored in the differences in the knowledge concepts of “performance” and “competence” that are discussed extensively in the third section of this book. The latter can be thought of as the real knowledge discussed earlier, a knowledge complex that forms an active part of a person’s ability to meet the challenges of life, while “performance” can be thought of as knowledge acquired in order to display its acquisition (e.g., learning something to pass a test).

Competences can not be reduced to a set of skills in which a person can be trained as one might train a dog or program a robot. While none of the Authors used the terms “competence” or “performance” to identify knowledge concepts, the Authors certainly had the concepts and made it central to their writing on education. Rousseau was the first, and certainly one of the most articulate, proponents of (what shall henceforth be called) competence over performance, and in doing so became an icon for holistic education. Rousseau felt that perfor-

mance based pedagogy depended on representations and abstractions for its displays, and that such learning was devoid of any emotional engagement on the part of the student. Rousseau claimed that it is much easier to “present a showy display of the instruction”¹¹⁴ than to instruct a child in anything truly useful (in which Rousseau includes moral and social learning that informs behavior). He acknowledged that competence based pedagogy does not make the teacher’s “...talents conspicuous from the outset nor make an impression on fathers. But it is the only one fit for succeeding.”¹¹⁵ This does, however, depend on what is meant by succeeding, and for Rousseau, succeeding is, as discussed previously, becoming a “natural man” and “all that a man should be”—achieving Ultimacy.

Rousseau gave no definitions of what we are calling competence based pedagogy or performance based pedagogy, but he frequently described the differences. These differences are evident in Rousseau’s frequent juxtaposition of Emile’s education with what he saw as mainstream education. He contrasted, for example, knowing by heart with knowing by experience, being able to read well in books with being able to read “in the book of nature,” Emile having his mind in “his head” with the mainstream student having it “in his tongue,” memory with judgment,¹¹⁶ and teaching science with helping the child develop the mindset “fit for acquiring it [science].”¹¹⁷ Rousseau blamed the self-interest of teachers for the emphasis on performance based pedagogy. It is only through giving performances of knowledge that the teacher can show off his skills, and in this way the student himself becomes a performance for the teacher.

A preceptor thinks of his own interest more than of his disciple’s. He is devoted to proving that he is not wasting his time and that he is earning the money he is paid. He provides the child with some easily displayed attainments that can be showed off when wanted. It is not important whether what he teaches the child is useful, provided that it is easily seen. He accumulates, without distinction or discernment, a rubbish heap in the child’s memory. When the child is to be examined, he is made to spread out his merchandise. He displays it; satisfaction is obtained. Then he closes up his pack again and leaves. My pupil [Emile] is not so rich. He has no pack to spread out. He has nothing to show other than himself.¹¹⁸

Rousseau shows his disinterest in performance based pedagogy by insisting that the amount of knowledge a child has is of very little importance.¹¹⁹ Rousseau was far more interested in students learning

how to question and acquire by themselves the knowledge which each student needs and wants than he was in the acquisition of any particular knowledge. Certainly becoming an expert in one subject is harmful to the child's overall development, and it is this overall development that generates the ability to meet the challenges of living. By not giving Emile facts or answers (which Rousseau repeatedly proclaimed are of slight importance) and by not demanding the acquisition of specific knowledge, Rousseau rejected the possibility of performance based pedagogy. Instead, Rousseau presented Emile with objects and situations that he felt might generate certain kinds of learning and, in so doing, loosely directed Emile's learning.¹²⁰ Such steering can only work if the student is a self-motivated learner, but for Rousseau motivation to learn is inherent in young people. Sometimes, Rousseau indicated that he knew what he wanted Emile to learn (e.g., some aspect of geometry), while at other times he seemed less sure what Emile would learn, only that he would learn something (as one might expect a person to learn by taking a trip around the world without knowing exactly what would be learned).

Rousseau also contrasted competence with performance in his discussion of art education. He claimed that a child can draw or paint a better likeness if the child copies another drawing or painting; and if the product is important (as it is in performance based pedagogy) then that is the best way to proceed. Rousseau, however, was not interested in the product. He was interested in training the hand and the capacity to see, in increasing the child's contact with nature since he felt this is related to an appreciation of something sacred—nature. Consequently, he insisted on Emile drawing from nature.¹²¹

Characteristics of Competence Promoted by Rousseau

Examining Rousseau's notions of judgment and values is complicated by the fact that there was no word in eighteenth century French that can be directly translated into the modern term 'values' in the sense the word is used in such modern expressions as 'values education'. The nearest eighteenth century French equivalent is *vertu*. *Vertu* is sometimes used by Rousseau to denote "virtue" and sometimes to denote "values." The difficulty is further increased because a close reading shows that both meanings can fuse even within a single sentence. This is perhaps explained by seeing that, for Rousseau, the man of virtue has values and the acquisition of values leads to virtue.

Rousseau presented Emile as valuing certain things and, as Emile is

Rousseau's ideal man, it is evident that Rousseau felt everyone should have similar values and criteria for establishing values. Such values follow from the virtue of commitment to self-preservation and well-being (which he saw as truly useful), and this commitment comes naturally from an uninhibited *amour de soi*. When it is understood that Rousseau included compassion and social responsibility within 'utility', it becomes less of an instrumental concept.

It is by their palpable relation to his utility, his security, his preservation, and his well-being that he ought to appraise all the bodies of nature and all the works of men. Thus, iron ought to be much more valuable in his eyes than gold, and glass than diamonds.¹²²

Rousseau included morals amongst the virtues to be acquired, but, for him, morality did not mean following prescribed behavior. Among other considerations, moral conduct meant acting with the emotional mastery discussed previously, being free of opinion and authority, having a "healthy heart" (which included compassion for others), "good sense," "courage," "wisdom," and "reason,"¹²³

Virtue, for Rousseau, required struggle, and he claimed that much of the education which Emile received was to make him physically, mentally, emotionally, and socially strong; so that Emile could prevail in the struggle for virtue. Rousseau felt that strength is partly necessary to "arm man against unexpected accidents,"¹²⁴ but its most important role is as part of the complex struggle of gaining virtue. Rousseau said to his imaginary student,

My child, there is no happiness without courage nor virtue without struggle. The word *virtue* comes from *strength*. Strength is the foundation of all virtue. Virtue belongs only to a being that is weak by nature and strong by will. It is in this that the merit of the just man consists; and although we call God good, we do not call Him virtuous, because it requires no effort for Him to do good.¹²⁵

Rousseau believed that it is only strength derived from struggle that gives goodness its real value. Without strength, goodness is too fragile, conditional, dependent on emotions and often self-serving. The strength of emotional mastery is the strength of virtue.

...he who is only good remains so only as long as he takes pleasure in being so. Goodness is broken and perishes under the impact of the human passions. The man who is only good is good only for himself.¹²⁶

Judgment, for Rousseau, also requires strength, as well as the acquisition of values (the criteria of judgment). Therefore, for Rousseau, a judicious person needs the qualities previously listed under strength and values. It is the development of judgment which Rousseau claims as a principal aim of his education.¹²⁷ He felt his fictional character's education was a success because of Emile's judiciousness and because Emile himself values this quality highly.¹²⁸ Rousseau claimed that, by the age of fifteen, the amount of intellectual knowledge a child acquires in mainstream education will be equivalent to what Emile has learned through Rousseau's competence based pedagogy,

...but with the difference that your child's knowledge will be only in his memory, while mine's will be in his judgement.¹²⁹

In this quote and several others that are similar, it is evident that Rousseau saw what he called judgment as related to a concept of knowledge rather than an activity of deciding. Judgment is a form of competence that Rousseau felt develops from experiential knowledge and self-knowledge, and it is indispensable in life. Judiciousness with regard to the physical world is important for survival and safety. Judiciousness with regard to the social world is important for both well-being (as we are social entities) and because we learn from observing others and need to judge well what we see. Such judiciousness involves not being deluded by conventional social indicators, but judging men "only by the condition of their hearts..."¹³⁰ Rousseau claimed that such judgment requires insight, intuition, and sensitivity; and this involves not just the intellect but also "a heart sensitive enough to conceive all the human passions and calm enough not to experience them"¹³¹—self-knowledge and emotional mastery.

Judgment, however, requires more than these elements. It also requires freedom. A person who is not free of influences that can pervert insight, intuition, sensitivity, etc., cannot judge well. Rousseau frequently stated that Emile does not value the prejudices of others,¹³² or even those of his own making; "he does not know what routine, custom, or habit is," and "never follows a formula..."¹³³ We hear Emile declare that he will be free anywhere he goes because, "all the chains of opinion are broken for me..."¹³⁴ It is not so much the things outside of the mind that enslave people, it is the inner authorities. This is noteworthy in view of Rousseau's political writings.

In a series of statements that resemble those about homeostasis in the twentieth century, Rousseau claimed that in giving a child liberty that child will come to do what is good for him.

In leaving him thus master of his will, you will not be fomenting his caprices. By never doing anything except what suits him, he will soon do only what he ought to do; and although his body is in continuous motion, so long as he is concerned only with his immediate and palpable interest, you will witness developing all the reason of which he is capable much better and in a way much more appropriate to him than it would in purely speculative studies.¹³⁵

A consequence of leaving a student “master of his will” is that the teacher has no tools for motivation other than inspiring interest, which exists only when the child derives pleasure or utility from the learning.¹³⁶ Rousseau described the importance of a young child learning how to be attentive, but “attention ought always to be produced by pleasure or desire, never constraint” because “it is never as important that he learn as that he do nothing in spite of himself.”¹³⁷ To learn to act “in spite of himself” is to learn to violate *amour de soi*, the natural order, freedom, and is what permits evil. Learning to do things “in spite of himself” is also learning to be gullible in the future to all those whose abuse (through persuasion, authority, etc.) will require such rejection of *amour de soi*.

Another aspect of learning freedom is learning to not be dependent on others, so Rousseau avoided assisting Emile too much.

The only one who does his own will is he who, in order to do it, has no need to put another's arms at the end of his own; from which it follows that the first of all goods is not authority but freedom. The truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases. That is my fundamental maxim. It need only be applied to childhood for all the rules of education to flow from it.¹³⁸

Rousseau did feel that one form of dependence is positive—love—and this stems from being a human and not God. In one of several statements, which sound as though they could have come from a Buddhist tract, Emile discussed his love of Sophie.

If I were without passions, I would, in my condition as a man, be independent like God himself; for I would want only what is and therefore would never have to struggle against destiny. At least I have no more than one chain. It is the only one I shall ever bear, and I can glory in it. Come, then, give me Sophie, and I am free.¹³⁹

Interestingly, Rousseau felt that giving a child freedom to do as he pleases (and experiencing the consequences), allows a child to learn

another dependence. This is our dependence on the law of necessity, and paradoxically this law shows us that we cannot just do what we please.

The irrepressible law of necessity always teaches man early to do what does not please him in order to prevent an evil which would displease him more. Such is the use of foresight, and from this foresight, well or ill controlled, is born all human wisdom or all human misery.¹⁴⁰

Rousseau believed that one cannot teach foresight to a child, but instead must allow the child to learn foresight from experiencing the law of necessity. As with all attempts to teach a child behavior construed by adults to be good, trying to teach foresight will generally only produce reaction and rebellion, which too often generates the opposite of the intended lesson.¹⁴¹

Learning the law of necessity was, for Rousseau, a very important element of what needs to be learned in education. Rousseau gave Emile “well-regulated freedom”¹⁴² by which he meant that Emile had freedom within the confines of what Rousseau thought was safe, and conducive to his well-being and learning. Emile was allowed to make his own mistakes (as long as they did not endanger him) and to take actions that had unpleasant consequences. Having freedom but facing the consequences was the way Emile learned “dependence only on things,” which is how one learns the law of necessity and follows “the order of nature in the progress of...education.”¹⁴³ Paradoxically, following these laws makes one free.¹⁴⁴ These laws are

...the eternal laws of nature and order... For the wise man, they take the place of positive [governmental] law. They are written in the depth of his heart by conscience and reason. It is to these that he ought to enslave himself in order to be free. The only slave is the man who does evil, for he always does it in spite of himself. Freedom is found in no form of government; it is in the heart of the free man. He takes it with him everywhere. The vile man takes his servitude everywhere. The latter would be a slave in Geneva, the former a free man in Paris.¹⁴⁵

As with all the Authors and others who have seen freedom as an aspect of what we have called sagacious competence, Rousseau does not conflate non-dependence with independence. As a consequence of our being social entities and the law of necessity, people cannot be

independent. Rousseau claimed that Emile's "...maxim was always to learn to do without the help of others in regard to everything he could do himself,"¹⁴⁶ and this extended to an important form of non-dependence: learning to learn by himself. This has several important consequences, such as depending less on authorities, giving less to the opinions of others, and, as a consequence, not getting "accustomed to servile submission."¹⁴⁷ From this there follow several other benefits according to Rousseau. One benefit is advancing in learning only at one's own rate rather than a rate determined by another, which means that the knowledge acquired is more likely to be appropriate to the condition and circumstances of the learner. Another benefit is that learning progresses only by making one's own connections which generates meaning, rather than accepting the connections and meaning of someone else¹⁴⁸ (which links to the earlier discussion of 'real' and 'non-real' knowledge, which shall be elaborated further in the chapters on Pestalozzi and Froebel).

For Rousseau, knowing facts discovered by someone else is never as valuable as discovering facts oneself,¹⁴⁹ and from this it follows that learning how to learn is one of his central characteristics of competence. "The goal is less to teach him a truth than to show him how he must always go about discovering the truth."¹⁵⁰ However, learning how to learn by oneself, according to Rousseau, requires that a person learns about their individual learning processes: meta-learning. It is partly to develop meta-learning that Emile is allowed to follow his own interests to such a large extent—what he learns is not as important as *that* he learns and *how* he learns, and *that* he learns *how* he learns. Rousseau frequently claimed that Emile does not acquire vast amounts of knowledge, "but what he has is truly his own." Rousseau also claimed that,

Emile has a mind that is universal not by its learning but by its faculty to acquire learning: a mind that is open, intelligent, ready for everything, and, as Montaigne says, if not instructed, at least able to be instructed.¹⁵¹

Rousseau felt that such a universal mind is especially important in moral questions and questions of judgment, as these areas often have no established answers. Therefore, one must be able to find them.¹⁵² For Rousseau, the ability to find the right questions, frame them, and find one's own answers is the only way to approach morality and judiciousness, and such skill must be deliberately learned. Meta-learning, for Rousseau, involves a person consciously seeing how they are learn-

ing and how their mind is functioning so that it remains “open, intelligent, and ready for everything.”

Rousseau believed that without judgment a person can not know directly what is worth learning. Without values as criteria for establishing worth, a person can not judge. Without freedom to form criteria and freedom from the coercive effects of opinion, authorities, beliefs, etc., a person is not in a position to exercise judgment. Such judgment, values and freedom can not be taught but they can be learned, and much of it, Rousseau believed, comes from self-motivated learning and learning to learn. The result of this learning is not knowledge as seen in schools, but knowledge as competence.

Rousseau presented several pictures of Emile who, as the ideal man, develops the competence Rousseau would have us all develop. Hence, we can see what Rousseau's competent person would be like. Rousseau called Emile “my pupil” and then corrected himself to show Emile's link with Ultimacy by saying, “or rather nature's,”¹⁵³ and described him as being “self-sufficient” and not turning to others for answers. Emile as an adolescent becomes judicious, pragmatic, practical, resourceful, a self-motivated learner, with foresight, physical strength, and self-knowledge of what suits him.¹⁵⁴ By the time Emile reaches almost the end of his education he is,

...well formed, well constituted in mind and body, strong, healthy, fit, skillful, robust, full of sense, reason, goodness and humanity, a man with morals and taste, loving the beautiful, doing the good, free from the empire of cruel passions, exempt from the yoke of opinion, but subject to the law of wisdom and submissive to the voice of friendship, possessing all the useful talents and some of the agreeable ones, caring little for riches, with his means of support in his arms, and not afraid if lacking bread whatever happens.¹⁵⁵

Rousseau felt that social-ability becomes intelligible to young people only very late in their development, at the end of adolescence. The attempt to teach it earlier (as it cannot be properly understood) requires the imposition of rules, habits, and opinions which are a violation of the child's nature. In fact, in the nearest Rousseau came to defining a person's “nature,” he described it as “dispositions” before they have been “constrained by our habits” or “corrupted by our opinions.”¹⁵⁶ To reduce the impact of the habits and opinions of society, Rousseau recommended using the law of necessity to guide children, which “can be expanded and contracted”¹⁵⁷ around the child by the

wise teacher, instead of imposing social laws which a child cannot really understand¹⁵⁸ and which inevitably corrupt the child's nature.

Social-ability is necessary to learn because "to live in the world, one must know how to deal with men,"¹⁵⁹ as the intention of Rousseau's education was to help people live in society, not isolated in nature.

But consider, in the first place, that although I want to form the man of nature, the object is not, for all that, to make him a savage and to relegate him to the depths of the woods. It suffices that, enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that he feel with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason.¹⁶⁰

Emile was to be "the natural man living in the state of society" who, following his *amour de soi*, must know how to preserve himself, which means knowing how to deal with other people and "to live, if not like them, at least with them."¹⁶¹ What is different about Emile, is that he has been raised according to the immutable laws of nature and for Ultimacy, and therefore raised for himself, not for society. Rousseau felt (as did the other Authors) that an education in which a person is raised for himself is incompatible with an education in which a person is raised for others (i.e., for society).

But what is to be done when...instead of raising a man for himself, one wants to raise him for others? ... Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man and making a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time.¹⁶²

Rousseau insisted that development for nature and development for society follow "contrary routes," and that if we try to follow both we are "forced to divide ourselves" and "follow a composite impulse which leads us to neither one goal or the other," and in the end we aren't "good either for ourselves or for others."¹⁶³ Rousseau did feel that being good for others—contributing positively to society—is important. However, Rousseau felt being good for others can only come from compassion and never duty, and compassion cannot be taught but can be learned through the education he promoted. While Rousseau believed that privileged people have a greater social debt,¹⁶⁴ all people have a social responsibility and, if properly educated (in which *amour de soi* extends to include others), will naturally meet this responsibility

from a properly developed sense of extended self.

Rousseau contended that education for others cannot produce the same result. Such education may produce people who engage in fine acts and have good intentions, but in such people social responsibility must necessarily conflict with self-interest (which is more primary), with the result that meeting social responsibilities is always contingent on the self being either appeased or suppressed.

Rousseau implied that institutions also have a form of self-interest. Hence, the intention of state education is to preserve the state (by producing workers, soldiers, nationalism, conformist behavior, etc.), and that what is good for the state must necessarily take precedence over what is good for the individual. Good parents, on the other hand, care primarily for the well-being of their individual children. If such care for the individual is fully pursued, it produces a person who is also good for society through being compassionate and having a developed sense of social responsibility. State education intending to produce good citizens cannot, Rousseau felt, produce good individuals because, of necessity, education for good individuals gives primacy to *amour de soi* which cannot be the intention of the state.

In summarizing Rousseau's conception of knowledge and education, Boyd makes a statement with which all the Authors would probably agree and which is in keeping with competence based education.

An educational system that places emphasis on preparation for adult life places more emphasis on what is taught than on predilections and aptitudes. An educational system that stresses development of the individual child puts more emphasis on the distinctive view of life taken by the child over the subjects. The actual child gets more attention than the future man, and what he learns is personal.¹⁶⁵

ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR ROUSSEAU

For Rousseau, students have learning processes that are natural and do not require the intervention of adults. However, he believed that, without interfering in these natural processes, the teacher had a great deal to do. Rousseau saw the student's learning processes as a product of *amour de soi* in that the student has a natural wish for self-preservation and well-being, hence a natural wish to learn anything that is useful for self-preservation and well-being. As the *soi* (self) of which one

has *amour* can extend beyond the boundary of the skin (through compassion, morality, social responsibility, etc.), so the healthy and natural development of the self's utility, preservation and well-being become a natural foundation for learning social and moral duties¹⁶⁶ and for acquiring a love of order and the public good.¹⁶⁷ Rousseau warned teachers that these natural learning processes can very easily be violated, because they have a natural sequence, which can be violated by approaching things out of their proper order. This is done, for instance, when trying to teach social and moral duties before *amour de soi* has developed to the point of extending itself. Rousseau believed that children must feel their rights before they can feel their duties.¹⁶⁸ Rousseau contended that, without the correct foundation that comes from respecting the student's natural learning processes, what should bring compassion only brings arrogance, and the student's education would be for nothing.¹⁶⁹ Such perversion of the natural learning processes also occurs when we use reason with children too early in their development.¹⁷⁰

Rousseau saw children's play as an expression of this natural learning process. It is in play that he felt children (like most animals) try to explore and understand their world; a theme taken up and greatly expanded by Pestalozzi and Froebel. Rousseau felt that education should emulate as well as make use of children's play.

...it ought always to be borne in mind that all this [education] is or ought to be only a game, an easy and voluntary direction of the movements nature asks of children, an art of varying their play to render it more pleasant to them without the least constraint ever turning it into work. Really, what will they play with that I cannot turn into an object of instruction for them?¹⁷¹

This he contrasted with what he felt occurred in the mainstream education of his day where teachers

feel that, no matter what, they just have to teach them [students] this or that always find it impossible to succeed without constraint, without quarreling, and without boredom.¹⁷²

Rousseau felt that the result of violating the student's natural learning processes is the creation of distorted and un-natural man. Because of the "constraint," "quarreling," and "boredom," a student naturally feels "aversion, disgust, and distaste" for his education,¹⁷³ and, as a consequence, the teacher must use "fear, covetousness, envy, pride"

and other “passions that serve as instruments for common education.”¹⁷⁴

It is worth noting that what Rousseau meant by “play” did not necessarily indicate ease or effortlessness, and he frequently disparaged all that is otiose. Rigor, toughness, endurance, and the ability to exert oneself were seen by Rousseau as important, and he ensured that these qualities entered into the play of *Emile*, (much as a mountaineer might find his form of “play” includes the most grueling and demanding efforts).¹⁷⁵

Rousseau felt that following the natural learning processes in students leads to the natural man because a person develops in a manner that is true to his nature. He also felt that this is the way in which a person leads a happy life. In describing his approach to educating *Emile*, Rousseau remarked,

I kept to the road of nature while waiting for it to show me the road of happiness. It turned out that they were the same and that, by not thinking about it, I had followed the road of happiness.¹⁷⁶

One of the most important aspects of the inherent learning processes is that, for Rousseau, they exist within the context of distinct stages of development—hence the five books of *Emile* which correspond to those stages. Rousseau’s insistence, as discussed previously, on the cultivation of the senses in early childhood (which he felt was universally ignored by mainstream education¹⁷⁷) was due to his belief that there are distinct stages in human development, with each stage needing to be successfully completed before the next is engaged. A principal that Rousseau claimed is central to *Emile* is that it causes damage to a child to treat that child as though the child is in a more advanced stage than is actually the case.

My whole book is only a constant proof of this principle of education.¹⁷⁸

Rousseau felt that teachers have to know the characteristics of these stages (which hold for people in general), yet be sensitive to the progress of the individual through those stages as these vary tremendously with the individual. The principle importance of these stages is that they determine what a person is capable of learning naturally, and Rousseau felt that he “cannot exhort the governor [tutor/teacher] too much to be sure that his proofs match the pupil’s capacity to understand them.”¹⁷⁹ Consequently, for Rousseau, the teacher should know the dynamics of

the different stages of development, the characteristics of different types of learning,¹⁸⁰ and have a willingness to “not displace ages any more than seasons. One must be oneself at all times and not battle against nature.”¹⁸¹ Unfortunately, Rousseau claimed, most people

...concentrate on what it is important for men to know without considering what children are in a condition to learn. They are always seeking the man in the child without thinking of what he is before being a man.¹⁸²

The results of such ignorance and of forcing learning before it is time are “defects of body and of mind.”¹⁸³ Rousseau felt that whatever faults his book may have in devising learning for the different stages, he is accurate in identifying the stages, and that this may be the main contribution his book makes to education.¹⁸⁴ Yet Rousseau believed the stages of development had to be more than merely acknowledged; they had to be valued. He claimed that “each age, each condition of life, has its suitable perfection, a sort of maturity proper to it”¹⁸⁵ and that rather than hurrying a child to maturity, we should “be humane with every station, every age...love childhood, promote its games, its pleasures, its amiable instinct....”¹⁸⁶

Rousseau insisted that,

Nature wants children to be children before being men. If we want to pervert this order, we shall produce precocious fruits which will be immature and insipid and will not be long in rotting. We shall have young doctors and old children. Childhood has its ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling which are proper to it. Nothing is less sensible than to want to substitute ours for theirs, and I would like as little to insist that a ten-year-old be five feet tall as that he possess judgement.¹⁸⁷

Rousseau believed that pushing children ahead of their time was the result of the teacher's or parent's egotism in the pretence of creating prodigies, but that the damage to children was lasting. He warned that, contrary to the common opinion, “harm is not in what the pupil does not understand but is in what he believes he understands,”¹⁸⁸ but actually doesn't; a harm generated by “false” knowledge that is very difficult to undo. Rousseau cited the results of religious instruction to children as an example. Not only are children not capable of understanding theology,¹⁸⁹ but also such study becomes an act of sacrilege by preventing an eventual true understanding.

The great evil of the deformed images of the divinity which are drawn in the minds of children is that they remain there all their lives; when the children become men, they no longer conceive of any other God than that of children.¹⁹⁰

For Rousseau, the attempt to learn before one is capable of understanding produces learning without knowing, and links this topic with the discussion of “real” or “unreal”/“false” knowledge. He claimed that at the age of fifteen Emile

did not know whether he had a soul. And perhaps at eighteen it is not yet time for him to learn it; for if he learns it sooner than he ought, he runs the risk of never knowing it.¹⁹¹

It is real and certain knowledge that is needed for Ultimacy, not “performance” or the mere show of knowledge. The proper study of childhood stems from the senses, and only at young adulthood should one attempt to know anything of the religious. Rousseau felt that it is “simple to rise from the study of nature to the quest for its Author [God]”¹⁹² which is a natural progression and one more likely to give students “real knowledge.”

Rousseau held that it was only after puberty—a “second birth” (when most education ended in 18th century Europe), that the faculty of reason has matured and that a more substantial education can begin because with reason education “takes on true importance.”¹⁹³ This for Rousseau, was the last stage of the student’s learning processes marked by physiological changes. The remaining changes were marked by developments of character, in the moral, social, and emotional domains.

As well as the inherent learning processes as one aspect of the student that facilitates the needed learning, Rousseau, like all of the Authors, also stresses another aspect of the student that facilitates this learning—inherent motivation.

Rousseau’s View of Inherent Motivation

For Rousseau, the foundation of motivation was rooted in *amour de soi*, which is constantly seeking ways to be preserved, extended and satisfied.

The innate desire for well-being and the impossibility of fully satisfying this desire make him constantly seek for new means of contributing to it. This is the first principle of curiosity, a principle

natural to the human heart, but one which develops only in proportion to our passions and our enlightenment.¹⁹⁴

It is important to remember, however, that *amour-propre* can be a surrogate for *amour de soi* and Rousseau warned of the former becoming a source of motivation. Rousseau believed that reason is the correct and safe “guide of *amour-propre*” so that before a child reaches the age of being able to employ reason well, *amour-propre* should be avoided assiduously.¹⁹⁵ It must especially be avoided as a source of motivation. Consequently, Rousseau felt it was important that a child do nothing out of wanting to receive the praise or avoid the criticism of others; nothing, in short, out of what today is called ‘secondary motivation’. Of course, this excludes obedience as a motivation for children, and from this “it follows that they can learn nothing of which they do not feel the real and present advantage in either pleasure or utility.”¹⁹⁶ Rousseau frequently stressed that the “advantage” needs to be “present” for the child.

It is inept to demand that they apply themselves to things one tells them vaguely are for their own good (without their knowing what that good is) and to things they are assured they will profit from when they are grown up (without their taking any interest now in that alleged profit, which they would not be able to understand).¹⁹⁷

Reiterating part of the discussion on freedom, a child who is conditioned always to ignore his own feelings and sense of what is right to do is robbed of developing “good sense,” accustoming “him to always be led,” and preparing him to be “a machine in others’ hands. You want him to be docile when little: that is to want him to be credulous and a dupe when he is grown up.”¹⁹⁸ However, Rousseau felt that as long as a child responds “only to what nature asks of him, ... then he will do nothing but good.”¹⁹⁹

Consequently, Rousseau warned teachers that it was not up to them to decide what students should learn, it was up to the students. However, as so often with Rousseau, things are not simple. Rousseau felt that it was up to the teacher to “skillfully give birth” to the students’ desires to learn things which, as Rousseau demonstrated, does not exclude the use of ruses and deceptions.

...you should be well aware that it is rarely up to you to suggest to him what he ought to learn. It is up to him to desire it, to seek it, to find it. It is up to you to put it within his reach, skillfully to give

birth to this desire and to furnish him with the means of satisfying it. It follows, therefore, that your questions should be infrequent but well chosen; since he will put many more questions to you than you to him...²⁰⁰

For Rousseau, a principal example of ignoring inherent motivation as a facilitator of the needed learning can be seen in the mainstream approach to learning reading and writing. Rousseau felt that, when a person begins to appreciate human relations,

The art of speaking to and hearing from absent people, the art of communicating our feelings, our wills, our desires to them at a distance without a mediator is an art whose utility can be rendered palpable to all ages.²⁰¹

Instead of such utility being made obvious, children are forced to learn reading and writing, which then become onerous tasks, and all manner of devices and methods need to be invented to help a child learn what he would rather not do. Rousseau claimed that if the desire to learn is instilled, the child will practically learn by himself.

ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR ROUSSEAU

In addition to the aspects of the student being critical to facilitating the needed learning, throughout *Emile*, Rousseau also indicates many aspects of the teachers which facilitate this learning, namely, their understandings of the students, the pedagogical process, and the pedagogic relationship, as well as the teacher's own self development.

Teachers' Understanding of Students and their Needs for Rousseau

Rousseau was convinced that each child is different and, as a consequence, each child needs to be approached differently.

One must know well the particular genius of the child in order to know what moral diet suits him. Each mind has its own form, according to which it needs to be governed; the success of one's care depends on governing it by this form and not by another. Prudent man, spy out nature for a long time; observe your pupil well before saying the first word to him.²⁰²

As the “form” for each person is different, the details of education for any particular child must also differ, with the consequence that Rousseau felt that it was impossible to stipulate what children, in general, should learn or when they should learn something.²⁰³ In fact Rousseau believed that, “it is of little importance whether he learns this or that, provided that he get a good conception of what he learns and the use of what he learns.”²⁰⁴ What was important for Rousseau was the development of the person, and such development, Rousseau believed, had little to do with developing specific knowledge. He insisted that the differences between children has to be respected as these are the basis for true development, and these differences are the consequence of differences in character, disposition, geographic location, and social position. He felt there are too many possible permutations of these to allow any intelligent discussion.²⁰⁵ What Rousseau felt he could discuss were general principles of learning, and general progression in human development. Rousseau did not want the acquisition of knowledge confused with the development of capacities. The rate at which the development of capacities occurs must be natural, according to Rousseau, and can not be speeded up by a teacher without damage to a child, but it can be slowed down without risk (by delaying contact with stimuli). Rousseau advocated such slowing down for sexual development; a development he felt was artificially stimulated by society.²⁰⁶ Such slowing down, however, is not slowing down the natural development of a child, but rather slowing down artificially accelerated development so that nature can take its proper course. Rousseau’s general rule for timing seemed to be to give all instructions “sooner or later as the peaceful or turbulent nature of the pupil accelerates or delays the need.”²⁰⁷

While Rousseau said that teachers have to study carefully each of their charges because what is taught necessarily “depends on the genius peculiar to each pupil, and the study of that genius depends on the occasions one offers each to reveal himself,” Rousseau did not suggest that some careful objective study of a child (as one might carefully study a plant) was sufficient. The subjective experiences of a child are also very important (as seen in the discussion of experiential knowledge), and he claimed these are beyond adult comprehension. The teacher must know the student, but there is a severe limit to such knowledge.

None of us is philosophic enough to know how to put himself in a child’s place.²⁰⁸

*Teachers' Understanding of
the Correct Pedagogic Process for Rousseau*

With Rousseau's notions of nature, it isn't surprising that his basic premise of the correct pedagogic practice is to follow nature. He counseled teachers to "always remember that you are the minister of nature, and you will never be its enemy."²⁰⁹ The sense throughout Rousseau's work is that if nature is allowed to act on its own without disturbance, it will make a person into a Natural Man. However, with the development of civilization, undisturbed natural processes are no longer possible. The teacher's job, therefore, is to understand what Nature wants (signs of which, Rousseau felt, abound in Nature as well as in the nature of humanity), make an alliance with the forces of nature, and help bring about what nature would have produced if it had not been thwarted by civilization. Rousseau counseled teachers to "leave nature to act for a long time before you get involved with acting in its place, lest you impede its operations."²¹⁰ In a sense, much of the correct pedagogy is thwarting harmful effects.

Such thwarting, instead of going towards something, seems to be the principle reason Rousseau described his education as "negative education." Rousseau felt that the surest way of reaching Ultimacy was to teach nothing that is not called for by the child for the first twelve years of the child's life.

To form this rare man [natural man], what do we have to do?
Very much, doubtless. What must be done is to prevent anything
from being done.²¹¹

This is very difficult to achieve in society, and very difficult for a teacher, because a teacher is judged by the student's learning of performances and not by preventing inappropriate learning. Yet this is what Rousseau felt was necessary and amounts to a "doing everything by doing nothing."²¹²

As a consequence of Rousseau's notions of developmental stages (with the corollary that engaging in learning prematurely causes damage), Rousseau was more concerned with preventing damage than making progress. He was certain that the learning forces inherent in people insures that they will learn what they need (for "utility" or "pleasure") quickly and easily if such learning is not ruined by premature exposure. What was necessary was prevention, "securing the heart from vice and the mind from error," rather than "teaching virtue" and knowl-

edge.²¹³ Rousseau felt that the end result of such prevention is a highly educated and wise young adult, and it is the end product that was important for Rousseau, not the intermediary stages.

Rousseau said that one of his important maxims was “that usually one gets very surely and quickly what one is not in a hurry to get.”²¹⁴ Rousseau was indifferent whether Emile learned how to read before the age of fifteen, though he was certain that Emile would learn well before that age because Emile would see its utility and want to learn it. Rousseau was convinced that if he tried to teach Emile to read before the natural motivation was in place, then the activity would be made onerous to Emile. If reading was made onerous for him, then even if Emile achieved a high level of reading, reading as an activity would be ruined for him. This, Rousseau felt, is too often the result that “positive” education achieves. Consequently he says provocatively, “Dare I expose the greatest, the most important, the most useful rule of all education? It is not to gain time but to lose it.”²¹⁵

Rousseau claims that from birth to the age of twelve is the most fragile time of life when a person is most vulnerable to the damage of “errors” and “vices.” Rousseau felt that “the only instrument for destroying” such damage was reason, but a child hasn’t reached the age of reason before twelve, and therefore has no means of combating such damage. For Rousseau, doing nothing educationally but avoiding error and vice is enough of an accomplishment.

You know, you say, the value of time and do not want to waste any of it? You do not see that using time badly wastes time far more than doing nothing with it and that a badly instructed child is farther from wisdom than the one who has not been instructed at all. You are alarmed to see him consume his early years in doing nothing. What? Is it nothing to be happy? Is it nothing to jump, play, and run all day? He will never be so busy in his life. ...Therefore, do not be overly frightened by this alleged idleness. What would you say of a man who, in order to profit from his whole life, never wanted to sleep? You would say, “That man is crazy; he does not gain time for his joy; he deprives himself of it. To flee sleep, he races toward death.” Be aware, then, that we have here the same thing that childhood is reason’s sleep.²¹⁶

Negative education has other aspects as well. Rousseau felt that much moral education can only be approached negatively. Rousseau claimed that the most important moral lesson is “never to harm anyone,” and that all notions of doing good must be subordinate to this

or they are “dangerous, false, and contradictory,”²¹⁷ as can often be seen by the most wicked of men who often try to do good in a limited way or to a limited group. Rousseau believed that “the most sublime virtues are negative,”²¹⁸ and although he doesn’t list many, there is enough in his text to imagine he might have had the list of Judeo-Christian “thou shalt not” in mind. In his *Social Contract* Rousseau stated simply, “I will never say enough that good education must be negative. Prevent vices from forming and you will have done enough for virtue.”²¹⁹

Even intellectual progress is to proceed by a negative approach. Rousseau claimed that it was better for Emile to take pride in “not falling into error” about something, than in “knowing the truth” of that thing;²²⁰ to know he didn’t know is better than to mistakenly think he did know, and a surer way of avoiding folly. “To be wise one must discern what is not wise.”²²¹

One of the tools that Rousseau believed a teacher should use to facilitate the needed learning is, as mentioned previously, what he called the “law of necessity.” Most simply, this may be considered as combining the rules which govern the physical universe (e.g., physics, chemistry), human dynamics (e.g., *amour de soi* being the source of all passions), and human relations (e.g., compassion requires empathy). Rousseau felt that it is obviously important for people to understand such laws. Consequently, understanding that there is a law of necessity, as well as understanding what some of those laws are, must be included in education. It is equally important, but far less obvious, that it is these laws which should serve as the basis for childhood discipline. For Rousseau this has several advantages, which he demonstrated by the example of a child lying.

1) A child cannot understand the reasons for prescriptions against lying because moral concepts are beyond his development. However, he can well understand that he is no longer believed because of past lying, and he can see the disadvantage of not being believed especially if he is wrongly accused of something and his protestations of innocence are not believed.²²²

2) If a child is punished for lying (for violating a prescription), he will generally feel that his punishment comes from the punisher who is, as a consequence, seen as the source of his discomfort rather than seeing his lying as the source. The child is, therefore, simply estranged from his punisher, and should this punisher be the teacher, it is anti-educational as the teacher is a person with whom the student should have a good relation.

3) If the consequences of actions come from people (e.g., punish-

ment or rewards) rather than things which follow the law of necessity, a child learns that what is important is the impressions received by those who can reward and punish, with the consequence that the positions of authorities are elevated and the art of dissembling is (unintentionally) encouraged.

For Rousseau, therefore, the teacher needs to understand that the experience of the consequences of the law of necessity “ought to take the place of law for”²²³ the student.

The teacher ought not train the student to follow commands but to understand the consequences of actions. The student ought also to not learn to issue commands, but learn to limit his desires to what he can do for himself and so learn the limits of his own strength. Rousseau understood that children cannot do many things for themselves which they need, but feels that such things must be distinguished from doing things for children that they simply want, because a lack of such distinction can give a child an inaccurate sense of his strength, his place in the world, his relations, and his freedom. Due to the law of necessity, such false learning will eventually rebound on the child and continually rebound until accurate senses of strength, place, relations, and freedom are acquired; potentially a prolonged and very painful process. What must be avoided is “an excess of rigor and an excess of indulgence.”²²⁴ This is what Rousseau called “well-regulated freedom,” which he succinctly described as the student doing “only what he wants; but he ought to want only what you want him to do.”²²⁵ Thus, the teacher’s understanding of the correct pedagogic process must be embedded in giving a child freedom but within a context the teacher controls (with the context exerting the “law of necessity”) that should steer the child in the direction the teacher feels is most apposite.

All the instruments [for governing children] have been tried save one, the only one precisely that can succeed: well-regulated freedom. One ought not to get involved with raising a child if one does not know how to guide him where one wants by the laws of the possible and the impossible alone. The sphere of both being equally unknown to him, they can be expanded and contracted around him as one wants. One enchains, pushes, and restrains him with the bond of necessity alone without his letting out a peep. He is made supple and docile by the force of things alone without any vice [from reacting to the teacher] having the occasion to germinate in him...²²⁶

To reinforce Emile’s understanding of the law of necessity, Rousseau had as Emile’s first book *Robinson Crusoe* as this is the story of a man

who needs give no importance to anything but this law. Yet the law of necessity has implications that go far beyond survival, and Rousseau hoped *Emile* would begin to understand these implications. The law of necessity establishes the “true relations of things” rather than the artificial relations of society, and understanding true relations is the beginning of the formation of judgment.²²⁷ The law of necessity is also the beginning of moral understanding. Rousseau would have the teacher gradually move his instruction from understanding the law of necessity, to seeing what is useful, to finally seeing “what is suitable and good,” because what is useful, suitable and good is necessary.²²⁸ In this way, morality finds its rightful place; it is an extension of the law of necessity and not some duty or obligation, and a person with that understanding of morality will remain moral even when it is difficult, while the person who sees morality as duty or obligation will not.

Linked in Rousseau’s mind with the law of necessity is learning these laws (whenever it is safe) from experience. For Rousseau then, the correct pedagogic practice is one in which the child experiences the law of necessity in safety, although not always in comfort.

To learn what is truly necessary, Rousseau insisted on the importance of preventing the formation of habits in children. Habits, he felt, are artificial needs and confuse a child’s understanding of the law of necessity, so that even the most basic habits should be avoided.

Food and sleep too exactly measured become necessary for them at the end of the same spans of time, and soon desire no longer comes from need but from habit, or, rather, habit adds a new need to that of nature. That is what must be prevented.

The only habit that a child should be allowed is to contract none.²²⁹

While Rousseau would govern the child by expanding and contracting the law of necessity around him, he would also “choose the time, the place, and the objects most favorable to the impression I want to make.”²³⁰ The “time” refers not just to the stage of development of a child, but to whether the child is in a frame of mind to learn something. The “objects” refer to those things that a judicious teacher will put in front of a child to excite his curiosity or stimulate his activities. The “place” refers to the context of a lesson (Rousseau sometimes used “place” as one of the “objects”) which has importance for a child’s ability to make connections between his life and the lesson or between lessons. Much in *Emile* describes Rousseau’s application of these three variables (time, objects, and place),²³¹ but with only a super-

ficial understanding of Rousseau, one could accuse him of shaping a student through the application of stimuli rather than assisting Nature in its unfolding of the student's inherent nature.

The "objects" with which Rousseau would have surrounded a student must be simple enough for him to understand, amusing or useful enough to be of interest and, in the teacher's mind at least, linked to other objects that together might form elements of a complex understanding. Rousseau would not, however, explicate that complex understanding for the child, as this is just the kind of abstraction he felt a child should not be subjected to. This is one of the instances in which Rousseau exhibited an unexplicated notion of pre-conscious cognition. Rousseau believed that if objects and experiences "are connected with one another by some sort of deduction..." students can easily and naturally "order them in their minds and recall them when needed,"²³² thereby generating their own, and therefore, appropriate abstractions. In this way a teacher can avoid the conflation of learning words (that Rousseau was so against) with the learning of things, and avoid the danger of *amour-propre* (from performance/representational learning, rather than competence) that often follows.²³³

As the student gets older, the "objects" include other people and their situations. When the student is young, Rousseau would have only those people around who would not corrupt the student. Yet, Rousseau insisted that if a child is brought up in society, then he must begin early to get "some idea of the relations of man to man and of the morality of human actions."²³⁴ To avoid corruption that might come from too much direct exposure, Rousseau felt it is better to first show the student "men from afar, to show him them in other times or other places..."²³⁵ Rousseau proposed this as the appropriate time for the study of history, as it allows for the study of people, but with a helpful objectivity that automatically comes from the peoples of history coming from another time and often another place. The history Rousseau would start with is biography.²³⁶

Thus, as the student gets older, Rousseau would have the student directly experience different kinds of people. Rousseau suggested that a young person regularly engage in charitable acts, partly because "it is in doing good that one becomes good; I know of no practice more certain."²³⁷ Another reason for this is that Rousseau felt it is important for young people to understand human nature, but not just human nature in abstraction; human nature and the application of action to human nature.

However, Rousseau believed that the practice of exposing the stu-

dent to humans in need must be judiciously done. The point is to learn about people and to develop empathy. Great care must be taken that the student “must be touched and not hardened by the sight of human miseries.”²³⁸

Rousseau put as a maxim for the correct pedagogic processes in social development that,

It is not in the human heart to put ourselves in the place of people who are happier than we, but only in that of those who are more pitiable.²³⁹

From this Rousseau felt it followed that instead of simply studying the glories and greatness that has been the lot of others, a child should also see the “sad sides” of others.²⁴⁰

Rousseau held as a second maxim that,

One pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel oneself exempt.²⁴¹

From this Rousseau felt it followed that a student must see others less fortunate as not “alien to him”²⁴² but as different only in fortune, and that good fortune is precarious and fickle. Rousseau would have the student not just hear about this, but “let him see, let him feel the human calamities.”²⁴³

Teachers can extend a student’s exposure to actual objects to what Rousseau called “facts.” He didn’t seem to ask any of the questions modern philosophers might ask about the nature of facts, but seems to be satisfied with a simple definition of facts as “things” and “events.” Rousseau’s pedagogic practice is to expose the student to things that he can verify with his senses. He would have the younger student verify one sense with another, e.g., seeing that a straw half in water looks like it bends at the point of entry, but then pulling it out and seeing that it isn’t bent. For older students he would have them “learn to verify the relations of each sense by itself without need of recourse to another sense”;²⁴⁴ a kind of critical thinking in which each impression is doubted and checked for its inner validity. This level of validation, Rousseau felt, is necessary for the development of judgment, as it is a safeguard against illusion and self-delusion.

Rousseau would also have the student in the early years exposed only to “facts” about history and social relations, without any opinions. Rousseau felt that,

The worst historians for a young man are those who make judgements. Facts! Facts! And let him make his own judgements. It is thus that he learns to know men. If the author's judgement guides him constantly, all he does is see with another's eye; and when that eye fails him, he no longer sees anything.²⁴⁵

Such avoidance of opinion is especially difficult with regard to the teacher's own opinions, as facts and opinions are so easily mixed together in our minds. This is another reason to avoid what Rousseau felt were mainstream notions of teaching, and to allow the child to experience things as much as possible on his own. Rousseau believed that there was a time for the teacher to give his own opinion; but, it was more important to first allow the child to develop judgment and to give the child the necessary experience of freedom (which for Rousseau included freedom from opinions). Thus, the time for the teacher to give opinions was only after the child had formed his own judgments.²⁴⁶ The dangers of public opinion were even more severe.

But if you begin by instructing him in public opinion before teaching him to appraise it, rest assured that, whatever you may do, it will become his, and you will no longer be able to destroy it. I draw the conclusion that to make a young man judicious, we must form his judgements well instead of dictating ours to him.²⁴⁷

Rousseau summarizes in one elegant sentence several of his notions about the pedagogic process necessary for facilitating the needed learning.

Set these contrasts side by side, love nature, despise opinion, and know man.²⁴⁸

Rousseau also had a great deal to say about the correct pedagogic practices for learning about the passions (which combine many modern notions of desire and emotion). Rousseau was convinced that sexual activity before early adulthood was premature and damaging to morals, character and body. He would prefer to keep a child ignorant of such matters until late adolescence, but was realistic about the practicality of this in society. Since innocence wasn't possible, education at an early age was necessary.

It is important here to leave nothing to chance; and if you are not sure of keeping him ignorant of the difference between the sexes until he is sixteen, take care that he learn it before he is ten.²⁴⁹

Rousseau ridiculed those who want to “guide the young soberly” by making “love disgusting to them and would gladly make it a crime for them to think of it at their age, as though love were made for the old.”²⁵⁰ Rousseau felt that the hearts of young people know this is a lie, and because it is contrary to Nature it can never work. He proposed instead to talk to the young about love as “the supreme happiness in life, because in fact it is”²⁵¹ and to show the rightful place of sex as the ally of love in order to “disgust him with libertinism.”²⁵² Rousseau claimed that the passions must be conquered, but this can only be done with the passions themselves—akin to fighting fire with fire. He claimed that part of the correct pedagogic processes is understanding that “it is always from nature itself that the proper instruments to regulate nature must be drawn.”²⁵³

Even though Rousseau stated that what a child learned was not important, he did feel that general academic areas should be learned. He wanted Emile to learn to read, to write, to do geometry, geography, and history, etc., but these are abilities to be developed, not to be confused with specific knowledge to be acquired. Rousseau claimed that how much geometry and what specific elements of geometry are learned is unimportant, and what Emile knows should be tied to use and be an aspect of personal development. This is seen perhaps most succinctly in Rousseau’s suggestions of teaching children to speak in public.

Teach him to speak plainly and clearly, to articulate well, to pronounce exactly and without affectation, to know and follow grammatical accent and prosody, always to employ enough voice to be heard but never to employ more than is required, a defect common in children raised in colleges. In all things, nothing superfluous.²⁵⁴

Rousseau recognized that one of the principle difficulties with the pedagogic processes he advocated (a difficulty that Bernstein points to in his discussion of competence based pedagogy—discussed beginning on page 243) is the problem of assessment. In brief, the problem is that in competence based pedagogy, which has no prescribed curriculum and does not seek displays or performances of learning, the

teacher needs to be able to discern the student's learning through whatever the student happens to show of that learning. Rousseau called mainstream assessment based on asking questions for which there are prescribed answers "vain and pedantic."²⁵⁵ He believed that

...often a word caught in midflight depicts their [the students'] bent and their mind better than a long speech would. But care must be taken that this word is neither dictated nor fortuitous. One must have a great deal of judgement oneself to appreciate a child's.²⁵⁶

The reason that "care must be taken" is seen in Rousseau's criticism of "showy displays" discussed previously and his notions of knowledge. Rousseau believed that in mainstream education the emphasis on performance too frequently displays only

the imitative spirit common to man and ape, which leads both mechanically to want to do everything they see done without quite knowing what it is good for.²⁵⁷

Rousseau believed that what is needed is astute observation of the child by the teacher in order to discern the student's talents, nature, disposition and understanding; as it is on the basis of these that the teacher can build. Rousseau claimed that, unfortunately, a person "is not seen in a moment"²⁵⁸ except by very rare and perceptive observers, but the correct pedagogic practice requires this talent.

I would want a judicious man to give us a treatise on the art of observing children. This art would be very important to know. Fathers and masters have not yet learned its elements.²⁵⁹

One of the difficulties that Rousseau believed teachers have in trying to study the student's "tastes, his inclinations, and his penchants and of seeing the first spark of his genius ignite"²⁶⁰ is that the teacher confuses his own enthusiasm for that of the student's, which leaves the student looking on passively and uninvolved in the task at hand.²⁶¹

Linking the question of teacher observation with the element of time discussed previously (see page 92, as well as page 236 in the sociological discussion): Teachers need to be able to see their students clearly to know through which stage of development a child is passing. Rousseau believed that teachers who ignore the child's stage of development, and focus instead on the stage they want the child to get to, end up cajoling and coercing what should come about naturally and, in

the process, spoiling the very developments they wish to bring about.²⁶² Rousseau felt that lessons should resemble play: they should be appropriate to the student's development and interests, have as strong an experiential component as possible, and advance only as the student's interests progress (guided indirectly by the teacher).²⁶³

Obviously, a teacher must have one eye on the future and intended development if the previous discussion on Ultimacy is to make any sense. The other eye, however, must be firmly on what the child is in a position to learn at the time of the lesson,²⁶⁴ and this depends not only on the specific developmental stage of the child, but the child's frame of mind as well.²⁶⁵ If "time" (as an aspect determining what a child is in a position to learn) is ignored, then "with chains of truths we heap up only follies and errors in their heads"²⁶⁶ and feel satisfied that we have given good instruction. This is what Rousseau felt normally occurs with the moralizing and sanctimonious preaching that passes for instruction for both young and old.²⁶⁷ Rousseau was especially adamant about the element of time as it concerned moral instruction. Rousseau believed that attempts to instruct in morals before the correct time do more than "heap up follies and errors," they often corrupt the unprepared mind. Speaking about things that students can't properly understand serves only "to give them a desire to know those things,"²⁶⁸ and the teacher ends up doing the work of the devil.

On this earth, out of which nature has made man's first paradise, dread exercising the tempter's function in wanting to give innocence the knowledge of good and evil.²⁶⁹

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that with reference to time, Rousseau counseled delaying all acts that might trigger development which is not called for by the student's nature, situation or inclination. This does not ensure the greatest rate of advance, but it avoids most damage, which in the long run, is far more costly.

Regard all delays as advantages; to advance toward the end without losing anything is to gain a lot. Let childhood ripen in children. And what if some lessons finally become necessary to them? Keep yourself from giving it today if you can without danger put it off until tomorrow.²⁷⁰

For Rousseau, the correct pedagogic processes must involve harnessing the inherent motivation mentioned previously. The teacher must understand that motivation is related to stages of development (i.e., a

child is not inherently motivated to learn something that is beyond him or too easy for him), and related to *amour de soi*. Instruction should be “suitable to his [the student’s] age” and “in forms which will make it loved.”²⁷¹ This is as important for correct instruction in moral and emotional matters as it is for academic ones. Rousseau felt that if a love of something could be engendered as well as knowledge of how to learn, then the needed learning would always occur.²⁷² For moral, social and (what today might be called) “character” development, Rousseau felt that much is accomplished by engendering a love of beauty (the beauty of nature, of good relations, of acting rightly, etc.) and it is such a love that is the basis of real happiness.²⁷³ Consequently, Rousseau insisted that “talent at instruction consists in making the disciple enjoy the instruction,”²⁷⁴ to the extent that:

They [students] should not be offered lessons; they should be the ones to ask for them. A reward ought not to be made into a chore; ...the first step toward success is to want to succeed.²⁷⁵

Rousseau felt the teacher should be wary of false or corrupted motivation, as would be the case if the motivation came from a perverted *amour-propre*. Rousseau felt it was important to prevent this and gave careful instruction in several instances on how this can be avoided.²⁷⁶ He was especially against comparisons and competition as motivation as these are particularly corrupting.

I prefer a hundred times over that he not learn what he would only learn out of jealousy or vanity.²⁷⁷

Consequently, Rousseau felt it was necessary for the teacher to “pay less attention to the words [the student] pronounces than to the motive which causes him to speak.”²⁷⁸ Seeing the student’s motives, therefore, is an important responsibility of the teacher in his care for the overall development of the student,²⁷⁹ and an important part of the assessment a teacher is responsible for making. This makes sense if what needs to be learned is sagacious competence (see page 35), but it has little or no importance if performance is the goal of education.

Many of Rousseau’s notions of correct pedagogic processes stem from his view that we have three sources of education—nature, men, and things.

The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature. The use we are taught to make of this

development is the education of men. And what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the education of things.²⁸⁰

The education coming from nature is beyond the control of people, “that coming from things is in our control only in certain respects,”²⁸¹ so it is only “the education of men” that can be entirely determined by the teacher. Rousseau felt these three sources of education must be in harmony for the student to grow in harmony. From this it follows that what is in the control of teachers must be directed so as to be in harmony with that over which there is no control. Consequently, Rousseau felt that education cannot succeed when it is prescriptive, as that is an activity removed from directly following nature as it exists in the student.

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Relationship for Rousseau

With respect to Rousseau's views on what facilitates the necessary learning for Ultimacy, he also gave specific recommendations about the correct pedagogic relationship, as well as mistakes to avoid with respect to that relationship. Rousseau's notions of the correct pedagogic relationship that teachers must understand revolve around two issues, both of which have been discussed before and which are connected. The first of these issues is authority, and the second is Rousseau's notions of the law of necessity.

Rousseau's notions of authority are singular: for the most part, there shouldn't be any.

Command him nothing, whatever in the world it might be, absolutely nothing. Do not even allow him to imagine that you might pretend to have any authority over him.²⁸²

This was his suggestion even for infants, and Rousseau felt there can be no compromise on the issue.

...there is no middle point here: nothing must be demanded from him at all, or he must be bent from the outset to the most perfect obedience.²⁸³

What Rousseau wanted instead is for the teacher to use the law of necessity which, in terms of the pedagogic relationship, means letting

the child perceive that he is incapable of many things of which the teacher is capable, and for which the child needs the help of the adult. It is the exercise of capacity not authority that Rousseau sees as the precursor to the child learning the law of necessity. Preventing the child from doing things rather than forbidding it (and doing so through things, e.g., putting something the child should not play with out of reach rather than forbidding it) will help the child see that he must yield to “the heavy yoke of necessity” that exists in things rather than yielding to “the caprice of men.”²⁸⁴

An aspect of authority that Rousseau frequently mentions is the authority of the child, which also has no place in the upbringing of a child. Rousseau would not allow the child to command and would especially not allow a power struggle to occur between the child and the adult, as this destroys the correct pedagogic relationship.²⁸⁵

There are other mistakes related to authority that can destroy the pedagogic relationship, which for Rousseau, must be based on affection and trust. Children automatically, and rightly (due to *amour de soi*) have a need to evade or reduce any authority that restricts their freedom, and this they do by looking for and exploiting the weaknesses of those who exercise authority.

One of children’s first efforts, as I have said, is to discover the weakness of those who govern them. This inclination leads to wickedness but does not come from it. It comes from the need to elude an authority which importunes them. Overburdened by the yoke imposed on them, they seek to shake it off, and the shortcomings they find in the masters furnish them with good means for that.²⁸⁶

This sets up a relationship of opposition where the teacher is trying to coerce the student and the student is trying to find and exploit the weaknesses of the teacher, with the result that the affection and trust Rousseau felt is necessary in education becomes impossible. When there is no authority and no attempt to coerce, Rousseau believed the student has no need to deceive or hide. With this transparency the teacher can engage in that vital activity of understanding the particular student and then “arrange all around him [the student] the lessons you want to give him without his ever thinking he is receiving any.”²⁸⁷

In what Rousseau called “the Second Age” (placed between infancy and adolescence) the most obvious uses of the law of necessity to direct the child are, according to Rousseau, to be replaced by “chains...put around his heart. Reason, friendship, gratitude, countless

affections speak to him in a tone he cannot fail to recognize.”²⁸⁸ Such complex emotions (which are all extensions of *amour de soi*, and so are “passions of nature”²⁸⁹) become possible at this age, and these should remain uncorrupted and the basis of the pedagogic relationship. Rousseau believed that if a student finds a teacher lying to him it “would ruin forever the whole fruit of the education,”²⁹⁰ as would any deception on the part of the teacher that is perceived by the student.

A deception related to notions of authority, which Rousseau felt often occurred, was the teacher “affecting a magisterial dignity and wanting to pass for a perfect man in the mind of one’s disciple.”²⁹¹ This is a terrible mistake because the image is impossible to maintain, but even if it were to be, it would destroy the basis of a positive pedagogic relationship. In terms that adumbrate Rogers, Rousseau calls for authenticity, for being someone whose humanness generates empathy and, therefore, listening on the part of the students. Rousseau castigated teachers who “run down their pupils” in order to “play wise men,” and implored teachers instead to “make them [the students] your equals in order that they may become your equals.”²⁹² Of course, this isn’t possible for a teacher who wants to maintain a power differential in order to control the student and, for Rousseau, such disempowering of the student is anti-educational.

Part of making a student “your equal” is to allow the student the freedom to make mistakes. Rousseau felt the teacher must “warn him [the student] of the perils to which he is exposed...clearly and sensibly, but without exaggeration, ill humor, pedantic display...” or advice disguised as an order.²⁹³ If the student insists on doing what he is warned against, Rousseau advised the teacher to accompany him on his mistake, partly for protection and partly because Rousseau believed that the lesson for the child is reinforced by the child seeing the teacher also suffer the consequences of his mistake. What the teacher must never do is engage in rebukes and “I told you so” which can “only inflame [the student’s] *amour-propre* and make it rebel.”²⁹⁴ There is another element to this accompanying the child in all things that Rousseau did not belabor but which is an interesting aspect of what he felt is the correct pedagogic relationship. It is learning with the student. Rousseau claimed of Emile, “I am convinced that he will only ever learn well what we learn together.”²⁹⁵ Rousseau often implies that even though the teacher may already know about a subject, he can always learn more, and the teacher’s engaging in the learning process for himself is an important part of the student’s learning to engage in the learning process.

Rousseau counseled a dramatic change in the pedagogic relationship when the student reaches young adulthood (which for Rousseau was determined by sexual development).

When, by the signs of which I have spoken, you have a presentiment of the critical moment, instantly abandon your old tone with him forever. He is still your disciple, but he is no longer your pupil. He is your friend, he is a man. From now on treat him as such.²⁹⁶

The teacher's role now is to make himself wanted by the student by his charm, his worthy personality, and his wisdom. The student no longer feels he needs the teacher, but instead wants him as his confidant and his friend.²⁹⁷

Teachers' Self-Development for Rousseau

Rousseau believed that a teacher must first accomplish in himself the development he would wish in his student. He stated that he "cannot repeat often enough that to be the child's master one must be one's own master."²⁹⁸ However, Rousseau didn't go further than seeing the value of this as residing in the importance of example.

Remember that before daring to undertake the formation of a man, one must have made oneself a man. One must find within oneself the example the pupil ought to take for his own.²⁹⁹

As Rousseau believed that "being a man" lay in Ultimacy and that virtue was one of the prime characteristics of Ultimacy, Rousseau counseled the prospective teacher to gain mastery by developing virtue. This, Rousseau believed, would generate respect in other people who surround the student, which in turn would help the student have the correct respectful relationship with the teacher.³⁰⁰

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF JOHANN HEINRICH PESTALOZZI
(12 JANUARY 1746 – 17 FEBRUARY 1827)

*P*estalozzi was born into an Italian merchant family which had immigrated to Switzerland in the middle of the 16th century. His family was only modestly prosperous, and trade kept his father away from home for the first five years of Pestalozzi's life. Some commentators have speculated that this early experience of having only a mother's influence in his life inspired the importance he placed on the role of mother in early childhood learning, but there seems little reason to suppose he could not have reached the same views had both his parents been present in his early life. He was an able student and progressed to the study of theology in order to become a clergyman at the prestigious Collegium Carolinum in Zurich. Once there, however, he became politically active and switched to the study of law with the intention of pursuing a political administration career. His political activism led him to join youthful idealists in promoting the Helvetic Society (a political movement proposing to overthrow the aristocratic cantonal governments of Switzerland), an activism which eventually caused him to be expelled from college. Before his expulsion, however, Pestalozzi read and

was greatly inspired by the then newly published work of Rousseau, most notably *Emile*, and *The Social Contract*. Filled with idealism, he wanted to go 'back to nature'. Pestalozzi acknowledged the importance of Rousseau's influence right until the end of his life.

In 1769 Pestalozzi married Ana Schultess, daughter of a successful merchant and heiress. With her inheritance Pestalozzi and his wife bought their first of several farms, all of which were to fail for lack of agricultural skill and business acumen. A year after marriage, the Pestalozzis had a son who they named after Rousseau (Johann Jakob as the Swiss-German equivalent of Jean-Jacques), but for some reason and in some way now lost in history, this child was mentally challenged and remained his family's charge into adulthood.

By 1774 Pestalozzi was forced to abandon agriculture and tried to start a textile business on his property. His intention was to take in poor children, teach them to spin and weave, and at the same time give them lessons and moral instruction so that they could become self-supporting. He was, however, far more interested in not exploiting the children than in making money, and the costs of feeding, clothing, educating and housing these waifs caused this venture to lose money dramatically, and ended in financial failure.

In 1780 Pestalozzi wrote his first book, *The Evening Hour of the Hermit*, in which many of his lasting educational principles appear, e.g., education had to be according to nature, learning should proceed from the familiar to the new, emotional responses and the pace of learning of each individual child had to be respected, the security a child finds in the home is the foundation of morality and happiness, etc. His book was an immediate success, and Pestalozzi finally found an activity at which he wouldn't lose money, writing. The success of this book was followed by *Leonard and Gertrude* in 1787 which was an even greater success. In this novel, Gertrude saves her village by her morality and is an inspiration to all with her integrity and well ordered home, with which she clearly demonstrates the right foundation for early education. Ten years later Pestalozzi writes the non-fiction *My Inquiries into the Course of Nature in the Development of Mankind*. In this work, Pestalozzi claims to have studied from observation the nature of humans and to see the basis for helping people develop so that they can think for themselves.

By 1798 the French Revolution had spread to Switzerland, and Pestalozzi was asked by the new (French supported) central government in Stans to set up an orphanage and school for the children in that city whom the war had made destitute. Pestalozzi engaged in this

project with all of his remaining resources and vigor, and despite what he claimed was the most exhausting time he ever knew, he often recalled this period as the happiest of his life. His building overflowed with more than four hundred children, and he would have taken more had space allowed. After only seven months, the orphanage had to close when the French army wanted Pestalozzi's buildings for a hospital after suffering reverses against the Austrians. The government of the Helvetic Republic then asked Pestalozzi to organize higher education in the devastated new republic, but Pestalozzi refused this offer as he felt his help was most urgently needed by the poor and usually orphaned children for whom no one else was caring.

Despite Pestalozzi's earnings from his writing and his wife's inheritance, Pestalozzi's care for poor children ruined him. All accounts of him remark on his appearance—tall, gangly, gaunt, often appearing underfed, and disheveled—yet they also remark on his obvious compassion, kindness, and selflessness. Throughout his career in education (which was almost always with poor children) he was known by his students as “Father Pestalozzi,” a name of endearment which he seems to have repeatedly earned for always trying to create the loving family atmosphere (even for more than four hundred children at a time) that he felt children needed.

From 1800 to 1804 Pestalozzi ran another school, this time at Burgdorf, but again he spent on the children more money than he could find, and this too failed. During this time (1801) he published *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* which served as an educational manual for mothers to teach their children. This was principally about intellectual education, which still had importance despite its secondary importance to moral education (or what today some call ‘personal education’). Borrowing from Rousseau, he felt that humans have innate intellectual faculties, and these should evolve from observation to comprehension to the formation of “clear ideas.”

In 1805 Pestalozzi started his most successful educational venture and the one that would make him most famous. For twenty years his school at Yverdon near Neuchâtel was visited by educators from all over Europe and America. It was the laboratory that proved the validity of his educational theories on intellectual, moral, and physical education. It was here that Froebel, Ritter, and other famous educators took their training and their inspiration. Yverdon had a combination of fee paying students and poor students, and Pestalozzi seems to have found a formula for a school that could make ends meet (when combined with his substantial publishing income). There was, however, to

be no happy ending for Pestalozzi. Squabbles and infighting amongst the staff developed that Pestalozzi could do nothing to quell. Those who didn't leave, turned on Pestalozzi and soon the fee paying students started to leave. Pestalozzi left in 1825 hoping those who remained could make something of the place if he was gone, and he retreated to Neuhof with a few of his poor students, but Yverdon didn't last.

In 1826 Pestalozzi published *Swan Song*, a beautiful little book in which he presents what he felt life had taught him about education, and in which he insists that "life educates"—a phrase with which he would thereafter be associated.

A year later, after one of his many solitary evening walks on a cold rainy night, he contracted pneumonia and died.

PESTALOZZI'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

Pestalozzi used language that is more conventionally religious than Rousseau, but not conventional enough to have prevented him from getting into trouble, like his hero, with the religious convictions of the governing authorities. He followed Rousseau in feeling that the best a person can aspire to is what is natural, but he tended to equate "nature" with "human nature" which he explicitly linked with the sacred: "[T]o elevate human nature to its highest, its noblest" requires developing "whatever of the divine and eternal lies within its nature."³⁰¹ This "elevation" was the goal of education, and is clearly a notion of Ultimacy.

While Rousseau had trouble with the governing authorities because of the religious views he espoused quite late in his career, Pestalozzi had similar trouble much earlier. During the early part of Pestalozzi's career, there was a great deal of political turmoil between monarchists and republicans, and between Catholic and Protestant movements that swept through the areas in which Pestalozzi was trying to start schools. Consequently, he avoided making statements that could be read as being against any religion, promoting only religiousness. Furthermore, he maintained that it is not through any church or dogma that the divine within is to be realized, rather "only in the holy power of love do I recognize the basis of the development of my [human] race to whatever of the divine and eternal lies within its nature."³⁰² As the "divine and eternal" was seen as within the nature of each child, the nature of

each child has to be respected by education, and education itself must follow nature. Such statements many have avoided seeming to favor either Catholics or Protestants, but they succeeded in antagonizing both.

Ultimacy in Relation to Pestalozzi's View of Human Nature

In examining Pestalozzi's view of human nature, he didn't contradict the themes in Rousseau's work but often developed them. He, like Rousseau, described Ultimacy as "manhood" or "Man," but he is a bit more helpful in telling us what that means. He said, for example, that a "Man" is someone who "is developed in his innermost powers."³⁰³ The reader is also told that "man will only become Man through his inner and spiritual life,"³⁰⁴ and a spiritual life is not to be found by a person in any outward expression of religiosity, but only in "the innermost sanctuary of his being." It is only here that Pestalozzi believed that a person could "find a genuine foundation for future love and power."³⁰⁵

In the early part of his career, Pestalozzi felt that allowing a child to follow nature (as he saw it, and very much as Rousseau explained it) was enough to ensure Ultimacy, but he changed this view as he grew older.³⁰⁶ Unlike Rousseau, Pestalozzi had the benefit of years of experimenting, and many of the lessons he learned were quite hard. He came to feel that "the education of nature" (i.e., a natural education or education according to divine nature) comes only from developing an awareness of one's inner life, which he called "the inner consciousness of thy powers."³⁰⁷ These inner powers "are innate in every man"³⁰⁸ and they include capacities of love and *Anschauung*.

Anschauung has no exact English equivalent, and Pestalozzi even used the word in an unorthodox way in German. This may be due to his being raised speaking Swiss German, or to his need to stretch the orthodox meaning to suit his purpose. *Anschauung* is variously translated as "sense impression," "perception," "intuition," and the *capacity* to see, hear or perceive, as well as other terms for subtle perception. Essentially, it refers to a person's direct, "natural," and unmediated contact with the world; "a face-to-face experience of the realities of the universe,"³⁰⁹ a way of knowing that is non-conceptual or pre-conceptual.³¹⁰

Capacities, Pestalozzi tells us, are in a child even before the child is born.³¹¹ Children first learn of love from their mothers (if they are fortunate in having good mothers) even before they are old enough to realize they are learning. They do this through *Anschauung*. *Anschauung*,

however, needs to be developed, and education, according to Pestalozzi, has a large responsibility in that development. *Anschauung*, Pestalozzi felt, is the first way we have of knowing as an infant, the primary way that we have of knowing new things, and the only way we have of knowing certain inner things. *Anschauung* also helps to explain Pestalozzi's version of listening or sensing within, and it is fundamental to Pestalozzi's view of the relationship between Ultimacy and human nature.³¹² He frequently, and in many different ways, expressed the importance in his education of such sensing of the Ultimacy within.³¹³

An important difference between holistic education and mainstream education follows from Pestalozzi's notions of the capacities of the child, capacities he described as "inner powers." Because of these inherent capacities, children ought not to be molded according to a model, or made into something that is alien to them. While this notion is mostly implied by Rousseau, Pestalozzi and all the Authors who historically succeed him wrote explicitly about this and that it marks one of their principal differences with mainstream education. Pestalozzi felt strongly enough about this that he not only wrote about it in his books, but often stated it to his students as though he felt he needed to frequently reassure them on this subject.³¹⁴

Like Rousseau, Pestalozzi felt that forces of nature drive the "purposeful evolution" described above. Pestalozzi also—at first just hinting, but later more openly—wrote of another "unseen force in the human organism in the production of a Man, a being made in the image of God..."³¹⁵ We must understand "Man" as Pestalozzi used the word means both genders, and indicates a full maturity into Ultimacy, as it is the finest and most complete human development. This good, natural and "unseen force" is, in an unspecified way, related to the divine. In Pestalozzi's last book, it is implied that by a person becoming Man (which is his duty and his natural destiny) God manifests.

Ultimacy As an Aspect of Religiousness for Pestalozzi

In terms of Ultimacy as an aspect of religiousness, Pestalozzi felt that "nature forms the child as an indivisible whole," and that all of a child's capacities are linked.³¹⁶ Pestalozzi never said how or when children stop being whole, but by the time they are of school age, he claimed they are in need of an education that will give them the unification that forms part of his notion of Ultimacy. Pestalozzi implied that society (or parents, family, or bad education) creates this fragmen-

tation or disharmony by over-emphasizing some of the faculties at the expense of others. This, he felt, is like a bud that only opens a few of its petals, with the result that the whole of the flower is ruined, for not only does the whole need each part, but each part needs the development of every other part for its full fruition.³¹⁷

Pestalozzi repeated Rousseau's categories of head, heart, and hand, and saw these as an "important witness to the unity of man's nature"³¹⁸ because they represent man's moral, intellectual, and physical capacities. For Pestalozzi, "only that which affects man as an indissoluble unit is educative in our sense of the word," and warned: "What God has joined [the wholeness of a human] let no man put asunder."³¹⁹

WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR PESTALOZZI

Pestalozzi's View of Experiential Knowledge

Pestalozzi's doctrine of *Anschauung* forms the basis of his notions of experiential knowledge. Hayward sums up this doctrine as, "Things before Words' and 'Concrete before Abstract'."³²⁰ Pestalozzi stated his epistemology simply and frequently.

The most essential point from which I start is this: Sense impression [*Anschauung*] of Nature is the only true foundation of human instruction, because it is the only true foundation of human knowledge.

All that follows is the result of this sense impression [*Anschauung*], and the process of abstraction from it.³²¹

Just as *Anschauung* meant the inner listening and seeing needed to know the divine within, for Pestalozzi, it also meant listening to the emotions and the mind.³²² Consequently, *Anschauung* also encompassed intuition for Pestalozzi,³²³ reflecting what Rousseau called "the sixth sense."

For Pestalozzi, the notion of *Anschauung* reinforced Rousseau's contention that lessons should be found in the everyday experiences of the child and not imposed by some idea of curriculum. As mentioned, one of Pestalozzi's favorite maxims was, "life educates."³²⁴ Lessons based on the immediate life of the child are able to be contextualized by the child and are, therefore, more likely to be meaningful.

The most important mistake of present-day education is undoubtedly the following: Too much is expected of the child and too many of the topics only appear to be something [to the child] but are nothing.³²⁵

Pestalozzi felt that “the mode of doing this [ensuring lessons come from the child] is not by any means to talk much *to* a child, but to enter into conversation *with* a child;...”³²⁶ This is one of many statements by Pestalozzi which indicate his sense that children deserve respect and that they have certain rights to determine their own education; a remarkable attitude towards children in eighteenth century Europe.

Such respect is also evident in Pestalozzi’s notion of “spontaneous-activity” (which Froebel renamed “self-activity”) whereby a child is left free to follow his impulses, generating activity that the teacher could then use for instruction. With children playing together, this same principle is applied to groups of children, becoming a group version of the doctrine of lessons following from experience.

Following impulses was also seen by Pestalozzi as a way for a child to learn about himself and what his vocation is. Watching such spontaneous-activity is, Pestalozzi felt, an important tool for the teacher in gaining insights into individual children, enabling the teacher to know how best to teach each child. Pestalozzi was firm in his commitment that education was meant to fit the child, not the reverse.

...education, instead of merely considering what is to be imparted to children, ought to consider first what they may be said to already possess, if not as a developed, at least as an involved faculty capable of development.³²⁷

The link between living and learning was extremely important for Pestalozzi. He claimed that knowledge disengaged from application is “a fearful gift from a fiendish spirit” because “knowing and doing are so closely connected, that if one ceases, the other [in any meaningful sense] ceases with it.”³²⁸

For Pestalozzi, it is partly due to the emotions that “life educates.” It is only in feeling things that, he believed, they really have meaning,³²⁹ and this is as true for moral knowledge as for knowledge of objects.³³⁰ Pestalozzi’s notions of emotional development constituted an important aspect of *Anschauung*, and are the foundations of moral and social development. None of the other Authors wrote as frequently or as passionately about love. Pestalozzi felt that the natural love that children have for their mothers is “the first feeling of an higher nature”³³¹

(i.e., feeling of the Divine within), and he declared that it is this love that guided the development of his method of education. In an address to the students at his school in Yverdon he said,

Children, that this love may increase, and be assured within you, is all that we propose for our object. Instruction, as such, and of itself, does not produce love, any more than it produces hate. Therefore it is that it is not the essence of education. Love is its essence.³³²

For Pestalozzi, “all human wisdom is based on a good heart,”³³³ as is morality. Pestalozzi held that love gives rise to justice, justice to freedom, and “therefore freedom is also based upon love.”³³⁴ Moral development entails broadening the heart. It followed for Pestalozzi that “one of the most effective aids of moral education”³³⁵ was music (with drawing following closely), because music and drawing can stir and extend the hearts of children.

Pestalozzi frequently demonstrated his belief in the primacy of experience, as he did in defining “clear ideas” as those “to which...experience can bring no more clearness.”³³⁶ However, Pestalozzi found more use for representational knowledge than Rousseau. While experience is the ultimate base of all knowledge, Pestalozzi believed that representations are often needed to enhance or extend experiential knowledge. More than Rousseau’s summarizing of the child’s experience into a maxim or drawing connections to similar knowledge, Pestalozzi held that words are needed after the experience for even simple things.³³⁷ For example, Pestalozzi would have the mother (or infant teacher) give a child spheres of different sizes, roll them around on the floor, and indicate roundness with hand movements before saying the word “round.” Saying the word, however, was important for Pestalozzi. To be presented with experience and representation in the reverse order was, for Pestalozzi, a violation of our nature (which develops senses before developing the capacity to understand representation). If such reversals become a habit, they make seeing truth more difficult because methods of learning become ingrained which are contrary to those of learning truth, which always conform to nature.³³⁸

Like Rousseau, Pestalozzi was scornful of representations substituting for experience, and Pestalozzi felt that “real knowledge” could not be derived from “word-teaching and mere talk.”³³⁹ However, unlike Rousseau, Pestalozzi addressed the issue of how things that have no physicality might be experienced and taught through experience.³⁴⁰ It seems that, for Pestalozzi, there are, what can be called, levels of abstraction or representation. For example, the direct experience of a

tree with no representation of any kind is the least abstracted. A painting of a tree is a representation of the tree but, as it has form and color which provide some sensory experience, it is less abstracted than a mere verbal description of the tree which would have no such experiences. As a consequence of this view of levels of abstraction, Pestalozzi encouraged teachers and others to give lessons about abstract notions (e.g., honesty, loyalty) with stories and songs which, he believed, give the child some level of experience. Pestalozzi's books for mothers and teachers are full of songs and stories he created for teaching such lessons. This is one of the few instances in which Pestalozzi is in direct opposition to Rousseau, who felt that the fables meant as moral lessons for children are useless because children do not have the necessary experiences to draw the intended inferences.

While Pestalozzi was not as disparaging as Rousseau about words being part of instruction, he did condemn as strongly as Rousseau the "baseless, wordy show" that passed for demonstrations of learning, likening such performance based pedagogy to toadstools growing on dung heaps of worthless learning.³⁴¹ Pestalozzi reinforced Rousseau's preference for competence based pedagogy over performance based pedagogy, and like Rousseau, identified the predominance of representations in education as what allowed, if not encouraged, the perversity of performance based pedagogy. Pestalozzi saw the mainstream preference for such pedagogy as responsible for both the failure of education in his society³⁴² and for the "civil, moral, and religious degradation" that, he felt, necessarily follows such failure.³⁴³ In a statement that seems diametrically opposed to one of the goals often claimed for liberal education, Pestalozzi claimed that his approach to education demands that, "...knowledge be a product of the cultivated mind and not that the cultivated mind should be a product of knowledge."³⁴⁴

Pestalozzi claimed that his own knowledge of education was "real knowledge" because it came from his experiences of those who learned (children and adults)—not from books, but from life.

In the matter of education I am usually very anxious to learn the ideas of people who have been brought up quite naturally and without restraint, who have been taught by life itself, and not by lessons.³⁴⁵

Competence for Pestalozzi

Pestalozzi, who had the benefit of actually running schools, was even more antagonistic to performance based pedagogy than Rousseau.

For Pestalozzi, the notion of competence is related to his notion of *Fertigkei*t, which is variously translated as promptitude, readiness in skill or in performing (but not the skill or performance itself), habits of action, facility, capabilities, the ability to *do*, etc. Pestalozzi believed that *Fertigkei*t comes from developing the “deeper faculties” which are common in everyone (as discussed on pages 110 to 111). In Pestalozzi’s last book, he often explained the difference between his method of education (which he called “The Elementary Method”) and other methods by describing his method’s emphasis on competence.

It is a psychological instrument for assisting Nature in the unfolding of our physical, intellectual, and moral powers. An intelligent visitor who had been watching a lesson in number remarked: “*C’est un pouvoir, ce n’est pas un savoir.*” [It is an ability to ‘do,’ it is not a knowing.] His comment exactly and clearly expressed the position and the difference between the “elementary” method and all others.³⁴⁶

In that same book, Pestalozzi made a distinction between “unfold-ing man’s natural capacities” and the “special branches of knowledge and special dexterities in which those powers are applied.”³⁴⁷ The development of these natural capacities (which, for Pestalozzi, are related to Ultimacy) must always take precedence over the “application and use of these powers...” which is a contrast between competence and performance.³⁴⁸ Pestalozzi, in several places, acknowledged that performance based pedagogy can produce people who perform valued tasks (e.g., “tailors, shoemakers, tradesmen, and soldiers; ...”³⁴⁹), but it fails to approach competence and so doesn’t relate to Ultimacy, consequently failing in the principal task of education as he saw it. The mainstream emphasis on the application of capacities (rather than their unfolding) was the reason Pestalozzi gave for the failure of all the special educational systems he saw created for the poor; they only tried to train poor people for work “whereas human nature demands a whole education. A half education is worth nothing.”³⁵⁰ Pestalozzi felt that his method of education resulted in a person being as capable in “application” as performance based schools, but who would also be “a *man* in the highest sense of the word.”³⁵¹

Having criticized schools and teachers, as Rousseau had, for looking after their own interests ahead of the students’, Pestalozzi reminded educators that “the ultimate end of education is, not the accomplishments of the school, but [the students’] fitness for life.”³⁵² Pestalozzi

believed that the inability in most schools to distinguish between competence based pedagogy and performance based pedagogy was responsible for “the waste of time and the deceptive exhibition of apparent knowledge” which he believed occupied most of the time and attention in schools.³⁵³ He felt that this “artificial show of acquirement which ornaments over [the] lack of inner natural powers”³⁵⁴ was peculiar to his century rather than as part of a trend, as it is still seen by many in holistic education today.

Reinforcing Pestalozzi's antagonism to performance based pedagogy was his aversion to children developing “virtuosity” (which today might be considered as “excellence”) in any one discipline. He was suspicious of the motives (e.g., egotism) for developing virtuosity, and he felt it detracted from the demands of Ultimacy for balance. Ultimacy, for Pestalozzi, requires “that all the faculties implanted in human nature should be properly developed” which relates to meta-learning.³⁵⁵

Characteristics of Competence for Pestalozzi

Pestalozzi made no significant departure from Rousseau on questions of values or judgment. One small elaboration of the question of judgment is found in a letter he wrote to revise *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* in which he describes the ideal man and why such a man would be so admired by his society. The qualities that rightly generate such esteem are “...judgment, kindness, and a sense of duty...”³⁵⁶ with a further explanation that judgment always employs kindness and duty.

Pestalozzi frequently described social responsibility in relation to freedom from authority in a way which might initially seem paradoxical; only by being independent of society can one be truly useful to it. Pestalozzi sometimes seems to anticipate Jung's notion of differentiation.

In relation to society, man should be qualified by education to be a useful member of it. In order to be truly useful, it is necessary that he be truly *independent*.... An individual whose actions bear the stamp of independence of mind cannot but be a useful as well as an esteemed member of society.... That such instances are but exceptions, and that these exceptions are so few, is owing to the system of education which generally prevails, and which is little calculated to promote independence of character.³⁵⁷

Consequently, Pestalozzi named one of the three ends of education as “to render him [the student] useful by rendering him indepen-

dent with relation to society....”³⁵⁸ Such independence must be practiced in school, and Pestalozzi believed a child should not be compelled to act against his will, or as Rousseau would have it “in spite of himself.” This extended to not preventing a child from making mistakes (with due consideration to safety) if the child was determined. In his diary entry for 18th February 1774 Pestalozzi wrote, “If he often asks for something you do not think good, tell him what the consequences will be and leave him his liberty.”³⁵⁹

Pestalozzi extended Rousseau’s comments that judgment sometimes involves foresight to do something onerous in order to avoid something worse in the future. This judgment began, he felt, with learning deferred gratification. His belief that such judgment is an indicator of educational success has been borne out by some recent psychological studies.³⁶⁰

Her [the mother’s] first and almost infallible criterion [of whether she is educating her child well] will be, if she really succeeds in accustoming her child to the practice of self-denial.

Of all the mental habits which may be formed by a judicious education, that of self-denial is the most difficult to acquire, and the most beneficial when adopted.³⁶¹

Pestalozzi’s educational method was widely adopted by the Prussians as a way of reconstructing their society after the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars,³⁶² partly because his approach was seen as a way of strengthening the culture of a country. Pestalozzi saw his Elementary Method as “...securing to their country her glory and her liberty by a moral elevation of her children.”³⁶³ Yet, he did not believe education should be for society or social adaptation (unlike Dewey); but rather, like Rousseau, he saw education as existing to help the individual approach Ultimacy, with the automatic consequence that such individuals contribute to their culture. Pestalozzi was as scathing as Rousseau about education for social intentions, and about state education “for the masses.” One of the most interesting quotes from Pestalozzi on this issue is quoted by Jung.

None of the institutions, measures, and means of education established for the masses and the needs of men in the aggregate, whatever shape or form they may take, serve to advance human culture. In the vast majority of cases they are completely worthless for that purpose and are directly opposed to it. Our race develops in human qualities in essence only from face to face, from heart to heart.

Essentially it develops only in little intimate circles which gradually grow in graciousness and love, in confidence and trust. All the means requisite for the education of man, which serve to make him truly humane and to bring him to mankindliness, are in their origin and essence the concern of the individual and of such institutions as are closely and intimately attached to his heart and mind. They never were nor will be the concern of the masses. They never were nor will be the concern of civilization.³⁶⁴

ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR PESTALOZZI

Pestalozzi felt he was studying nature by his study of children because he believed he was studying what is natural in children. He was convinced that understanding the natural and, therefore, inherent learning processes would solve the problems of education, and he often described his educational method as a simple following of nature. He claimed that,

All instruction of man is then only the Art of helping Nature to develop in her own way; and this Art rests essentially on the relation and harmony between the impressions received by the child and the exact degree of his developed powers.³⁶⁵

Like Rousseau, Pestalozzi felt that the “degree of...developed powers” progress in stages, although he was less specific than Rousseau in delineating these stages. He frequently repeated Rousseau’s dictums that it is detrimental to reason with children too early³⁶⁶ and that in pushing children to learn something before they are ready “the faculties of the mind are weakened, and lose their steadiness, and the equipoise of their structure.”³⁶⁷ Linking this topic with those of performance versus competence and learning through representations, Pestalozzi felt that such pushing is usually done with “the thousand-fold confusions of word-learning and opinions.”³⁶⁸ Similarly, Pestalozzi felt that the stage in the inherent learning process that allows children to feel “faith and love in themselves” and to “think, feel, and act rightly” was prior to the stage which allows the student to understand theology. This prior stage of feeling, therefore, needs to be successfully completed before this second, more theoretical, study is started.³⁶⁹

For Pestalozzi, his doctrine of “free activity” or “spontaneous ac-

tivity” (depending on the translator) helps the teacher determine when the successive stages are reached. This doctrine is linked to the topic of motivation and is discussed in greater detail below. However, it needs to be briefly mentioned here in its relation to the student’s inherent learning processes. A child, in naturally trying to master and make sense of his world, takes on greater and more sophisticated challenges. These begin with the simple cries and movements of the infant and progress to the complex challenge of understanding the sacred. It is to approach this ultimate challenge (Ultimacy) that the child moves freely and spontaneously according to the child’s stage of development and readiness to learn. Children ask (explicitly or implicitly) for the help they need in this process and, in so doing, indicate their stages of development. For Pestalozzi, following these indications is the only natural way of making progress in a child’s education.³⁷⁰

All of the early Authors can be seen as part of the “naturalism” movement, and their views of the inherent learning process as an aspect of students that facilitates the needed learning must be seen in this light. “Naturalism” has been described as a nineteenth century conflation between the study of “natural events” and “substances” (today thought of as the physical sciences) and the religious extolling of nature (most famously practiced by the Romantics) that was a reaction against the industrial revolution and the supranaturalism of mainstream religions.³⁷¹ In this view “the world was conceived as a unified living organism of creatures, plants, stars and stones, all participating in the life of the universe.”³⁷² This view has many correlations with modern Gaia theory. Pestalozzi, and later Froebel, explicitly indicated they felt they were on a religious quest in discovering the natural learning processes of students, and that by discovering and then becoming an ally of these natural processes the needed learning is most likely to occur. In Pestalozzi’s last book, *Swan Song*, in a section entitled “Education Means the Development of the Whole of Man,” Pestalozzi claimed that the whole of his educational endeavors had been to “conform to the order of Nature in the cultivation of man’s capacities and powers.”³⁷³ As following the “order of Nature” is most important, Pestalozzi, like Rousseau, often expressed that what is learned is not nearly as important as how things are learned³⁷⁴ since the needed learning comes not from knowledge but from engaging the inherent learning processes. Interestingly, before there was a recognized science of psychology, Pestalozzi claimed that in studying the natural learning processes in children and creating a system of education based on that, he was, “...trying to psychologize the instruction of mankind.”³⁷⁵ This is ex-

amined further in the discussion on Pestalozzi's notions of the teachers understanding of correct pedagogic practices (beginning on page 124).

One final element of the inherent learning process as seen by Pestalozzi is that this process develops gradually, methodically and somewhat mysteriously. It always builds at its own pace, on what already exists, and the exact outcome cannot be known ahead of time. To communicate this he often used plant metaphors, and often those of an acorn growing into a tree;³⁷⁶ each part of the growing tree is an extension of existing parts, and the exact shape of the tree can never be anticipated. An anonymous author (who seems to be Greaves) writing of Pestalozzi's method after spending three years working with him at his school in Yverdon noted, "that development must be gentle, gradual; with progress imperceptible"³⁷⁷ and "...any lessons...exceeding a child's capacity are utterly unprofitable, and will serve rather to confuse and tire, than to improve and amuse him."³⁷⁸

Pestalozzi's View of Inherent Motivation

Pestalozzi claimed that the schools of his time were onerous for most children so that children didn't want to be there and learned reluctantly and with difficulty. Not surprisingly, his contentions that learning is natural and naturally wanted by students were mocked by teachers in the mainstream education of his time. The fact that the students in his school *did* seem to want to be there caused his critics to dismiss his approach to education as not serious, and as nothing more than self-indulgent entertainment. Pestalozzi claimed that those who insisted that education was necessarily unpleasant and unwanted by students, were similar to those who contended that only medicine that tastes bad is good for you. To respond to his critics, he felt the need to reinforce Rousseau's point that learning must involve exertion. However, "a child should not be taught to look upon exertion as an unavoidable *evil*,"³⁷⁹ which he felt was the result of the pushing of children which occurred in mainstream education. He felt that children naturally exert themselves when it is for something they enjoy or want, as children naturally exert themselves in games, and from such natural exertion students will come to see the value of exertion (which is needed for Ultimacy). If, however, children are pushed by someone else (e.g., a teacher or parent) this stops the very learning which needs to be engendered. Pestalozzi claimed that following the inherent learning process means fostering inherent motivation. To do this for each student

is more difficult for the teacher as it demands more perspicacity on the teacher's part than the mechanical following of lesson plans.

One motivation that Pestalozzi was very insistent should never be used is fear. Pestalozzi believed that whenever fear is allowed to enter a child's learning process, it quickly destroys any interest that the child might have had for the topic and replaces it with dislike. In such instances, not only is the lesson lost, and perhaps even the future interest in the topic, but perhaps even an interest in education itself is lost.³⁸⁰ Pestalozzi felt that children did not like school because it was made onerous by the teaching methods, not by the subjects themselves. The key to teaching, according to Pestalozzi, is generating interest, and nature herself will do the rest.

This *interest* in study is the first thing which a teacher...should endeavour to excite and keep alive. There are scarcely any circumstances in which a want of application in children does not proceed from a want of interest; and there are, perhaps, none under which a want of interest does not originate in the mode of teaching adopted by the teacher. I would go so far as to lay it down for a rule, that whenever children are inattentive, and apparently take no interest in a lesson, the teacher should always first look to himself for the reason.³⁸¹

ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR PESTALOZZI

Teachers' Understanding of Students and their Needs for Pestalozzi

Unlike Rousseau, Pestalozzi was concerned with instructing classes rather than an individual tutee. However, Pestalozzi was as insistent as Rousseau that education is about the instruction of individual students even if they are in classes. In a series of local newspaper articles published in 1782, Pestalozzi tried to counter what he saw as the opposite tendency in mainstream education.

...fixed attention to the particular situation of every child is one of the first and most essential of the rules of education, moreover, all more general educational principles which have in mind not a particular, definite individual but the entire [human] race, easily lead one astray.³⁸²

Pestalozzi felt that people easily understand a single object, and easily “abstract principles of education from the observation of their own children,” but that understanding universal laws (which he insisted had to include Ultimacy) and then finding ways to apply them to the idiosyncratic individual was a rare talent.³⁸³ Pestalozzi felt it is important to understand both the general and particular because educators have to understand what they are trying to achieve (both ultimately and in the short term), and they have to appreciate that the materials with which they have to work (i.e., students, including their contexts and circumstances) vary almost infinitely as each student needs to follow their unique path. An appropriate metaphor is that the same thermal laws form all snowflakes, yet each snowflake is different and has its own unique perfection. Pestalozzi discussed this in terms of distinguishing “the laws of Nature and her course; that is, her single workings...”³⁸⁴ and insisted that education depends on harmony between the two.

Pestalozzi believed that humans are the most varied of all the species³⁸⁵ and that the reason for this has religious roots.

The idiosyncrasies of individuals are, in my opinion, the greatest blessing of human nature, and the one basis of its highest and essential blessings; therefore they should be respected in the highest degree.³⁸⁶

This “highest and essential blessing” is, of course, Ultimacy, which, according to Pestalozzi, is necessarily an individual accomplishment that must be uniquely achieved. Consequently, Pestalozzi felt that education which addresses amalgams of individuals, which he criticized mainstream education for doing, is a sacrilege because it ignores or inhibits the idiosyncratic. Any method of education that was to be considered positive for Pestalozzi, has to be concerned with the “blessing” of individuality.

Inasmuch as the method [of education] is positive, it bases itself directly on the individual child whom it has in its care; indeed there is nothing positive in education and in teaching but the individual child and the individual talents he has.³⁸⁷

Teacher's Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process for Pestalozzi

Pestalozzi came upon what he believed to be the correct pedagogic process from both conviction and experiment. As stated previously,

he was greatly influenced by Rousseau who shaped many of his convictions. However, there is no record of Rousseau's trying to apply the method he advocated in *Emile* (although he might have tried aspects of it in some of his tutoring experiences early in his career). One of the earliest records of an attempt to apply Rousseau's method (very literally) is by an aristocratic English family,³⁸⁸ whose daughter, so educated, eventually worked with Pestalozzi. It was Pestalozzi, however, who first tried to put Rousseau's insights into practice in classes (rather than a tutorial situation) and systematically experimented to find what worked.³⁸⁹

It has been claimed that it is with Pestalozzi that "scientific pedagogy can be said to begin"³⁹⁰ (despite others claiming to have founded their educational initiatives on observations of children, including Rousseau³⁹¹) because he not only based his pedagogy on observations of children, but on experiments of applying his hypotheses and then changing the hypotheses on the basis of his results and experimenting again. Pestalozzi certainly seems to have been quite honest in reporting his many failures and heartaches. Pestalozzi's process was 1) observing the nature of children in general, 2) observing the particular children in his care, 3) keeping in mind the goal of Ultimacy, 4) knowing the basic principles of pedagogy (e.g., the role of *anschauung*, "real" versus "unreal" knowledge, etc.), and 5) continually experimenting and changing on the basis of what was seen. Pestalozzi suggested this as the correct pedagogic process for all teachers.

Pestalozzi felt that part of the reason for observing the nature of children was in order to follow nature as it developed in children, and he frequently spoke of observing, respecting, and following nature in religious terms.³⁹² He claimed that his educational method was an endeavor

to organize the several means of developing the individual powers and capacities in a psychological sequence corresponding to the course through which nature herself develops these powers.³⁹³

Consequently, Pestalozzi claimed that there "can be not *two good* methods of instruction" for only "the one that rests entirely upon the eternal laws of Nature"³⁹⁴ can be good. Pestalozzi did not claim to have mastered that method, but such mastery was his aspiration, and had to be the aspiration of anyone interested in helping children acquire what needs to be learned.

Pestalozzi and Froebel often employed horticultural metaphors,

and these metaphors clearly demonstrate what might be thought of as a paradox in their writing. In many instances the teacher is told that he must act as if he is nature, and at other times the teacher is simply to let nature act. As an example of the first, Pestalozzi told teachers,

The mechanism of Nature as a whole is great and simple. Man! imitate it.³⁹⁵

The teacher is meant to act like nature in unfolding the capacities of each child, and Pestalozzi claimed that his method consisted of “various devices for developing”³⁹⁶ these capacities.

As an example of letting nature act, Pestalozzi constantly reiterated that the child’s surroundings did most of the work of stimulating the growth of the child’s capacities (“life is the great educator”³⁹⁷), and the good teacher had to ensure the child’s surroundings were rich in stimuli—very much like providing nutrients to plants. The teachers are encouraged to think of themselves as a gardener who “contributes nothing to their [the student’s] growth” but “only sees to it that no external force should hinder or disturb the natural course of development. . . .”³⁹⁸ Pestalozzi’s resolution of this paradox seems to be as follows: Man is endowed by nature with capacities that would unfold at the right time and in the right way and lead to each person’s fullest development if only there were not so many powerfully corrupting forces that “are poisonous in their influence on man’s primitive nature”³⁹⁹ and which prevent nature from acting. The teacher’s role is to both protect the natural forces, and at times to act for them, accomplishing what they would accomplish if they had not been thwarted. As such, the teacher can be thought of as contributing nothing to the child’s development as the teacher is only an agent of nature.

Some of the difficulties in this seeming paradox may be resolved if the word “God” is substituted for “nature,” which for both Pestalozzi and Froebel is often justifiable. It is presumptuous to believe that God needs a person to accomplish something, and yet a person may think their efforts are serving God’s intentions and purposes (which both Pestalozzi and Froebel believed was true for them). It would be presumptuous for someone to think they saved another’s soul as it is not within anyone’s gift to grant salvation, yet people might think they are assisting another to be in a position to receive such a gift. The religious fervor with which the educational ideas of Pestalozzi and Froebel spread, and the terms that were used to describe these ideas make clear that such a transposition of the kind described above was not uncommon.⁴⁰⁰

In this way, part of Christianity was an anchoring idea for both Pestalozzi and Froebel.

Pestalozzi claimed that one of the pedagogic processes he came upon by chance

worked with great force on the birth and growth of the conviction in me, that all true, all educative instruction must be drawn out of the children themselves, and be born within them.⁴⁰¹

This process was of children teaching other children. Without a technique to rely on, and with the sensitivity to each individual that Pestalozzi felt is required, no teacher in his schools had enough time to do all of the teaching required. It fell quite naturally, according to Pestalozzi, to other children who had learned some lesson to help others who were in the process of learning it. Pestalozzi would ensure that these child-teachers understood certain basic premises (e.g., kindness, experiential knowledge, etc.) and claimed that he was often surprised by their creative and effective means. He claimed that, in this way, he would often learn better ways of teaching.

In a section entitled "Human Nature as a Whole Must be Educated" in Pestalozzi's last book, he describes the teacher's role as not only developing the different human capacities, but stresses that these capacities only have their meaning if they combine together in harmony to form the unity he felt was part of Ultimacy. Pestalozzi believed that mainstream education created imbalances by not seeing the importance of unity in students and by developing only some of their capacities in isolation.

But in their isolation the cultivation of these faculties is not enough. There is always the danger of over-emphasis in one direction or another, which brings about internal disharmony.⁴⁰²

For Pestalozzi, disharmony (which precludes Ultimacy) was not a price worth paying for any worldly success, and he was against specialization or the early development of virtuosity as these, in his view, always generated imbalance and disharmony. However, trying to get the balance right for every student was not simple and could not be approached mechanically or by a formula. Pestalozzi felt that such harmony, such development of human nature as a whole "depends upon the successful establishment of the disposition of love and faith..."⁴⁰³ in the student through these qualities being present in the teacher. The

power of love and faith in the teacher would spread from the teacher to the students, ensuring the needed harmony.

Pestalozzi's view that there can be no technique or formula that is good for everyone went against the current of the mainstream education of his time. Pestalozzi felt that technique or formula-driven education always results in trying to fit the student to the system and leads to education that consists of a "series of admonitions and corrections, of rewards and punishments, of injunctions and directions, strung together without unity of purpose, or dignity of execution..."⁴⁰⁴ and this is incompatible with education for Ultimacy, which has as its goal "the elevation of man to the true dignity of a spiritual being."⁴⁰⁵ For Pestalozzi, education, like religion, had no single path to the truth.

Moreover, a strict and stiff adherence to one order is not nature's way of teaching. If it were, she would train one-sided characters; and her truth would not accommodate itself easily and freely to the feelings of all men...

The power of nature, although unquestionably leading to truth, leads with no stiffness.⁴⁰⁶

While, for Pestalozzi, the correct pedagogic process could not rely on any formula, it could rely on what has variously been translated as the sentiment or feeling of love or devotion. Pestalozzi believed this sentiment had its origin in the mother-child relationship and extends naturally to the feeling of man toward God. This feeling, Pestalozzi claimed, was the source of his educational method and what should lie at the root of all teachers' actions.⁴⁰⁷ Teachers should love what they teach as well as who they teach. Pestalozzi claimed that students are very susceptible to a teacher's frame of mind and respond accordingly.⁴⁰⁸ Consequently, Pestalozzi felt that teachers had to work on their own sentiments (discussed more fully beginning on page 129).

An aspect of what Pestalozzi feels is the correct pedagogic process is that students must feel that they are active participants in their education. Rousseau had wanted students to be able to say to themselves, "I conceive, I discern, I act, I learn"⁴⁰⁹ and Rousseau felt that the *amour-propre* of teachers often prevented teachers from giving students such a feeling of freedom, self-mastery, and sovereignty. Pestalozzi agreed with Rousseau and added that students are often not given that sense of agency in their education because it is easier for adults to believe they know best and to conceive of the adult role as actor and the student role as recipient of action. Pestalozzi believed this approach is wrong due to all that has been previously discussed in relation to freedom,

authority, and individual development. Pestalozzi gave more of an agent's role to the teacher than did Rousseau but still claimed that, even for very early education, "Let the child not only be *acted upon*, but let him be an *agent* in intellectual education."⁴¹⁰

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Relationship for Pestalozzi

Pestalozzi and Froebel wrote a great deal about the importance of the correct pedagogic relationship, but added nothing to Rousseau's notions of affection, empathy and absence of authority.

Teachers' Self-Development for Pestalozzi

Pestalozzi had a more complex notion of the teachers' self-development than Rousseau. Part of his notion can be seen as professional self-development in that Pestalozzi encouraged teachers to continually seek out the "educating forces" in their students; to study the children and find the divine laws that express themselves in the children and that must be harnessed for education. Froebel extended this notion of Pestalozzi and claimed that "my teachers are the children themselves...and I follow them like a faithful, trustful scholar."⁴¹¹ Yet, for both Pestalozzi and Froebel, such studying of the student could not occur without an equal self-study by the teacher. Pestalozzi advises,

Man! Examine yourself and seek to find out in what ways you attain harmony within yourself and how you come to be at war with yourself and with your fellow-men. See in what ways you can come to be a friend of faith, of love, of truth, and justice, and, on the other hand, how you can come to be an enemy of all these. Examine yourself closely.⁴¹²

Another part of his notion of teacher self-development stems from the religious nature of his view of Ultimacy and his notion of Ultimacy as the goal of education. Pestalozzi believed that a teacher could not help bring about in a child what the teacher is not bringing about in himself, and this is true even for the youngest infant. In answering the question of whether a mother will be able to "spiritualise the unfolding faculties" of the infant, Pestalozzi responds,

Not unless she has first lent her own heart to the influence of a higher principle; not unless the germs of a spiritual love and faith, which she is to develop in her child, have first gained ground in the

better affections of her being.⁴¹³

The reason the mother/teacher must first have the spirituality she would wish to develop in her child seems to be due to this needed learning being experiential. A child is able (through empathy) to experience the state of the mother/teacher, and through this to experience (in a childlike way) the spiritual experience of the mother/teacher. The spirituality of the mother/teacher is the only access the child has to that needed learning.

Pestalozzi presents much of his writing on education almost as a confessional, full of his errors, failures and shortcomings. He is never in doubt, however, about the nature of his endeavor or its importance, with a crucial role played in both by self-examination and self-knowledge.⁴¹⁴ Education for Pestalozzi is linked with Ultimacy, and without Ultimacy there can be no resolution to the problems of the individual or society. Pestalozzi does not present himself as an educational authority, but as a student of education which, for him, coincides with seeking religious truths.

*Friedrich Wilhelm
August Froebel*A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF FRIEDRICH WILHELM AUGUST FROEBEL
(21 APRIL 1782 – 21 JUNE 1852)

*F*roebel was the fifth child of a German clergyman. His mother died when he was nine months old, and by his accounts, he was neglected for all of his early years until he was old enough to attend school, at which time an uncle took him in. Some commentators have claimed that this neglected and wounded childhood was a source of his seeing the importance of early childhood education and his later claims about the effect of wounds suffered in youth.

In school, despite a facility for mathematics and languages, he seems to have had a natural affinity and a greater enthusiasm for the study of plants and natural phenomena. Upon leaving school, he apprenticed as a forester. This, however, did not last long, and he returned to school for some informal tertiary studies. This middle period of his life is only vaguely known. He tried his hand at a variety of jobs (with no apparent success) and spent time in debtors' prison. Eventually, he took up teaching, and as fortune would have it, it was in a Pestalozzi school in Frank-

furt run by a progressive educator named Anton Guner. He claimed this was a turning point in his life because it was here he found his vocation.

After two years of working under Guner's instruction in the Pestalozzi method, Froebel felt he was ready to learn from the source, and he traveled to Yverdon. Froebel found himself enthralled with Pestalozzi's method of education and initially by Pestalozzi himself. However, after two years he became exasperated by Pestalozzi's lack of business acumen, and Froebel became one of the principal protagonists in the disputes at Yverdon that brought down that school. Froebel came to criticize Pestalozzi personally and bitterly.

Feeling the need to strike out on his own, and knowing a university degree would assist him in his aspirations, in 1811 Froebel left Yverdon to enter the University of Göttingen. His studies, however, were interrupted by military conscription against the Napoleonic campaigns. He seems to have been actively thinking and talking about education during his five years of service as he met two friends while in the service who became students of his in education and loyal supporters and co-workers.

In 1816, with his two service friends and their wives, Froebel set up his first school (very much along Pestalozzi's lines) at Griesheim in Thuringia (now in Germany). In 1818, political circumstance forced him to move his school to Keilhau. There it flourished, expanded greatly, and remained for the rest of his life.

In 1826 Froebel began his writing career with the publication of *The Education of Man*. This won him wide acclaim and recognition. Germany was looking for a national inspiration to rebuild its education after the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars, and Froebel's vague brand of nature-mysticism Christianity was able to be accepted by both the Catholic and Protestant population. With his book, Froebel distanced himself from Pestalozzi (who had been given honorary French citizenship and was therefore not as welcome in the German states), and although his views clearly owed a great deal to Pestalozzi, they were distinct enough for him to claim originality.

In 1831, Froebel left the school at Keilhau to his two friends and their wives in order to engage in what could be seen as a 'one-upmanship' on his old mentor. Froebel accepted the Swiss government's offer to train elementary school teachers (which Pestalozzi had turned down several years earlier) and to head the orphanage at Burgdorf (which Pestalozzi had started but gone bankrupt with twenty-seven years before). Froebel seems to have done both extremely well, and in 1837 he

returned to Keilhau with his reputation greatly increased.

While living at Keilhau, Froebel started his first school for infants. It was in Blankenburg, Prussia, and has special significance as it is the first school he named Kindergarten (children's garden). His contention that early education lays the foundation for later education, and that education is the foundation for (the then much needed) social reform struck a popular chord. For the next fourteen years, Froebel's work flourished. The Kindergarten movement spread all over the German speaking world and, eventually, well beyond. He started a publishing firm for his educational work, and another firm which made educational materials (books, maps, and educational objects called "Froebel's gifts") for mothers and teachers to educate children.

In 1851, a year before his death, Froebel was to see almost all of his work collapse in his native land. Froebel had a nephew who was a socialist activist in the uprisings of that time, and either through a confusion of names, or fearing that Froebel was corrupting the youth with his nephew's views, the government closed and forbid the Kindergarten movement and closed the publishing works. This ban was not removed until eight years after Froebel's death. However, Froebel's work in other countries was not affected by this confusion or shortsightedness. Froebel's writing, his "gifts," and the Kindergarten movement thrived in Europe and America where they became standard.

FROEBEL'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

Froebel was the most overtly theistic of all the Authors. For him Ultimacy is the "representation of the divine nature within"⁴¹⁵ achieved through unity which is "the goal of all human history, individual and collective...."⁴¹⁶ Froebel's use of conventional Christian language to convey his notions of Ultimacy ensured that his work was easily accepted by the populations of Europe and North America. A closer reading of his views, however, reveals that only his terminology was conventional, and that his religious views did not fit easily into any established church.

Ultimacy in Relation to Froebel's View of Human Nature

Like Pestalozzi, Froebel saw Ultimacy as man's unique destiny. Although he saw both nature and man as expressions of God, Froebel felt that man's unique mission was in representing the union of the

two.⁴¹⁷ Such a mission is not to be approached at the end of one's development, according to Froebel, but to be engaged in throughout life.⁴¹⁸ This is Ultimacy as engagement, not an end state, and Froebel's educational program is based on fostering that engagement. Froebel saw such engagement as "...the realization of the divine principle in man..."⁴¹⁹ which could not be taught but accomplished only by inner listening or sensing.

Froebel (once he had returned to Germany after working with Pestalozzi in Switzerland) stridently reiterated what had been the principal cause of recrimination against Rousseau in Catholic France and Pestalozzi in Calvinist Western Switzerland. "Man is essentially good and it is the source of all evil to consider his nature to be evil or bad."⁴²⁰ In several remarkable statements which foreshadow some later theories of neurosis, Froebel assured his readers that anything that appears to be bad is only a person's goodness "repressed, disturbed or misled," and that the proper cure is not to counter what is wrong (which is done by punishment) but to reinforce the natural goodness.⁴²¹ Since Froebel saw people as naturally good and as having an inherent "living principle of growth" within them that can manifest and direct development, "it follows...that the first condition of all education is the utmost freedom for the child."⁴²² He expanded on this principle by claiming

...the undisturbed operation of the Divine Unity is necessarily good—can not be otherwise than good. This necessity implies that the young human being—as it were, still in process of creation—would seek, although still unconsciously, as a product of nature, yet decidedly as surely, that which is in itself best; and, moreover, in a form wholly adapted to his condition, as well as to his disposition, his powers, and means.⁴²³

As one would expect, Froebel reiterated Pestalozzi's plea not to treat children as "a lump of clay" to be shaped but, instead, for each child to be appreciated for their uniqueness just as one appreciates other aspects of nature.⁴²⁴

Ultimacy As an Aspect of Religiousness for Froebel

In the one hundred years that passed between Rousseau's first work and Froebel's last, there seems to have been an increasing impetus in Germany for unification. Perhaps this can be explained by citing his-

tory—the Industrial Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars generated an increased sense of fragmentation, and the national aspirations to create a nation state became stronger at the beginning of Bismarck's era. This concern for unification in the common consciousness of Germany worked in Froebel's favor.

Froebel's notions of Ultimacy included unification with God, and he saw this as being approached by successive smaller unifications, including social unification.

The goal of all human history, individual and collective, is unification; first, the unification of each individual's whole life within himself; the unification of his life with that of nature and his fellow-men; and finally his unification with God.⁴²⁵ [underlines as in the original texts]

Froebel translated the nouns that Rousseau and Pestalozzi felt needed uniting (i.e., heart, hand, and head) into their actions (i.e., “feeling, acting and representing, thinking and perceiving”⁴²⁶), and he described this as the “tri-unity”⁴²⁷ of human nature, claiming that all of human life is encompassed by these three. At the end of his life Froebel's categories had only slightly changed, but they became nouns again: “feeling,” “intellect,” and “will.”⁴²⁸ What is important is that Froebel saw the united development of all human capacities as necessary for full human development; and full human development as necessary for Ultimacy.

Like Rousseau and Pestalozzi, Froebel saw harmony and union with the divine as part of man's destiny because of man's inherent position between nature and God.

Thus, too, the destiny of man as a child of God and of nature is to represent in harmony and unison the spirit of God and of nature, the natural and the divine, the terrestrial and the celestial, the finite and the infinite.⁴²⁹

Interestingly, and in opposition to Rousseau and Pestalozzi, Froebel saw union with the progressively larger wholes of family, community and nation as a way of growing toward the divine.⁴³⁰ This, of course, gives divine sanction to political union, and gave Froebel many admirers. Rousseau saw the progression as going from family to humanity in general; a significant distinction. Froebel's religiousness seems to have consisted mostly of feeling oneness with nature and society, and per-

ceiving the divine in these and in himself. He used Christian terminology, but has been described as more of a Christian Pantheist in the Romantic mold⁴³¹ than part of any mainstream Christianity. What Froebel described, however, were his own experiences of Ultimacy,⁴³² and such experiences were his stated goal in education.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR FROEBEL

Froebel's View of Experiential Knowledge

Froebel took Pestalozzi's notion of representations in relation to experiences one step further away from Rousseau. While still eschewing excessive verbal instruction for the young, he supported another form of representation. Froebel encouraged mothers to use hand signals (which he detailed in his books) to give an infant, what he believed to be, experiences that are unavailable from any physical object or other event. For instance, Froebel encouraged mothers to put their hands together as in prayer in front of a child to communicate an experience of piety. It is as if Froebel believed in something resembling a mixture of Platonic forms and Jungian archetypes. Froebel felt these hand gestures had inherent meaning for children, and stimulated some kind of pre-conscious recognition which gives children experiences of things they don't have words to recognize.

In addition to demonstrating a substantial shift from Rousseau's position on the role of representation (e.g., hand signals), Froebel also felt that at the age when words become viable tools for children, he placed greater importance on words and other forms of representation than did either Rousseau or Pestalozzi. Rousseau would give no lessons in words (at least for the young) although he might summarize a child's experience in maxims or use words to help the child see connections between various experiences. Pestalozzi encouraged more use of words than Rousseau (albeit after experiences), and wanted them used earlier in children's education. Finally, Froebel promoted "external, physical, productive activity interspersed in intellectual work...", and he wanted this principally because such activity refreshes and stimulates intellectual work.⁴³³ So, while Froebel decried "merely extraneously communicated knowledge,"⁴³⁴ the emphasis must be on his use of the word "merely." Experience, for Froebel, reinforces verbal lessons,⁴³⁵ the reverse of Rousseau.

Competence for Froebel

Froebel added little in the way of theory to Rousseau or Pestalozzi on the subject of competence or competence based pedagogy versus performance based pedagogy. He did, however, make one interesting association. While Rousseau condemned swaddling clothes and all other physical constraints on infants for their deleterious effects on the child's physical growth, disposition and constitution,⁴³⁶ Froebel associated such constraints with inhibiting freedom and Ultimacy. Froebel claimed that all physical constraints (as well as "being spoiled by too much assistance") prevent the "free all-sided use of his [the child's] powers,"⁴³⁷ which hinders incipient freedom, competence and Ultimacy. Where Froebel did contribute to his predecessors' notions of competence came from his systematizing a competence based pedagogy, as discussed in the sections that follow.

ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR FROEBEL

Froebel saw play in the early years of childhood as "the highest phase of child development"; "the purest, most spiritual activity of man at this stage..." and a child's playing "until physical fatigue forbids" as the foundation for becoming "a thorough, determined man, capable of self-sacrifice for the promotion of the welfare of himself and others."⁴³⁸ Froebel fostered play by providing materials with which to play, and teachers to encourage play. Froebel's materials and teachers' efforts were to encourage the play to be directed toward the needed learning, but never cease to be play.

For Froebel (as for Pestalozzi), the "self-activity" of students was an expression of the child's nature, and, if allowed to follow its own course, would lead that child to unity with God and man, what Hamilton called "Rousseau with a Christian interpretation."⁴³⁹ It amounts to an early understanding of homeostasis with implications for notions of freedom.

Indeed, in its very essence, education should have these characteristics; for the undisturbed operation of the Divine Unity is necessarily good—can not be otherwise than good. This necessity implies that the young human being—as it were, still in process of

creation—would seek, although still unconsciously, as a product of nature, yet decidedly as surely, that which is in itself best; and, moreover, in a form wholly adapted to his condition, as well as to his disposition, his powers, and means.⁴⁴⁰

It is perhaps Dewey, in an article entitled “Fröbel’s Educational Principles,” who best expresses Froebel’s notion of the inherent learning process that facilitates the needed learning.

That the primary root of all educative activity is in the instinctive, impulsive attitudes and activities of the child, and not in the presentation and application of external material, whether through the ideas of others as through the senses: and that, accordingly, numberless spontaneous activities of children, plays, games, mimic efforts, even the apparently meaningless motion of infants—exhibitions previously ignored as trivial, futile, or even condemned as positively evil—are capable of educational use, nay, are the foundation stones of educational effort.⁴⁴¹

Froebel agreed with Rousseau and Pestalozzi about the importance of “...the deepest possible search into the life of the child, and into what he must necessarily require according to his present stage of development,”⁴⁴² but he disagreed with the notion of distinct stages of development, feeling instead that maturing was a continuous series of transitions with a central core of humanness running throughout.⁴⁴³

Froebel’s View of Inherent Motivation

Pestalozzi and Froebel shared the idea of “free activity” or “spontaneous-activity” (which Froebel called “self-activity”) which was the basis of their notions of motivation. The idea of “spontaneous-activity” is essentially as follows: Every child is born with a capacity to receive impressions from the world and to react to them, as well as the capacity to generate movements that are not just a response to external stimuli. Such interior-stimulated movements are seen by Froebel as “free” or “spontaneous.” These spontaneous movements can group to form tendencies or inclinations. After a certain age such grouped tendencies or inclinations become agents for specific forms of action (such as artistic, verbal, numerate, kinesthetic or dexterous operations), which favor a student’s engagement in art, reading and writing, mathematics or logic, sports, or crafts. Any of these forms of action might absorb a child for a period, perhaps even a long period if they are

nourished and supported, or they can be stifled by unfavorable circumstances. As a child satisfies its internal demands for these forms of actions, other forms of action seek to be satisfied until eventually the child exercises and develops all its capacities. For Froebel, it is by developing all of one's faculties that a person approaches Ultimacy. What is important, however, is that the impetus to engage in different forms of action comes from the child, because it is the burgeoning capacity calling out for its own flowering that needs to be developed, not another. Froebel held that only the child can know what form of action to move to and when to move. A teacher's role, however, is not just to passively watch and support the child's actions. As both Pestalozzi and Froebel (although especially Pestalozzi) worked with poor and often delinquent children, some of the "activity" that their charges engaged in was not very positive or educative. Both Pestalozzi and Froebel felt that the "wrong" kind of activity needed to be negatively reinforced, not through punishment, but through a kind of starving out with a lack of positive reinforcement.

ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR FROEBEL

Froebel did not have anything significant to add to Rousseau or Pestalozzi in terms of how the teachers' understanding of students and their needs or of the correct pedagogic process, or even the teachers' own self-development could facilitate the needed learning. However, he did have some views of the correct pedagogic process that are worth noting.

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process for Froebel

Froebel's principal contribution to the notions of the correct pedagogic process that have significance for holistic education is his increased emphasis that education "originally and in its first principles, should necessarily be *passive, following* (only guarding and protecting), *not prescriptive, categorical, interfering*," [italics in the original] ⁴⁴⁴ Froebel felt a non-prescriptive approach is especially important in early childhood, just when the mainstream education of his day was most prescriptive as young children were seen as most in need of being shaped. He also developed the educational materials mentioned earlier that came to be called "Froebel's gifts." These gifts were a series of educational

manipulatives (often made of wood) meant to be given to children in a sequence that followed what he saw as the general progression of capacities in children's development (e.g., spheres, cubes, then rectangular blocks equivalent to two cubes, etc.).

For Froebel, humans are by nature reflections of divine will and, therefore, all their inherent capacities and tendencies are sacred.⁴⁴⁵ Education must fit in with the child, and not the reverse, and all "prescriptive and categorical, interfering...instruction and training must, of necessity, annihilate, hinder, and destroy"⁴⁴⁶ the very thing that education is meant for—Ultimacy. Froebel was more insistent than Rousseau or Pestalozzi that the only role of teachers is to understand the nature of each individual child and aid each child's unique and natural development.⁴⁴⁷ He abhorred what he felt was the *tabula rasa* perception of children, and insisted that this was sacrilegious.⁴⁴⁸ For the teacher to understand the nature of a child, the child should be encouraged to play. The nature of this play was to be closely followed by the teacher as play is actually "highly serious and of deep significance" because it "discloses the future inner life of the [person]" and so informs the teacher about the education appropriate for that child.⁴⁴⁹

As mentioned earlier, Froebel did not believe in the existence of evil, and was contemptuous of what he felt was the mainstream attitude which held that children, in much of their play, displayed inherent depravity (e.g., violence, dishonesty) confirming the presence of original sin. Froebel believed that only goodness exists, and that what appears evil is no more than perverted good. Froebel believed that "one of the highest functions of the educator is therefore to reveal the true source of the perverted impulse and to allow the original good to find a new direction,"⁴⁵⁰ a process Froebel called "conversion."

*Carl Gustav Jung*A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF CARL GUSTAV JUNG
(26 JULY 1875 – 6 JUNE 1961)

*J*ung claims that he had a lonely and unhappy youth. From a fairly early age, Jung is reported to have had little interest in relationships, seeming more content to observe people than to engage with them. He frequently feigned illness to avoid personal interaction, and would often faint if a social situation was even slightly stressful.

Jung's father was a brilliant pastor cum philosopher-scientist-scholar and materially successful. When Jung was only six, his father started teaching him Latin, which may have triggered his interest in languages, for as an adult Jung could speak several modern languages and a few ancient ones (including ancient Greek and Sanskrit). Jung's early relationship with his father soured when Jung reached adolescence, as his father went through a metaphysical crisis, lost his religious convictions, and seems to have become emotionally unavailable to his son. Jung's earnest youthful response was to try to "cure" his father's despondence by conveying to him the nature of his own religious experiences. This, however, didn't work, and Jung was left feeling that he and his

deepest experiences were rejected and that he and his father couldn't communicate or understand one another any longer. This only increased his sense of isolation.

As Jung was clearly a bright student, it was assumed that he would join the clergy, which had been a tradition on both sides of the family. It has been assumed by some that his unhappy attempts at religion with his father and his distaste for social interaction encouraged him to resist the family pressure, and he took to studying philosophy and science instead. As he grew older he wanted to become an archeologist, but settled on medicine as more acceptable to his family, eventually specializing in the medicine of the mind, psychiatry. Jung's medical studies were in Zurich, where he worked under Eugen Bleuler (who systematically studied and named schizophrenia). While working there, Jung invented word-association as a form of diagnosis and discovered that the unconscious associations his patients had to words (which he called "complexes") revealed much about their illnesses which was otherwise hidden from view. This brought him extraordinary early acclaim.

Jung's word-association work seemed to confirm some of Freud's theories, and when they met, Jung was flattered to be welcomed by Freud as a brilliant young protégé. For five years Jung and Freud worked closely and Jung seemed to be Freud's intellectual heir, but in 1909 an estrangement began on a long ocean voyage to America. During that trip, Freud and Jung began to analyze each others' dreams as a form of amusement, but after several days, Freud abruptly broke off the game when he felt he was losing his authority. What finally drove a wedge between them was Jung's disagreement with Freud's insistence that sex lay at the basis of all neurosis and most other mental illnesses. This difference was made public and solid with Jung's publication in 1912 of *Psychology of the Unconscious*. For Freud the unconscious was the seat of suppressed, sublimated and often perverse psychic forces, whereas for Jung the unconscious was the locus of the universal and mystical.

One remarkable feature of Jung's work is the painstaking and systematic study Jung made of his own unconscious through his dreams, fantasies, and visions. He wrote, drew, painted, and sculpted what he could extract from his unconscious and then he analyzed it. From 1913 to 1928 his study was extremely laborious and tortured (to the point, some claim, of being neurotic). What began as a search for an understanding of his own psyche became an understanding of the human psyche in general and eventually transcended his science to become part of our present cultural understanding. That there are common

universal experiences and perceptions (variously expressed) which lie at the base of all religions (eventually labeled "Perennial Philosophy" by Aldous Huxley) is widely accepted, as is the existence of a collective unconscious, archetypes, types of personality, and the equating of psychological development with spiritual development.

Jung popularized the notion that religions, religious texts and myths of other places and/or times can be stripped of their cultural aspects to reveal universal psychic and spiritual truths. This seemed to Jung to be easier to do with religions of simpler cultures, and to pursue this path to the universal, Jung visited the indigenous (and to his mind simpler) cultures of Africa, Asia, India, and the US. Contrary to much of the thinking of his time, which held such cultures as inferior to the more "developed" cultures, Jung found these less elaborated expressions of the universal laudable simply because they were less elaborated and culturally adulterated; a view that is now popular.

In 1955 Jung's wife of fifty-two years, Emma Rauschenbach, died and Jung retreated, secluding himself in his lakeside house, granting few interviews and even fewer public talks.

JUNG'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

The Authors of the twentieth century lose the advantage of the shorthand of religious terms, but their notions of Ultimacy are no less religious.⁴⁵¹ Notions like "divine nature" need greater explication in the more pluralist and scientific modern world. Jung's *homo maximus*,⁴⁵² achieved through the arduous process of individuation,⁴⁵³ attains what he calls "personality," which "means nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being."⁴⁵⁴ Jung used several words as synonyms for his understanding of Ultimacy (e.g., Tao, personality, Satori, Samadhi, liberation, Atman, etc.) as he struggled to convey a rich notion of perfection. Jung felt that terms from Eastern religions need to be employed partly because the East has a greater tradition that considers wholeness,⁴⁵⁵ and partly because (except for a few Western mystics) there is nothing in Western terminology or thought forms which encompasses both release from the ego of consciousness and the consequent potential to "attain the inner (godlike) man."⁴⁵⁶ Even if this goal is not (except in rare circumstances) achieved fully,⁴⁵⁷ its existence establishes the nature of our perfectibility, what might be thought of as the trajectory of our intended development.

The Importance Given to Ultimacy by Jung

For the twentieth century Authors, living in perhaps a more cynical and jaded age, it was necessary to explain the importance of Ultimacy. Jung insisted that notions of Ultimacy have tremendous importance, whether or not there is any objective reality behind such notions.⁴⁵⁸ Through most of his writing he insisted that, as an empiricist, he could not speculate beyond the processes and nature of the psyche, but he departed from this view late in his life, asserting the objective existence of Ultimacy.⁴⁵⁹ All through his career Jung contended that we need notions of Ultimacy to protect us from the “powers of darkness—that is, of the unconscious.”⁴⁶⁰ Jung stated in several places that most of his clients (and certainly all of the ones over the age of thirty-five) suffered from inadequate notions of Ultimacy,⁴⁶¹ and adequate notions of Ultimacy are important for mental health. Ultimacy, for Jung, is important because without it a person “has failed to realize his life’s meaning,”⁴⁶² and without meaning there is “psychic suffering” and sickness.⁴⁶³ Ultimacy has this effect because “it leads in the end to that distant goal which may perhaps have been the first urge to life: the complete actualization of the whole human being...,”⁴⁶⁴ and must, therefore, be considered the first and primary motivation of all humans.

Ultimacy in Relation to Jung’s View of Human Nature

The Authors of the twentieth century worked from a psychological paradigm of human nature and, consequently, saw Ultimacy in relation to human nature in terms quite different from those of the earlier Authors. Their dichotomy of existence tended not to be between good and evil or salvation and damnation, but between fragmentation and wholeness or illness and wellness. An equation emerges that may have existed before Christianity was as moralized as it had become; when the *salv* in “salvation” connoted health, and physical healing was a sign of holiness; when “goodness” was not simply a moral position but equated with “wellness.” All the twentieth century Authors cited existing pre-modernized cultures (i.e., Native American, African) where such connections of goodness and wellness still existed in their day, and in which shamans were a combination of healer, psychologist, and priest. The equation of the twentieth century Authors seems to be: 1) Well-being requires health (of at least the psyche), 2) health of the psyche requires some engagement with Ultimacy, 3) an engagement with Ultimacy necessarily involves what is “good” and of value.

Essentially, Jung argued that humans have a consciousness sophis-

ticated enough to have a conscious and unconscious that can join to become a whole, and the resulting wholeness is “the highest good and the ultimate concern of life.”⁴⁶⁵ Jung, who frequently stated that he was an empiricist, claimed he was able to prove that, “our consciousness has, fundamentally, a tendency towards wholeness...,”⁴⁶⁶ or Ultimacy. Jung used the name “Libido” (not to be confused with Freud’s use of the same word) to describe the force, drive, or “energy concept” for wholeness (which Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel held to be nature or some vague divine force) which is humanity’s ultimate motivation. Libido should flow along a predetermined path (which Jung called “*rta*”) and “this path is also fate... It is the path of our destiny and the law of our being.”⁴⁶⁷ The result of this energy flowing correctly is “personality” (one of Jung’s terms for Ultimacy) and achieving this is humanity’s “ultimate aim and strongest desire.”⁴⁶⁸ Therefore, there is, for Jung, a purposeful evolutionary force, but it is not one that most people can see through to its conclusion. Despite the universal availability of Ultimacy, the approach toward it is so arduous and requires such total commitment⁴⁶⁹ that only those with a true calling or “vocation” for Ultimacy can endure it.⁴⁷⁰

In analytical psychology, the processes of listening or sensing within became very sophisticated when compared to the versions of such listening and sensing expounded by Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel. The role of analytical psychologists “as physicians of the soul”⁴⁷¹ is to assist such inner listening and sensing—there really is no help to be sought from outside other than assistance in listening to that which is within. What Jung believed we are listening to or sensing is pre-existing potential wholeness and the innate forces that can bring about this wholeness; and he borrowed from Aristotle the word “entelechy” to designate the realization of an existent potential.⁴⁷²

Part of the listening and sensing within that analytical psychology developed is “being in the present” or “living in the present” first mentioned in reference to Rousseau. For Jung, being “aware of the immediate present” is extremely difficult because to accomplish it a person “must be conscious to a superlative degree,” which “requires the most intensive and extensive consciousness, with a minimum of unconsciousness.”⁴⁷³ The resemblance between what Jung saw as necessary for Ultimacy and several forms of meditation fascinated Jung and has inspired some interesting research.⁴⁷⁴

Jung did not believe that only the good exists; but this has to be seen in the context of his overall worldview of necessary dichotomies, with progress being made through the reconciliation of these dichoto-

mies. "Evil is the necessary opposite of good, without which there would be no good either."⁴⁷⁵ He was, however, very optimistic in his view of human nature and its inherent spirituality, enough so that Browning classifies his approach to psychology (as well as humanistic psychology) as part of "the culture of joy."⁴⁷⁶ Perhaps nowhere did Jung express more poetically what he felt was humanity's innate spirituality, mission and, meaning than in *The Development of Personality* in which he equated one of his terms for Ultimacy (personality) with Tao. He concludes this work with:

To rest in Tao means fulfilment, wholeness, one's destination reached, one's mission done; the beginning, end, and perfect realization of the meaning of existence innate in all things. Personality is Tao.⁴⁷⁷

Ultimacy As an Aspect of Religiousness for Jung

Jung's contribution to religiousness not anchored to any religion—which might be called 'secular religiousness'—is probably unique, and he certainly addressed religious issues to a far greater extent than either of the other two modern Authors. Jung was not against religions. On the contrary, he saw religions as potentially performing a necessary function⁴⁷⁸ but, unfortunately, one that they rarely performed adequately in modern times.⁴⁷⁹ Many ordinary people and even theologians of different religions have claimed that their own faiths were reaffirmed, rediscovered, or reinforced by Jung's work in psychology.⁴⁸⁰ It is interesting that, for Jung, the process of affirmation worked in the reverse direction; his reading of religious texts confirmed his psychological insights which he usually gained from exploring his own psyche.⁴⁸¹ Jung felt that if religions do not change with their constituencies, then their symbols and dogmas, instead of serving as a means of keeping people in touch with their higher selves, serve only to alienate the very people they were intended to serve. Jung held that people who are not alienated but who blindly follow dogma are also badly served by religions because this denies them necessary psychic growth.⁴⁸²

While a distinction is made here between religions and religiousness, Jung used "creed" to designate what we are calling religion, and frequently used "religion" to designate one aspect of what has been called religiousness in this book.

...the term "religion" designates the attitude peculiar to a

consciousness which has been changed by experience of the *numinosum*.

Creeds are codified and dogmatized forms of original religious experience. The contents of the experience have become sanctified and are usually congealed in a rigid, often elaborate, structure of ideas.⁴⁸³

Jung was concerned with religiousness throughout his career⁴⁸⁴ (even his doctoral dissertation was on the psychology of occultism), and many excellent books have been written on the religious aspects of Jung's work. The subject is very complex, but fortunately only a brief outline of Jung's religiousness is needed to explore its importance for holistic education.

Among the most important influences on Jung (which he frequently acknowledged) were the Romantic, speculative, and metaphysical *Naturphilosophen*. These were inheritors of Rousseau (including Schelling and Goethe), and many became champions of an approach to medicine called *Naturphilosophie* (as opposed to the mechanical and reductionist *Naturwissenschaft*) that was practiced by many notable doctors, including Jung's father.⁴⁸⁵ If, as the Romantics held, the divine is natural and to be found in nature (and nature includes the nature of man); and if the natural physical elements of man include both his body and his psyche (the psyche had previously been considered to be more ethereal and less physiological);⁴⁸⁶ and if the psyche is seen as the locus of perception, experience, consciousness, and knowledge; then it follows that to study man's relationship to the divine means studying the human psyche—or so it seemed to Jung. For Jung, the psyche was the locus of religiousness and the bridge to the sacred.

If one experiences himself and comes in the end to know more or less clearly who he is, then he has also experienced something of God and who he is.⁴⁸⁷

Jung's early contention was that an empiricist (which he considered himself to be) can only know human experiences as physiological and psychological processes without any view as to the objects of the processes. Consequently, someone's religious experience can only be studied as a kind of experience that the experiencer interprets as religious without any view as to the nature of the object being experi-

enced, or the truth of the interpretation.⁴⁸⁸ For example, what we experience when we physically see something is really just an inner experience—neurons firing in the brain making patterns which (for sane people) have a certain (though, ultimately, indefinable) correlation with objective reality. Eventually, Jung came to see that in observing psychic phenomena, those psychic phenomena themselves are altered. This led to a complex relationship between the observer and the observed, and as early as 1941 he noted some striking parallels between his studies of consciousness and the studies of microphysics, which he postulated might become more numerous.⁴⁸⁹ This has certainly been borne out, many years later, by some esteemed physicists.⁴⁹⁰

Jung's views on what can be empirically studied in the psyche became more complex with the emergence of the importance he gave to the unconscious subsequent to his studies with Freud. Jung felt the unconscious has an importance equal to that of the conscious, and is also a seat of perception, knowledge, and experience, despite these being beyond the grasp of consciousness and, therefore, rationality. As the conscious cannot grasp the unconscious, the only tools for discovering something of the contents of the unconscious lie in noticing the symbolic representations that the unconscious projects (e.g., dreams, the contents of active imagination, etc.). Since there is a collective unconscious shared by groups of people with a similar psychic heritage, and a larger collective unconscious shared by humanity as a whole, there exist symbols that represent and are accessible to the members of those collectives. For this reason, Jung encouraged people to seek out the vitality and richness of the symbols in their cultural inheritance (e.g., Western people seeking out the Christian and western pre-Christian symbols) or the universal inheritance. Jung lamented some people's tendency to drop the richness of their own heritage for that of another group, which he saw in the often faddish adoption by Westerners of Eastern religions. If, on the other hand, exploring the symbology of others was helpful for discovering the symbols and therefore the unconscious of one's own psyche, then that was worthwhile, and Jung did a great deal of this himself.

Such use of many religions to discover universal truths is important for the intellectual precedents of holistic education. It also shows Jung to be an important contributor to the Western movement that began in the late nineteenth century of attempting to incorporate diverse religions into an all embracing metaphysics. In validating all religions; showing them to be only expressions (bound by the time and location of their foundation) of eternal truths; demonstrating that all

religions express the same deep (perhaps ultimately ineffable) religiousness; and giving newer more inclusive and more appropriate expressions for the modern pluralist world; a new religion can be created. Such a new religion (and Jung's analytical psychology is said by some to be paramount to a new religion⁴⁹¹) appears to be superior to all the old ones as it incorporates them and seems not bound by time or location, and is therefore closer to the eternal religiousness that lies at the origins of all religions. Theosophy, which Jung frequently mentions, was just such a movement, and was extremely popular and powerful during the formative years of Jung's life and work. It has been suggested that Theosophy was influential for Jung both through the books of Eastern religion it translated and published to which Jung referred, and through friends of his whom he often quotes and who were active Theosophical writers.⁴⁹²

One of Jung's contributions to this movement of creating an all inclusive religiousness, was his giving it a scientific and biological basis. This is important for holistic education as it allows the collective base of identity construction to be decentring, centring, and recentring, and allows identity constructions to be located in the past, and the present; an important consideration in the sociological analysis of the nature of holistic education. These aspects of identity construction are discussed in full in Section III; it is important here simply to indicate their relationship with Jung's work.

Fairly early in his career, Jung saw the necessity of both the conscious and unconscious working together. This is the notion of balance and harmony evident in Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel, but for Jung the notion is more complex. The conscious and unconscious have different and even contradictory functions, but the health of the individual depends on the struggle between them being "at least a fair fight, with equal rights on both sides."⁴⁹³ This balancing of the conscious and unconscious working, perhaps in contention, but nevertheless in harmony was part of the process of psychological development that Jung called "individuation."

By paying careful attention to the contents of the conscious and (through its representations) the unconscious, there can be a union of them by what Jung called "the transcendent function."⁴⁹⁴ This union was a "rounding out of the personality into a whole...."⁴⁹⁵ Jung felt that his work empirically proved that "our consciousness has, fundamentally a tendency towards wholeness...."⁴⁹⁶ Jung called the results of this wholeness the "self."⁴⁹⁷ Jung proposed the self as a "psychological concept, a construct that serves to express an unknowable es-

sence” which “might equally well be called ‘God within us’.”⁴⁹⁸

What is meant by the self is not only in me but in all beings, like the Atman, like Tao. It is psychic totality.⁴⁹

While Jung felt that he could empirically prove “the existence of a totality supraordinate to consciousness,”⁵⁰⁰ it remains beyond the grasp of consciousness, hence rationality. It is not, however, beyond the combined and evolved forces of the conscious and unconscious —the self.

Jung also postulated the existence of the “ego.” This is the conscious experience people have of themselves, and can be thought of as a personal and social construct. The ego is subordinate to the self, and “the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego,”⁵⁰¹ as such an experience is one of non-ego or egolessness. This is one of the similarities between Jung’s analytical psychology and mystical religions.⁵⁰² Both, Jung claimed, have as a result the emergence of a non-ego state that he felt is identical to experiencing the collective unconscious.⁵⁰³ The reason for the similarity between experiencing the self and mystical experiences is that,

the self can be distinguished only conceptually from what has always been referred to as “God,” but not practically. Both concepts apparently rest on an identical numinous factor which is a condition of reality.⁵⁰

Even though Jung felt that his discoveries were in many ways a rediscovery of the truths of religions and shamanism (which he studied directly and indirectly, and to which he appreciated being compared⁵⁰⁵), he felt that Ultimacy resulting from his analytical psychology is superior (especially for modern Western people) because with such Ultimacy, a person enters into an experience of self in a conscious state “without any diminution of moral responsibility which is one of the attainments of Western culture.”⁵⁰⁶

Jung’s claims of being an empirical scientist⁵⁰⁷ and not “an atheist, a Gnostic, an agnostic, a mystic, a metaphysician, not a theologian,” with no wish “to preempt the task of the philosopher or theologian”⁵⁰⁸ rest on his notions of the truths that are accessible to science. He rejected the reductionist *Naturwissenschaft* view of science (which is the mainstream modern notion of science) and saw the limitations of Freud and Adler as being due to this limitation.⁵⁰⁹ Jung felt that reductionist science created a division between religion and science that did not

exist in antiquity, does not exist in the East, and is unhelpful for all the important questions of human existence.⁵¹⁰ Jung felt that “psychic truths” exist as well as physical ones, and that even though such truths are not derived by rationality, they are not beyond the bounds of psychology.⁵¹¹ Without the speculative and metaphysical inclinations of the *Naturphilosophen*, Jung’s scientific bias could well have left him as “Godless” as Freud described himself.

While most of the union in Jung’s Ultimacy described so far can be considered a unification *of* (e.g., the conscious and unconscious, the fragments of the psyche, etc.) there remains one final form of union that would have to be considered to be a unification *with*, although, as with many things Jungian, it isn’t entirely distinct. This is Jung’s notion of *Unus Mundus*. At the end of a process Jung called “conjunction,” he believed the psyche has

a unison with the world—not with the world of multiplicity as we see it but with a potential world, the eternal Ground of all empirical Being...⁵¹²

In this oneness with all of existence, the duality of spirit and matter disappear. This real, not imagined, event Jung saw as the union of “the personal with the suprapersonal Atman, and of the individual Tao with the universal Tao” and felt it was expressed by joining of the Ying and the Yang and by Satori in Zen Buddhism.⁵¹³ He claimed that, for Westerners, this event is so mysterious as to appear mystical.

Logically, such union must either be made by some magical or metaphysical power which transforms the nature of both matter and spirit, or there must be some common ground which allows the union to occur—something actual which exists in both spirit and matter that permits such a commingling so that they can form a oneness. For this Jung proposed the “psychoid unconscious”⁵¹⁴ and with this proposal all things have an animate aspect, even (so-called) inanimate objects. This allied him in yet another way to most archaic and shamanistic traditions.

Jung acknowledged that the notion of the psychoid unconscious “draws man more into the center of the picture as the measure of all things”⁵¹⁵ as no force, power, or entity external to man is needed to effect Ultimacy. It has been suggested that this notion of Jung’s, more than any other, has given Jung his importance in New Age spirituality and neopaganism since the translation of his work on this in the 1960s.⁵¹⁶

Jung insisted that he came to his insights from his own experience.

As the Ultimacy he discussed is (purportedly) the greatest that a human can experience, he has been considered by some to be as spiritually accomplished as any person in history—a view some of his critics have claimed he cultivated.⁵¹⁷ Although Jung insisted that a person needs to have the development of their psyche as a serious vocation to pursue it as far as he did,⁵¹⁸ he felt that “an experience of totality” or “becoming whole” was open to all those willing to commit themselves fully to it.⁵¹⁹ For holistic education such potential universality of acquisition is important. Jung was adamant that he was not creating a religion dressed as a science (something that he criticized Rudolf Steiner of doing with Anthroposophy, which Steiner called “spiritual science,” and Mary Baker Eddy of doing with Christian Science).⁵²⁰ Jung felt that religions don’t suit modern man (though the truths of religions—called here *religiousness*—are available to modern man through a study of the psyche) because modern man needs to experience these truths and not just get them second hand.⁵²¹ Besides, religions (or “creeds” as Jung called them) are only expressions of eternal truths which are always expressing themselves anew; and Jung, with his new science of analytical psychology, searched for such expressions for the modern age—an endeavor viewed sympathetically by many holistic educators.

The living spirit grows and even outgrows its earlier forms of expression; it freely chooses the men who proclaim it and in whom it lives. This living spirit is eternally renewed and pursues its goal in manifold and inconceivable ways throughout the history of mankind. Measured against it, the names and forms which men have given it mean very little; they are only the changing leaves and blossoms on the stem of the eternal tree.⁵²²

WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR JUNG

Jung’s View of Experiential Knowledge

As Jung addressed issues in general education only slightly,⁵²³ (feeling that conventional education was not within the purview of his science⁵²⁴) he did not elaborate his views on childhood acquisition of knowledge. He did have a great deal to say, however, about *knowing* that is needed in life which he sometimes referred to as knowledge and which at other times he counter-posed to knowledge (in which case he was referring to knowledge as intellectual knowledge). In general, Jung’s view was that a major part of the non-cognitive or pre-cognitive knowl-

edge needed for meaningful living (because of its relationship to Ultimacy) cannot be derived or even grasped cognitively as it lies in "a totality supraordinate to consciousness." For Jung, the unconscious can only be discovered through experience and such experience alters the nature of consciousness. A person must experience the truths of religion firsthand, and not get them secondhand; the latter being, for Jung, the nature of received beliefs.

Jung was interested in some epistemological questions and, in some regards, took a view not unlike Rousseau's in seeing knowledge as based on perception, with the relationships among perceptions, and the relationships between new perceptions and existing knowledge forming the basis of new knowledge. Both perception and knowledge are in the psyche. "Knowing' therefore is based upon the perceived connection between psychic contents."⁵²⁵ Apart from instrumental issues, such knowledge is important for modern individuals because "consciousness develops in civilized man by the acquisition of knowledge and by the withdrawal of projection"⁵²⁶ which, Jung felt, get reintegrated into the psyche.

Perhaps one of the most interesting notions of experiential non-rational knowledge in Jung's work is exemplified by what he called "synchronicity." From 1929 onward,⁵²⁷ Jung noted a relatively common kind of event in which psychic events (e.g., dreams, fantasies, etc.) correspond with material events, yet cannot be seen to have any causal connection (e.g., the dreams occur before the event they presage). Such phenomena are sometimes associated with parapsychology or telepathy. Even when the psychic event is presented only symbolically, it seems to have the same meaning for the experiencer as the physical event. This "phenomenon of synchronicity" indicated to Jung that psychic energy and physical energy are part of some larger reality. This being so, then at least on occasion, physical reality is in some way a mirror-image of psychic reality and indicates, therefore, a transcendent reality encompassing them both. The veracity of this, Jung felt, was borne out by some of the new discoveries in microphysics which was developing concepts he recognized as similar to some in depth-psychology.⁵²⁸ What gives this relatively common phenomenon such importance is that it constitutes "the *empirical* indication of an ultimate unity of all existence...the *Unus Mundus*."⁵²⁹

Synchronicity involves another distinct knowledge concept in Jung's work relevant to the present discussion: "absolute knowledge." This is "a self-subsistent 'unconscious' knowledge"⁵³⁰ which forms part of the phenomenon of synchronicity. Through the "lowering of the thresh-

old of consciousness”⁵³¹ (which can happen while asleep or in certain waking states) a person can gain access to the absolute knowledge evidenced in synchronicity. Jung believed this to be the same form of knowing that occurs in some Eastern mysticism, a sensing with “your inner eye, your inner ear.”⁵³²

What emerges from Jung’s work is that great swaths of essential knowledge are accessible only from experience. This brings the change in emphasis on the importance of experience as a form of knowing which occurred from Rousseau to Froebel, back to the emphasis that Rousseau expressed—experience is the only basis for most important knowledge.

Two other sources of experiential knowledge need to be briefly mentioned. One is “archetypes,” which Jung described as “primordial images” and “the most ancient and the most universal ‘thought-forms’ of humanity” which “are as much feelings as thoughts.”⁵³³ The second source of experiential knowledge was alluded to earlier: transcendent reality, which can only be experienced and is always experienced as absolute. Jung felt these “intense inner experiences” lead to “lasting psychic growth” and should be the “unshakeable foundation...not of faith alone, but also of knowledge.”⁵³⁴

Religious experience is absolute; it is not to be disputed. ...No one can know what the ultimate things are. We must therefore take them as we experience them.⁵³⁵

Intellectual knowledge and rational understanding have an interesting role to play with non-conceptual knowing. Even though they add “nothing to the experience of wholeness,” Jung claimed that they can facilitate the repetition of such experiences. Also, “intellectual representation...proves meaningful and helpful...when the road to original experience is blocked.”⁵³⁶ This does not mean Jung disparaged intellectual knowledge. Rather, he saw it as having a more limited place than he felt it was given by the modern Western culture of his time. “I believe strongly in the power and dignity of the intellect, but only if it does not violate the feeling-values.”⁵³⁷ Jung spoke of what is necessary for dream analysis (which for him is a form of education of the whole person) in a way that elucidates this approach to knowledge. He claimed that one needs an intellectual knowledge of the history of symbols, but that “mere intellect is not enough; one also needs feeling...”⁵³⁸ cautioning that such feelings “must not give way to sentiment.”⁵³⁹

In a reference to Rousseau that is interesting for this book, Jung

wrote of the form of psychology he created as “a reaction against the exaggerated rationalization of consciousness”⁵⁴⁰ and that unlike going “‘back to nature’ with Rousseau,”⁵⁴¹ Jung proposed that we need to contact the nature that is in our psyches.

The question arises as to what agency humans have for the experiences that form the basis of the needed learning. While Rousseau felt that, to a large extent, the experiences necessary for his student could be engineered, Jung felt that for the knowledge he valued,

Experiences cannot be *made*. They happen—yet fortunately their independence of man’s activity is not absolute but relative. We can draw closer to them—that much lies within our human reach. There are ways which bring us nearer to living experiences, yet we should beware of calling these ways “methods.”⁵⁴²

Jung’s analytical psychology, which gives attention to the unconscious, is one way to “draw closer” to such experiences. Another mechanism for such drawing closer is, according to Jung, intuition. Jung felt that intuition is not “an isolated gift but a regular function which is capable of being developed...with a specific range of knowledge based upon [it].”⁵⁴³ He also felt that intuition is an activity “without which no realization is complete.”⁵⁴⁴

Although Jung did not address the educational issues addressed by Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel, like them, he identified words as a source of illusion. Jung felt the problem of being “deluded by words”⁵⁴⁵ was especially acute with philosophers and theologians, and that words and concepts are too often substituted for and confused with reality. He felt that,

...our civilization is largely founded on a superstitious belief in words. One of the supreme religious assumptions is actually the “Word.” Words can take the place of men and things.⁵⁴⁶

Like Rousseau and Pestalozzi, Jung seems to have been especially wary of words in making moral decisions.

Since real moral problems all begin where the penal code leaves off, their solution can seldom or never depend on precedent, much less on precepts and commandments.⁵⁴⁷

Jung extended Rousseau’s antipathy to representations to include thoughts as representations. Some of Jung’s reasons for asserting that

nothing of importance could be captured by the intellect is that he felt "...the mind [intellect or consciousness] cannot establish or assert anything beyond itself"⁵⁴⁸ and that the conception of a thing cannot be "identical with the nature of the thing itself, and this for very obvious scientific reasons."⁵⁴⁹ As the intellect cannot reach beyond itself, when it tries to deal with things which are beyond intellect (such as all religious matters) it becomes "a great cheat and illusionist" by giving the impression that the intellectual grasp is a real grasp, when in fact, "one possesses nothing unless one has experienced it in reality...intellectual insight is not enough."⁵⁵⁰ The "intellectual one-sidedness of consciousness"⁵⁵¹ first makes a false dichotomy between matter and spirit—the materialist perspective and the spiritual perspective⁵⁵²—and then attempts to rejoin them by trying sometimes to "spiritualize matter and at other times materialize spirit."⁵⁵³ This false dichotomy has left modern man fed up with this "warfare of opinions" and needing to "bring meaning once more into life on the basis of fresh and unprejudiced experience."⁵⁵⁴ Jung contrasted this to the Eastern tradition in which, he felt, such dichotomizing has not occurred.⁵⁵⁵

The importance Jung gave to self-knowledge is embedded in the whole of his work. It is, in fact, impossible to discuss substantive parts of his work without broaching the subject. However, Jung made a distinction between what he called self-knowledge and what he felt was commonly thought of as self-knowledge.

Most people confuse "self-knowledge" with knowledge of their conscious ego-personalities. Anyone who has any ego-consciousness at all takes it for granted that he knows himself. But the ego knows only its own contents, not the unconscious and its contents. People measure their self-knowledge by what the average person in their social environment knows of himself, but not by the real psychic facts which are for the most part hidden from them.⁵⁵⁶

In some of his work Jung uses the term "persona" to label the person, personality, or socially-constructed-identity similar to the ego-personalities or ego-consciousness named above which most people think of as themselves. To know the persona is only to know a surrogate for the self and, while it may in many ways occupy the place of the self, it does not resemble it very accurately.

In answering a question about the systematic preoccupation with oneself in analytical psychology in relationship to egocentricity, Jung made statements that would have found sympathy with Rousseau. He

claimed that,

One *must* occupy oneself with oneself; otherwise one does not grow, otherwise one can not develop! ...occupation with and meditation on one's own being is an absolutely legitimate, even necessary activity...⁵⁵⁷

Self-knowledge must include knowledge of one's emotions. For Jung this is much more complicated than knowledge of their existence or even of what generates them. It involves knowing the intensity and subtle nature of the emotions as these establish "feeling-value" which serve to contextualize the psychic landscape,⁵⁵⁸ as it is heart or feeling which imparts an abiding value to what has been understood.

While Jung agreed that self-knowledge is necessary for all the reasons related to Ultimacy discussed in Chapter Two, Jung claimed that self-knowledge is also needed in order to understand other people, and understanding others is an important part of living.⁵⁵⁹ Self-knowledge, therefore, is a foundation for the pragmatic as well as Ultimate aspects of living.

Jung's View of Competence

Jung did not discuss judgment, values, or freedom in education to any significant extent. He did write a great deal about independence in relation to the process of individuation and to 'the child' both as an actual person and as an archetype. For Jung, "'Child' means something evolving towards independence" which "requires detaching itself from its origins."⁵⁶⁰ Jung equated freedom with self-mastery in this way.⁵⁶¹ Jung also stated that "there is no morality without freedom,"⁵⁶² claiming that the development humans need for Ultimacy requires at least enough freedom to be moral agents.

While Rousseau claimed that physical dominion and possessions necessarily infringe on liberty,⁵⁶³ Jung felt psychic possession to be incompatible with freedom. In a discussion about the "psychic disposition that limits our freedom," Jung concluded that,

Bondage and possession are synonymous. Always therefore there is something in the psyche that takes possession and limits or suppresses our moral freedom. In order to hide this undeniable but exceedingly unpleasant fact from ourselves and at the same time pay lip-service to freedom, we have got accustomed to saying apotropaically, " *I have*

such and such a desire or habit or feeling of resentment,” instead of the more veracious “Such and such a desire or habit or feeling of resentment *has me*.” The latter formulation robs us of the illusion of freedom.⁵⁶⁴

Social-ability for Jung

Another passage that Jung quoted from Pestalozzi highlights the distinction between culture and civilization, giving Pestalozzi's view that culture is based on individuals, and is fundamentally different from civilization; a distinction often made by holistic education which runs counter to many advocates of “citizenship education.”

More than a hundred years ago, in times not so unlike our own, Pestalozzi wrote (*ibid.*, p. 186): “The race of men cannot remain socially united without some ordering power. Culture has the power to unite men as individuals, in independence and freedom, through law and art. But a cultureless civilization unites them as masses, without regard to independence, freedom, law or art, through the power of coercion”. [N.B. Pestalozzi evidently subscribes to the Germanic distinction between *Kulture* and *Zivilisation*, where the latter term is employed in a pejorative sense. The idea that culture, deriving ultimately from tillage and worship (*cultus*), is a natural organic growth, whereas civilization is an affair of the city (*civis*) and thus something artificial.]⁵⁶⁵

Jung is clearly in agreement with Pestalozzi and Rousseau on many issues concerned with the relationship between the individual and society. As discussed earlier, Ultimacy for Jung is approached through the process of individuation, which is a singular engagement of a person discovering and uncovering himself. For Jung this has a social component, partly because everyone lives in social relationships, but also because everyone has a collective unconscious which lies beneath the personally acquired layer of the psyche. Part of the therapist's job is to reinforce the individual elements of the psyche when they are being smothered by the collective elements.

As the goal of individuation is the transformation of the psyche through uncovering and discovering it, alteration of the psyche in order to adapt to society was seen by Jung as counterproductive. Every individual is part of their society and indebted to it,⁵⁶⁶ but for the transformation of the psyche to occur, the individual needs to separate himself from society. To accomplish this the individual,

must offer a ransom in place of himself, that is, he must bring forth values which are an equivalent substitute for his absence in the collective personal sphere.⁵⁶⁷

Not only has society a right, it also has a duty to condemn the individuant if he fails to create equivalent values, for he is a deserter.⁵⁶⁸

Part of the reason for the divergence of interests between the individual and society is that they function according to different laws.

The misfortune is that never under any circumstances are the laws of nations in such concord with those of nature that the civilized state is at the same time the natural state. If such concord is to be conceived as possible at all, it can be conceived only as a compromise in which neither state could attain its ideal but would remain far below it. Whoever wishes to attain one or other of the ideals will have to rest content with Rousseau's own formulations: "You must choose between making a man or a citizen, you cannot make both at once."⁵⁶⁹

While society is always hostile to individuation because of the desertion from the collective, according to Jung, society is even more hostile at some historical points than at others. Jung felt that "the tempo of the development of the consciousness through science and technology" has left modern man with an unconscious which has lagged behind and which reacts with "the frightful regressions of our time" (e.g., Nazism, Communism). In fact, Jung felt that all of the "social and political isms," no matter how ideal they claimed to be, had the effect of "inhibiting the possibilities of individual development."⁵⁷⁰ In an interview about Nazism and Hitler, Jung pointed to the social pressure which made people "stupider and more suggestible"⁵⁷¹ and which worked against individuation. When asked how this could be cured, part of Jung's response was, "Education for fuller consciousness"⁵⁷²—education for Ultimacy.

Even though Jung emphasized the importance of maintaining society, he insisted that society is never "a carrier of life. The sole and natural carrier of life is the individual, and this is so throughout nature."⁵⁷³ It is also the individual who is the carrier of the collective, "because the masses are not changed unless the individual changes."⁵⁷⁴ Even though Jung, like the Authors before him, saw Ultimacy as "man's natural destiny," he, like they, saw this as part of being in the right relationship to the collective.

...the natural process of individuation brings to birth a consciousness of human community precisely because it makes us aware of the unconscious, which unites and is common to all mankind. Individuation is an at-one-ment with oneself and at the same time with humanity.⁵⁷⁵

Jung described only sketchily what an education that assisted individuation would look like. To do this he postulated three general kinds of education, all of which a person should experience at different times in their development: 1) "Education through example," which proceeds "wholly unconsciously and is therefore the oldest and perhaps the most effective form of all."⁵⁷⁶ 2) "Collective Education" by which Jung did "not necessarily mean education *en masse* (as in schools), but education according to rules, principles, and methods."⁵⁷⁷ While Jung did not feel this to be the best education for all individuals, he stated that "we live in a collective world, and we need collective norms, just like we need a common language,"⁵⁷⁸ even if the cost of "the collective mode of life" is a person's "wholeness."⁵⁷⁹ 3) "Individual Education," in which all rules, principles, and systems must be subordinated to the one purpose of bringing out the specific individuality of the pupil. This aim is directly opposed to that of collective education, which seeks to level out and make uniform.⁵⁸⁰

It seems that, just as individuation is "man's destiny," but suited only for those who can withstand the arduous process, individual education is appropriate only for those who can withstand the difficulties of separating themselves from the collective and pay the ransom described above. It is, however, an education that is in keeping with Jung's notions of approaching Ultimacy.

ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR JUNG

A great deal has already been said about Jung's notions of the individuation process, the achievement of personality and *Unus Mundus*. However, there remain to be discussed several elements of Jung's views of the learning processes that facilitate such needed learning, especially those related to childhood.

Jung believed that "the unconsciousness is the matrix out of which the conscious grows," however, the process of adding fragments from the unconscious to the conscious slows down after puberty. In this

process of “the integration of consciousness,” schools, as socializing agents, can play an important role.⁵⁸¹ It is generally only after consciousness has substantively developed that a new stage of development can occur; “...normally the psyche attains relative independence only after puberty. Up till then it has been largely the plaything of instinct and environment.”⁵⁸² Childhood was seen by Jung as the time when contact with the unconscious needs to decrease because, for children

...their problem lies mainly in adapting themselves to their surroundings. Indeed, their connection with the primordial unconsciousness must be severed, as its persistence would present a formidable obstacle to the development of consciousness, which is what they need more than anything else.⁵⁸³

During childhood, the child’s psyche “is extremely susceptible and dependent, and is steeped for a long time in the atmosphere of the parental psychology,”⁵⁸⁴ and this atmosphere is not generated mainly from the consciousness of the parents (which is within their means to manipulate) “but from their unconscious background.”⁵⁸⁵ In this, the most powerful influence comes from the “unlived life of the parents”⁵⁸⁶ by which Jung meant “all the life which the parents could have lived, but of which they thwarted themselves for artificial motives.”⁵⁸⁷

The process of growing out of childhood is partly, for Jung, the process of forming a separate identity (ego, in Jung’s terms), a process he called “differentiation.” This process, according to Jung, is never completed in some “primitive tribes” whose members don’t develop a sense of separate selves and in many modern western adults who fail to tear themselves away from their familial identity and national prejudices.⁵⁸⁸ Yet this process of differentiation is necessary for psychic growth. “In this battle for freedom the school plays a not unimportant part,” as it should help a child construct a separate identity and loosen the grip of the parents’ psychological influence.⁵⁸⁹ For Jung,

“Child” means something evolving towards independence. This it cannot do without detaching itself from its origins: ...The symbol [child] anticipates a nascent state of consciousness. So long as this is not actually in being, the “child” remains a mythological projection which requires religious repetition and renewal by ritual. The Christ child, for instance, is a religious necessity only so long as the majority of men are incapable of giving psychological reality to the saying: “Except ye become as little children. . .”⁵⁹⁰

After the early stages of forming the conscious from the unconscious, this “evolving towards independence” is, for Jung, a crucial aspect of the inherent process that facilitates the needed learning. It is so universally inherent that it lies behind the “child” archetype. As the most subtle and complex forms of this “independence” are involved in approaching Ultimacy, the “child” archetype has connections to “the sacred.” Jung believed that many adults engage in transference of the sacredness of the archetype onto actual children,⁵⁹¹ and conflate their enthusiasm for their own need for independence and psychic maturing with their enthusiasm for children.⁵⁹²

However, Jung was quite insistent that the psychic development that was possible for adults was not for children, and frequently warned “that the high ideal of educating the personality is not for children...”⁵⁹³ as the very qualities required of personality, “definiteness, wholeness, and ripeness...cannot and should not be expected of the child, as they would rob it of childhood,”⁵⁹⁴ a tendency that Jung felt was often present in adults who know only a little about psychology. This amounts to a form of coercion, and a person “should never be forced into a development that does not come naturally and spontaneously.”⁵⁹⁵

Jung makes several references to the process of acquiring the needed learning as being inherent or natural. He complained that the European (which today would be called the modern Western person) “has become so far removed from his roots that his mind has finally split into faith and knowledge...” and Jung felt that the modern Western person’s “task is to find the natural man again.”⁵⁹⁶ Jung claimed that he means something slightly different than Rousseau by this expression, but their different meanings are not in opposition to one another. One of the possibilities of childhood is not to become “so far removed” from one’s roots of the collective unconscious and not to become too immersed in “systems and methods” which “repress the natural man.”⁵⁹⁷ For this, schools can again play a positive role by not confusing their more important mission of personal growth with the lesser function of conveying knowledge.⁵⁹⁸

The school can also play an important role in the development of the child by ensuring that it maintains “a balanced education” which avoids “over specialized fields” as this “is essential as a measure of psychic hygiene” for all children but especially for gifted or highly-strung children.⁵⁹⁹ Jung would also include emotional development in personal growth, and echoes Pestalozzi when he says that “there are, besides the gifts of the head, also those of the heart, which are no whit

less important,” and which often make a more valuable contribution to society.⁶⁰⁰

One aspect of conditioning in the West that Jung felt could be avoided in childhood is one that Jung also feels is particularly pernicious as it acts to block the very process necessary to acquiring the needed learning—dependency. Jung frequently states that the tradition that has emerged in the Western world of depending on outside agencies (e.g., God, Grace, priests, rituals, etc.) to achieve Ultimacy actually prevents Ultimacy by causing the psyche to be undervalued and preventing the individual from taking responsibility for their own “higher development.”⁶⁰¹

Jung's View of Inherent Motivation

We have already discussed Jung's claim that the quest for Ultimacy is a vocation, but it must again be touched on briefly here as it relates to his notions of motivation. Jung's use of the word “vocation” must be understood in the classical sense of a calling that is only ignored at one's peril. Hence, for one's well-being following one's vocation is a “prime necessity” and an “indispensable requirement.”⁶⁰² This, for Jung, is the motivation a person has that facilitates the needed learning. However, unlike the classical Christian sense of “calling,” for Jung it came from Nature (as present in the psyche) and not from any external agent.⁶⁰³ Jung seems to claim that this vocation is in everyone, at least as a potential, but that most people's lives have so developed that by the time they are old enough to respond, they are incapable of hearing the call. The substance of this motivation is due to the libido, a concept of psychic energy (which Jung sometimes referred to as “inner Tao”) which flows naturally and inexorably towards a harmonious and unified existence.

The natural flow of the libido ... means complete obedience to the fundamental laws of human nature, and there can positively be no higher moral principle than harmony with natural laws that guide the libido in the direction of life's optimum.⁶⁰⁴

Jung felt that the libido is such a strong ordering principle that in people who have not been overly complicated and corrupted by civilization (as he believed some indigenous people to be), libido is even responsible for the natural creation of social laws and social order.

Jung felt that not only is the libido present as a motivating force, it

is necessary, because without some form of compulsion the energy to bring about Ultimacy would never be expended.

The only thing that moves nature is causal necessity, and that goes for human nature too. Without necessity nothing budes, the human personality least of all. It is tremendously conservative, not to say torpid. Only acute necessity is able to rouse it. The developing personality obeys no caprice, no command, no insight, only brute necessity; it needs the motivating force of inner or outer fatalities.⁶⁰⁵

ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR JUNG

Teachers' Understanding of Students and their Needs for Jung

Jung seems to articulate Rousseau's and Pestalozzi's positions most fully for the modern Westerner, especially Pestalozzi's perhaps unclear claim that a teacher must have an understanding of students in both the general and the particular.

There is and can be no self-knowledge based on theoretical assumptions, for the object of this knowledge is an individual—a relative exception and an irregular phenomenon. Hence it is not the universal and the regular that characterize the individual, but rather the unique. He is not to be understood as a recurrent unit but as something unique and singular which in the last analysis can be neither known nor compared with anything else. At the same time man, as member of a species, can and must be described as a statistical unit; otherwise nothing in general could be said about him. For this purpose he has to be regarded as a comparative unit. This results in a universally valid anthropology or psychology, as the case may be, with an abstract picture of man as an average unit from which all individual features have been removed. But it is precisely these features which are of paramount importance for *understanding* man. If I want to understand an individual human being, I must lay aside all scientific knowledge of the average man and discard all theories in order to adopt a completely new and unprejudiced attitude. I can only approach the task of *understanding* with a free and open mind, whereas *knowledge* of man, or insight into human character, presupposes all sorts of knowledge about mankind in general.⁶⁰⁶

This quotation reflects part of the previous discussion on knowledge and the way in which one kind of knowledge is seen as an inhibitor of another kind (in this case articulated as understanding).

Jung claimed that even though all humans share the same archetypes, psychic forces and psychic structures, and that the “universal Tao” or *Unus Mundus* for everyone is, of necessity, the same, yet “each person is a new and unique combination of psychic elements.”⁶⁰⁷ Jung claimed that the universal must be understood by the psychiatrist and educator because the universal is the psychic context in which to locate the individual, but it is only understanding the individual that facilitates the needed learning, as it is the individual psyche that “must nevertheless individuate itself if it is to become actualized...” and no two people do this identically.⁶⁰⁸ Like Pestalozzi, Jung claimed that preventing or inhibiting the individual nature of a person prevented or inhibited Ultimacy.

Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process for Jung

Jung contributes several important notions to what a teacher should understand about the correct pedagogic processes from the perspective of the development of the psyche. As stated previously, a child must begin the long process of individuation by breaking away from identification with the parents, a process in which schools can and should play a significant role; the classmates take much of the psychological place of siblings and teachers take the psychological place of parents. The classmates can not be expected to consciously take on their role as surrogate siblings. However, the correct pedagogic process requires that the teacher “be conscious of the role he is playing...and not be satisfied with merely pounding the curriculum into the child...”⁶⁰⁹

Part of what is required of teachers for the correct pedagogic process is to exercise “the delicate task of avoiding repressive authority...”⁶¹⁰ while simultaneously maintaining a minimum but appropriate authority. The teacher is mainly to direct and affect the child through the teacher’s own personality, which must be done without artifice and through the teacher being “an upright and healthy man himself, for good example still remains the best pedagogic method.”⁶¹¹ This requires a personal approach to education and to relationship with the students, which is of such importance that “if the personal relationship of child to teacher is a good one, it matters very little...”⁶¹² what

method of teaching is used. Jung brings into the twentieth century the notion of the earlier Authors that the correct pedagogic process rests on the relationship of the teacher to the student, but Jung's basis for this is his understanding of psychological growth. As such growth is of the greatest importance, Jung also ends up agreeing with the earlier Authors that it is not important what "amount of specific information a child takes away with him from school..."⁶¹³

Jung's analytic psychotherapy has been described by several commentators as a cure through increased knowledge and understanding and, therefore, as educative.⁶¹⁴ Consequently, it is appropriate to consider any part of the process Jung used with his patients that was not solely psychotherapeutic as also broadly educative. In this regard, a case can be made for examining Jung's technique of "active imagination" as there are several parallels between this and the "free activity" or "spontaneous activity" of Pestalozzi and the "self activity" of Froebel. This revealing of oneself to oneself and others through expressions of the unconscious⁶¹⁵ was used extensively by Jung. It was adapted and used for children more by Jung's friend and disciple Frances Wickes than by Jung himself.⁶¹⁶

More interesting for this discussion on pedagogic process is an aspect of a technique Jung engaged in that emerged from a survey of his patients. This has been referred to as a "paradoxical technique,"⁶¹⁷ but is probably best described as "performative apophasis." Apophasis has been convincingly portrayed as an aspect of the discourse of Plotinus, John the Scot Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Ibn Arabi, and others.⁶¹⁸ An example of apophasis is to say that the transcendent is beyond description; then to acknowledge that "beyond description" is in fact a description and so to add that the transcendent can't be thus described; then to acknowledge that "can't be thus described" is also a description, *ad infinitum*. It is in the necessary retraction of one proposition by the next that paradox is generated, and it is through this tension between the two propositions that meaning is conveyed rather than in the propositions themselves. It is "a propositionally unstable and dynamic discourse"⁶¹⁹ that defies conceptual construction and therefore eludes the conscious mind allowing the unconscious mind to operate. Such a technique by Jung "reflects his [Jung's] *völkisch* beliefs in the transformative effect of experiencing" the unconscious which for Jung was related to the "god within."⁶²⁰ This is a pedagogic process based on experience of a very subtle nature.

*Teachers' Understanding of
the Correct Pedagogic Relationship for Jung*

For Jung, unlike Maslow or Rogers, it is questionable to what extent the psychotherapeutic relationship can be equated with the pedagogic one. That it can be equated to some extent seems fairly uncontentious, but for Jung the psychic structure of a child is so different from that of an adult that it would imply that a different relationship is necessary. Nevertheless, what Jung proposes for the correct therapeutic relationship has been taken by some holistic educators to be the correct pedagogic relationship, and, as such, is worth briefly noting.

Psychotherapy is at bottom a dialectical relationship between doctor and patient. It is an encounter, a discussion between two psychic wholes, in which knowledge is used only as a tool. The goal is transformation—not one that is predetermined, but rather an indeterminable change, the only criterion of which is the disappearance of egohood. No efforts on the part of the doctor can compel this experience. The most he can do is to smooth the path for the patient and help him to attain an attitude which offers the least resistance to the decisive experience.⁶²¹

Keeping in mind that “the disappearance of egohood” is part of Ultimacy for Jung, that experiential knowledge is what needs to be learned, and that the goal is not the shaping of people but their own discovering or uncovering of themselves; then an equation becomes possible of at least part of the correct therapeutic relationship and the correct pedagogic relationship of holistic education.

Jung claimed that “the attitude” of the therapist is more important than precepts, methods, or theories “which in any case never work properly unless they are applied with right understanding.”⁶²² Jung equates such an attitude with both a religious attitude and with love, which are more important than any moral or social intervention.⁶²³ Jung claims that this religious, empathetic attitude is, in fact, “unprejudiced objectivity,” which is not to be “confused with a purely intellectual, abstract attitude of mind.”⁶²⁴

It is a human quality—a kind of deep respect for the facts, for the man who suffers from them, and for the riddle of such a man's

life. The truly religious person has this attitude. He knows that God has brought all sorts of strange and inconceivable things to pass and seeks in the most curious ways to enter a man's heart. He therefore senses in everything the unseen presence of the divine will. This is what I mean by "unprejudiced objectivity."⁶²⁵

Jung made several links between his notions of the correct therapeutic process and the correct pedagogic process in discussing the education of gifted children. He also showed his affinity with Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel with his emphasis on the role of affection in pedagogy.

...I would say, in the light of my own experience, that an understanding heart is everything in a teacher, and cannot be esteemed highly enough. One looks back with appreciation to the brilliant teachers, but with gratitude to those who touched our human feelings. The curriculum is so much necessary raw material, but warmth is the vital element for the growing plant and for the soul of the child.⁶²⁶

Teachers' Self-Development for Jung

Given that a large part of Jung's analytical psychology derives from his inspection of his own psyche, and that he felt this was an ongoing and life-long endeavor, it is hardly surprising that he believed in the benefits of continued self-development for all adults. He felt such self-development was of special importance for the psychologist "if he is not to be merely an unconscious fraud."⁶²⁷

We could say, without too much exaggeration, that a good half of every treatment that probes at all deeply consists in the doctor examining himself, for only what he can put right in himself can he hope to put right in his patient.⁶²⁸

Jung felt that such self-development was equally important for teachers because "it is much better to educate oneself first before one educates others."⁶²⁹ For Jung, "educating oneself" was not a matter of acquiring more knowledge of the outside world; and he cites the social, professional, and emotional disappointments in so many people's lives as evidence of the lack of education and that "vast numbers of men and women thus spend their entire lives in complete ignorance of the most important things."⁶³⁰ This marks an important shift in the study of mind that is evident in all the modern Authors: what had been an

approach to treating an illness became an approach for all to healthy living. "What was formerly a method of medical treatment now becomes a method of self-education."⁶³¹

In what may be a difficulty in the translation of the German *kulture* or a deliberate fusion on Jung's part, he conflates "culture" as social culture and as the noun form of "cultivating oneself."

The teacher must not be a merely passive upholder of culture; he must actively promote that culture through his own self education. His culture must never remain at a standstill, otherwise he will start to correct in children those faults which he has neglected in himself. This is manifestly the antithesis of education.⁶³²

Even though Jung frequently emphasized that "the most important question next to the education of the child is the education of the educator,"⁶³³ he never discussed this in terms of what could be called "teaching skills." In fact, Jung felt that "it is not knowledge, not technical skill" that achieves the wanted results in psychotherapy or in education, but the personality or quality of being of the doctor or teacher, and developing this "presupposes self-education."⁶³⁴ Jung contended that "as a man is, so will be his ultimate truth, and so also his strongest effect on others."⁶³⁵ Jung claimed that the flaws of the teacher will most likely be the source of things that go wrong with the students.⁶³⁶ Consequently, Jung presented analytical psychology as a tool for the educator to develop himself. Such self-development is partly important because of the power of example. It is also important because a person who is undeveloped (in Jung's terms) can very easily act out unconscious forces that run counter to his intentions.⁶³⁷ This is the damage often caused by the unlived lives of the parents mentioned previously, which applies to teachers as well as parents, and can take the form of the adult pushing the child instead of himself.

...when, as is unfortunately all too often the case, parents and teachers expect the child to make a better job of what they themselves do badly, the effect is positively devastating.⁶³⁸

Even though Jung was convinced that the teacher's use of analytical psychology for self-development "...will eventually rebound to the good of his pupils,"⁶³⁹ to engage in such development, the teacher must first make the uncomfortable acknowledgement that he is in as much need of change and development as is the world around him;

echoing Rousseau's dictum of teachers needing humility, and Rogers's claim they need "realness." Unfortunately, such acceptance of "himself in all his wretchedness is the hardest of tasks."⁶⁴⁰

...the teacher has to be absolutely convinced that his personal attitude is in need of revision, even of actual change. Nobody will condescend to this unless he feels that there really is something wrong. In view of the actual condition of the world every intelligent person is ready to admit that there is something utterly wrong with our attitude. Yet this inclusive statement rarely ever includes the individual in question, namely, the would-be teacher. His attitude is surely right and only needs confirmation and support, but no change. It is a very long step from this conviction to the conclusion: the world is wrong and therefore I am wrong too. To pronounce such words is easy, but to feel their truth in the marrow of one's bones is a very different proposition, yet it is the *sine qua non* of the true teacher. In other words, it is a question of personalities, without which no method and no organization makes sense. *A man whose heart is not changed will not change any other's.* Unfortunately the world of today is inclined to belittle and to ridicule such a simple and evident truth as this and thereby proves its own psychological immaturity, which is one of the prime causes of the present state of affairs as well as of numberless neuroses and individual conflicts.⁶⁴¹

Jung believed that such an attitude of including oneself with the world and of accepting one's wretchedness is a necessary part of the "unprejudiced objectivity" discussed previously.⁶⁴²

*Abraham Harold Maslow*A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
ABRAHAM HAROLD MASLOW
(1 APRIL 1908 – 8 JUNE 1970)

*M*aslow was the eldest of seven children born to uneducated Russian Jewish immigrants who had settled in Brooklyn. Like many immigrants, his parents saw education as the means to success for their children and they pushed young Maslow very hard in his studies. He later stated that his childhood was poor, lonely and unhappy, and he was surprised that he hadn't gone insane.

At the instigation of his parents, Maslow went to City College in New York with a view of eventually studying law. After transferring to Cornell, and then returning to City College, he realized his heart was just not in the subject. To the chagrin of his parents, after a year and a half of pre-law studies, he went to the University of Wisconsin to study psychology and physiology. There he completed his graduate degree and did original research on the dominance and sexual behavior of Rhesus monkeys. What is significant in this research for his later work is that he began to see a hierarchy of needs in these monkeys

(thirst before hunger, hunger before sex, etc.); an idea he was to refine and elaborate as part of his eventual theory of human psychology.

While at the University of Wisconsin, he married his first cousin Bertha Goodman against the express wishes of his parents. They would eventually have two daughters.

At the age of thirty-two Maslow completed his Ph.D., whereupon he went to Columbia to teach and do some research on human sexuality. Despite his training and research as a behavioral psychologist, while at Columbia, he met and had as a mentor Alfred Adler (an early follower and student of Freud). He also made acquaintance with several other intellectuals fleeing Nazi Europe such as Eric Fromm, and he was inspired to study Gestalt Psychology and other more “person centered” psychologies at the New School of Social Research in New York City.

While teaching at Brooklyn College from 1937 to 1951 Maslow found two other mentors who were to have a profound impact on his work, the anthropologist Ruth Benedict and the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer. Not only did their thinking influence his, but he felt they were both “wonderful human beings” and he began to study them as subjects. This was the start of his study of highly developed people he would eventually describe as “self-actualized” (a term actually coined by his friend Kurt Goldstein).

Maslow felt that most of the psychology he had studied was concerned with abnormal mental states or illnesses,⁶⁴³ whereas his study of these two mentors was concerned with extremely healthy mental states or perhaps even the fullest possible human development. He found this so important for understanding the human psyche that he continued to study “the finest, healthiest, people, the best specimens of mankind I could find.”⁶⁴⁴ This, he felt, was an important yet neglected part of psychology.

Maslow felt there was another important gap in the field of psychology of his time. He felt that behaviorism was too reductionist and mechanical, Freudian psychoanalysis was too negative and sordid about human nature, and Jungian analytical psychology was too abstract and theoretical. Maslow felt that something in between these mutually exclusive approaches to psychology was needed, and he proposed a third way or “third force” that he called humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology is distinct from the mechanical approaches like behaviorism and the “high theory” of approaches like Freud and Jung. Maslow felt that humanistic psychology is accessible to the general public, brings meaning back to human nature, and puts normal healthy psyches to

the forefront. It also seemed to offer hope to everyone that their fullest potential could be developed.

Maslow taught at Brandeis University from 1951 to 1969 where he was as much sought after by the students for personal advice as for his courses. He died soon after retiring.

MASLOW'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

Maslow's initial investigation of what could be called Ultimacy was empirical—he recorded long lists of characteristics from subjective descriptions used by people and about people who seemed to have experienced Ultimacy. These people seemed generally to have been accepted as “the best specimens”⁶⁴⁵ and included historical figures as well as some available for interview. His term for the ultimate state of development was “self-actualization” and his term for the ultimate engagement or experience was “peak-experience.”

The climax of self-actualization is the peak experience. “Peak experience” is a splendidly *naturalistic* idiom, hospitable to all the similar meanings in the vocabularies of religion and mysticism, yet confined to none of them. A peak experience is what you feel and perhaps “know” when you gain authentic elevation as a human being. We don't know how the peak experience is achieved; it has no simple one-to-one relation with any deliberate procedure; we know only that it is somehow *earned*.⁶⁴⁶

Maslow believed that “...sickness comes from the denial of human potential.”⁶⁴⁷ Maslow's notions of Ultimacy are at the center of his psychology; they are “the compass by which man gains a sense of the magnetic north of his existence,”⁶⁴⁸ and without this a human is necessarily disoriented. Ultimacy was also important for Maslow as it provides the basis of all motivation. Maslow postulated a universal human “hierarchy of needs.” In this scheme, the basic needs of survival (e.g., food, shelter, etc.) form the base level of the hierarchy, and these must first be met. When this first level is satisfied the next level in the hierarchy (e.g., belonging) is felt and cries out to be met. When this second level is met the needs move up to the next level of the hierarchy, etc. The final stage in the hierarchy is the need for self-actualization, the ultimate state for Maslow. In this scheme, however, the higher needs are not dormant until the lower ones are met. Instead, they are

working in the background, so that the ultimate need (self-actualization) is seen as behind, and in a way, driving all the others. Consequently, Ultimacy, for Maslow as well as the previous Authors, has importance because it is our most fundamental and all pervading motivation.

Ultimacy in Relation to Maslow's View of Human Nature

For Maslow, Ultimacy defines what it means to be human to the extent that he often substituted phrases like "full humanness"⁶⁴⁹ for his terms for Ultimacy (e.g., self-actualization, full Being, etc.). He goes so far as to say that those who are not actively engaged in the process of self-actualization "can be called 'human impersonators'."⁶⁵⁰ Maslow felt that he had established an empirical base for his assertions about human nature claiming that, "man demonstrates *in his own nature* a pressure toward fuller and fuller Being."⁶⁵¹ As well as towards Ultimacy, this pressure is also a tendency toward the "sub-aspects of self-actualization," what we have called secondary values (see page 23), which for Maslow included "serenity, kindness, courage, knowledge, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness."⁶⁵² Maslow also frequently interchanged the term "self-actualization" with "psychological health"⁶⁵³ reinforcing the notion that we are naturally approaching Ultimacy when we are in the best of health and fulfilling "our biological destiny."⁶⁵⁴

Maslow felt that in peak-experiences, which are the moments when we see most profoundly and clearly, "there is the realization that what 'ought to be' *is*"⁶⁵⁵ which resembles Rousseau's principle of finding that "what is, is good." For Maslow this includes "the perception of evil"⁶⁵⁶ which is no more than "a product of limited or selfish vision and understanding"⁶⁵⁷ and which has its rightful place in the world. Maslow would agree with Jung that evil is a necessary part of a good universe, and therefore, paradoxically, is part of the good.

That "people at their best are far more admirable (godlike, heroic, great, divine, awe-inspiring, loveable, etc.) than ever before conceived, in their *own* proper nature..."⁶⁵⁸ raised questions for Maslow, i.e. why were people ever considered to be otherwise? Maslow answered this by saying that if people are inherently bad yet need goodness (a need conceded by most cultures), then it follows that people are necessarily dependent on outside agents for goodness. Maslow felt that it is in the interests of some authorities and some social institutions (i.e., religious authorities and churches) to create and maintain such dependence. Therefore, the work in psychology that is "proving" man's inherent

goodness reduces the authority of religions, and so helps liberate humans by contributing to the modern “decay in supernatural sanctions.”⁶⁵⁹

Maslow claimed that being aware is more than an aspect of peak-experiences. He felt that a peak experience is a mental state that emotionally healthy people have frequently, and which positively influences a person’s material success by fostering problem-centered thinking rather than ego-centered thinking. While he said that psychology experiments were proving this to be a better mind-set for all thinking and learning, he credited Krishnamurti for particular insights into the importance of “choiceless awareness,” which he felt “contrasts to the abstracting, categorizing, and rubricating...”⁶⁶⁰ in which people commonly engage.

Ultimacy As an Aspect of Religiousness for Maslow

While Jung came to the religiousness of his notions of Ultimacy by what seems to be inclination, and certainly an interest that he claimed went back to his childhood; Maslow came to it reluctantly. In studying the healthiest and finest people he could find, Maslow kept getting reports from them resembling mystical experiences.

And, like most scientists, [he] had sniffed at them with disbelief and considered it all nonsense, maybe hallucinations, maybe hysteria—almost surely pathological.⁶⁶¹

Maslow came only grudgingly to consider and finally accept the existence of a universal religiousness in human experience. He saw that what he was discovering in his studies of people was nothing new and could easily be found by “any reader of Zen, Taoistic, or mystical literature...”⁶⁶² Adding substantially to his popularity in the 1960s, he equated these religious experiences to those of many people taking psychedelic drugs (like Huxley). Part of religiousness, for Maslow, was “being lost in the present” which had “something to do with this ability to become timeless, selfless, outside of space, of society, of history,” and which results in “transcendence.”⁶⁶³ Maslow advocated some common cultural activities that he felt encouraged this state, such as art and music.

Unlike Jung, but like the earlier Authors, Maslow saw religions as a corruption of religiousness. This corruption was partly perpetrated by special interests and partly by tendencies within consciousness, which he claimed to be the main thesis of his book *Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences*.⁶⁶⁴ Although Maslow had previously made such claims about

religions, he used this book to summarize his notions and to correct what he had felt was a bias in his previous work on the subject. This book also shows one of his approaches to notions of balance between human feeling and thinking. Maslow named the tendency toward the experiential feelings and the mystical as "Dionysian," and the tendency towards the rational and formulaic as "Apollonian."⁶⁶⁵ Maslow had previously been more critical of the generally dominant Apollonian tendency⁶⁶⁶ in individuals which he felt (like Jung) was largely due to society's overemphasis on rationality. By the mid-1960s, however, he felt it necessary to emphasize that a balance of the two is what leads to Ultimacy.

While Maslow's notions of balance and harmony are not as complex as Jung's, they are just as all embracing. He claimed that the tendency to dichotomize, "is itself a pathological process,"⁶⁶⁷ and when this stops there is the unity (which originally existed) of apparent opposites. Such notions of original unity, harmony and balance (or the unity, harmony, and balance in the universe) are Maslow's moral justification for developing all the faculties within the individual. It is this development that produces the unity, harmony, and balance within and consequently puts us in unity and harmony with the universe. Such ontological notions have led some of Maslow's critics (such as Browning) to claim that

The images of harmony fuse at points in Maslow's writings with what must be called virtually monistic metaphysical metaphors... Monism is characterized by the idea that the sacred is a unified, motionless, timeless, unconditional, and self-caused perfection and, furthermore, that the human self in its depth is a manifestation of the divine life itself.⁶⁶⁸

Browning's contention that there are religious assertions in the work of Maslow and Rogers is well supported by statements which these psychologists both made, but Browning's contention that they should not stray into such areas as they are not theologians supports a fundamental claim made by Maslow, Rogers, and Jung. All three claimed that such dichotomizing of science and faith is one of the symptoms, as well as a cause, of many modern ills. All three also claimed that they had not sought to engage with the religious domain. They had sought to study the facts of human existence and in that pursuit found that they had to study people's notions of Ultimacy—religiousness forced itself into the picture. Jung, Maslow and Rogers all claimed that by keeping the study of the religious separate from everyday human ex-

perience, neither could be understood, and this separation was a source of human ills, not its cure.

Maslow felt that rejecting religiousness as part of what a scientist could consider was to establish preconditions of what could be found (a very unscientific position), which results in rejecting the very wholeness he had come to realize a scientist needs in order to understand the human condition. Maslow's Ultimacy involves integration of the person through "the recovery of aspects of the unconscious and preconscious,"⁶⁶⁹ and for this the rational, analytical conscious intellect is completely inadequate. For Maslow, such integration leads to a "unitive consciousness."

This is the ability to simultaneously perceive in the fact—the *is*—its particularity, *and* its universality; to see it simultaneously as here and now, and yet also as eternal, or rather to be able to see the universal in and through the particular and the eternal in and through the temporal and momentary. In my own phrasing, this is a fusion of the Being-realm and the Deficiency-realm: to be aware of the B-realm while immersed in the D-realm.⁶⁷⁰

Maslow's hierarchy of needs corresponds to states of being, and all of the activities engaged in while in a particular state are affected by that state. Hence, the nature of cognition in a lower state was seen by Maslow to be different from the nature of cognition in the highest state. Maslow's notion of Ultimacy or the highest state of being a person can aspire to, in which there are peak experiences, he described simply as 'Being'. Maslow attached 'Being' to activities or qualities characteristic of this state to distinguish them from their facsimile in other states. Maslow spoke, therefore, of Being-values (or B-values for short) and similarly of B-love, B-cognition, and B-knowledge.

While Maslow's notions of Being-realm and Deficiency-realm, and Being-values and Deficiency-values, etc. are discussed later, it is important to introduce the notions here because their fusion is an important aspect of the religiousness of Maslow's Ultimacy. For Maslow, as for Jung and Rogers, the mundane or everyday (the Deficiency-realm) is not negated or destroyed by the sacred (the Being-realm) but is subsumed by it. The first in Maslow's list of Being-values is "wholeness (unity; integration; tendency to one-ness; ...)"⁶⁷¹ and Being-cognition has no difficulty with the apparent paradox of seeing the whole world as a unity, or of seeing one small part, for a moment, as though it were all of the world.⁶⁷²

WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR MASLOW

Maslow's View of Experiential Knowledge

Like the preceding Authors, Maslow made a distinction between knowledge from experience and knowledge from abstraction, and, considering himself an empiricist, he gave precedence to experience.⁶⁷³ Maslow's unique contributions to the question of what needs to be learned are his notions of the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge. Unfortunately, Maslow's language complicates elucidating his thoughts on this as he used several terms to convey similar notions depending on what he was trying to emphasize.

Maslow asserted that some things can only be known experientially (e.g., colors) and other things can only be known if experiential knowledge is part of the knowing.

Perhaps it is better to say that all of life must first be known experientially. There is no substitute for experience, none at all. All the other paraphernalia of communication and of knowledge—words, labels, concepts, symbols, theories, formulas, sciences—all are useful only because people already know experientially. The basic coin in the realm of knowing is direct, intimate, experiential knowing.⁶⁷⁴

Knowledge that can be thought of as logically compelled (which Maslow called “inductive knowledge”—giving mathematics as an example) is adequate for conceptual conviction, but this is a far cry from certainty. Maslow felt that certainty is more visceral and that “inductive knowledge can never bring certainty.”⁶⁷⁵ Echoing Jung's claims that a person's religious experience is a certainty for that person, Maslow claimed that experiential knowledge can bring certainty (perhaps the only certainty), and even when it doesn't, “in any case, it is real...”⁶⁷⁶ In this statement and elsewhere, Maslow made the same simple distinction between “real” and “unreal” knowledge seen in the early Authors.

With this distinction, it is not surprising that, like his predecessors, Maslow was critical of an unbridled scientific perspective.

It was primarily the physicists and the astronomers who created the *Weltanschauung* [or paradigm] and the subculture known as Science (including all its goals, methods, axiomatic values, concepts, languages, folkways, prejudices, selective blindnesses, hidden assumptions). This has been pointed out by so many as to amount to a truism by now.⁶⁷⁷

Maslow went on to say that it is only recently that this *Weltanschauung* has been shown to be inadequate for studying people as individuals. He felt that science as a form of nomothetic knowing must look for general laws in which each individual is necessarily treated as one of a group or class and “not unique, not sacred, not *sine quo non*.”⁶⁷⁸ However, Maslow felt that to know individuals, one needs to use what he called “The Holistic Approach,”⁶⁷⁹ in which people are seen as a whole and reductionism has no role. Maslow further criticized classical science as knowing only how “to study people as objects”⁶⁸⁰ when what had emerged from many of the insights of psychology was the importance of seeing them as subjects.

Like Jung, Maslow criticized nineteenth-century science for becoming “too exclusively mechanistic, too positivistic, too reductionistic, too desperately attempting to be value-free.”⁶⁸¹ Science claimed to have nothing to say about ultimate or spiritual values, placing such issues outside of that which could be confirmed. As a consequence, in the scientific paradigm (which he felt was the dominant modern perspective) a person cannot feel they have objectively true knowledge about religious issues. Science and religion had become too narrowly conceived, and as a result, dichotomized, much to the detriment of modern man.

Maslow emphasized that, while experiential knowledge is primary,⁶⁸² “it is not enough.”⁶⁸³ Writing in the ‘flower-power’ 1960s, Maslow found it necessary to emphasize that accumulating and ordering objective facts is also necessary, an emphasis which none of the previous Authors found necessary. He described his approach as holistic, by which he meant making a place for “experientially-based concepts” and for “experientially filled words” which could generate an “experientially-based rationality in contrast to the a priori rationality that we have come almost to identify with rationality itself.”⁶⁸⁴

Part of Maslow’s approach to developing a language for discussing “experientially-based rationality” was his distinction between “extrinsic” knowledge and learning, and “intrinsic” knowledge and learning, a distinction he had in common with Rogers. They both felt that schools were mostly engaged with extrinsic knowledge.⁶⁸⁵ Extrinsic learning is,

...learning of the outside, learning of the impersonal, or arbitrary associations, of arbitrary conditioning, that is, of arbitrary (or the best, culturally determined) meanings and responses. ...the learning is extrinsic to the learner, extrinsic to the personality, and is extrinsic also in the sense of *collecting* associations, conditionings, habits, or

modes of action. It is as if these were *possessions* which the learner accumulates...⁶⁸⁶

Maslow felt that extrinsic learning was promoted by the behaviorist paradigm which had come to dominate American education. Students were seen as needing to accumulate knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviors that could be measured.⁶⁸⁷ Because such a paradigm cannot see and ally itself with the internal forces in every child which strive for self-actualization, the learning that it generates tends to be outside the meaning structures of the individual. Maslow felt that this was the principal cause for the failure of the American educational system.⁶⁸⁸

Intrinsic learning, on the other hand, requires the engagement of the person—the person's experiencing and consequent internalizing of events are fundamental. Maslow believed that intrinsic learning is the learning that occurs in the great eye-opening moments of our lives, when we learn significant things about the world and ourselves, and is part of "the process of growing into the best human being one can be."⁶⁸⁹ Maslow claimed that, unlike the lessons we tend to have in schools, intrinsic learning experiences

...are apt to be unique moments, not a slow accumulation of reinforced bits. ...These are the experiences in which we discover identity.⁶⁹⁰

Maslow and Rogers both contended that even vocational training requires intrinsic knowledge in several ways, one of the most obvious of which is problem solving.⁶⁹¹ If a problem cannot be solved with prescribed procedures, then creativity is necessary. Creativity requires being able to approach B-cognition, to look at the situation afresh and to listen to and follow inner voices. Thus, creativity is necessary on pragmatic grounds alone, but creativity is also part of the hierarchy of needs⁶⁹² and necessary for self-actualization. Yet despite its obvious importance, Maslow and Rogers felt that creativity is usually (though perhaps unconsciously) punished in normal education where prescribed learning and conformity are wanted and rewarded.⁶⁹³

Maslow felt that if one saw the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic knowledge and learning, and one saw the relative importance of them in people's living, "then you *must* have a different picture of the good teacher and of his functions."⁶⁹⁴

For both Maslow and Rogers, it was not a matter of choosing in-

trinsic over extrinsic learning, but of integrating them and applying them in their proper domains. One of the ways in which this can be done is to ensure that extrinsic learning is motivated by intrinsic needs (e.g., personal needs of fulfillment, meaning, interest, etc.) and not from extrinsic stimuli (e.g., rewards or punishments).⁶⁹⁵ These notions of intrinsic and extrinsic knowledge underlie most of Maslow's and Rogers' statements on education and also link several other notions such as self-knowledge, homeostasis, freedom, values and Ultimacy.

Before Maslow used the terms 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' he used 'concrete' and 'abstract' to convey similar meaning, and from early in his writing he was interested in the correct relationship between them.

First comes "knowing" in the experiential sense; then come the checks on the fallibilities of the senses and of experiential knowledge; then come the abstractions, i.e., orthodox science.⁶⁹⁶

Maslow identified experiential knowledge as concrete knowledge, and wanted to stress that he was attacking "abstractness dichotomized from concreteness" and not "abstractness hierarchically-integrated with concreteness and experience"⁶⁹⁷ which he felt "is a necessity for human life."⁶⁹⁸

Maslow was aware that his approach and many of the cultural trends he saw in the 1960s could veer over to "the anti-rational, the anti-empirical, the anti-scientific, the anti-verbal, the anti-conceptual,"⁶⁹⁹ and such veering leaves a person with no way to check the experiential and so no protection from delusion. However, the integration of non-rational with the rational was difficult for most people and for education because non-rational knowing had been so little studied and was often conflated with anti-rationality. He described one form of non-rational knowing that was common as "experiential naïveté"⁷⁰⁰ —a simple unmediated openness related to what is needed to appreciate art and music. Maslow believed this openness is often part of children's seeing and is retained by "the sages, in whom wisdom, goodness, perspicuity, and learning become a unity."⁷⁰¹ Experiential naïveté requires "not knowing" or the suspension of knowing, and this, Maslow felt, raises substantive questions about when and how rational knowledge blocks non-rational knowing. As such questions had not even been asked, much less resolved by mainstream education, Maslow felt that mainstream education too frequently generates knowledge that blocks experiential naïveté and, consequently, negatively affects the lives of its students.

Fundamental to the notions of intrinsic knowledge for both Maslow

and Rogers was their conception “of the human being as having an essence”⁷⁰² which people are born with, and which, in many aspects, is different in everyone—“(anyone of you who has more than one child knows that).”⁷⁰³ Maslow and Rogers saw people as having unique ‘core selves’ which must be discovered or uncovered so that people can be self-actualized. This is a rejection of the *tabula rasa* approach to education (which, they felt, implies that the same things can be learned by everyone regardless of their nature), and it pitted Maslow and Rogers against the popular existentialist philosophy of their time. While Maslow and Rogers both talked of “being” and “essence” they specifically and repeatedly negated the notion of being preceding essence popularized by Sartre (this, despite their support of existentialist psychology which also took a position on being and essence contrary to Sartre). Maslow and Rogers felt that *tabula rasa* notions support behaviorism with its promotion of operant conditioning and coping behavior. The dominance of the behaviorist paradigm in Western education, they felt, is tragic because “true learning is possible only when it is intrinsic, experiential, significant or meaningful”⁷⁰⁴ which is always a response to inner needs as determined by the individual’s “core self.”

Maslow and Rogers held that both Ultimacy and discovering one’s vocation are based on uncovering the self. Both require knowledge of what a person wants and doesn’t want,⁷⁰⁵ and the way in which each person is unique (with unique talents, abilities, capacities, and inclinations). Consequently, Maslow proposed what he felt would be a new kind of education, free from any prescribed learning that would allow the discovery of self, with the consequent discovery of vocation.⁷⁰⁶

Another goal which our schools and teachers should be pursuing is the discovery of vocation, of one’s fate and destiny. Part of learning who you are, part of being able to hear your inner voice, is discovering what it is that you want to do with your life. Finding one’s identity is almost synonymous with finding one’s career...⁷⁰⁷

While knowledge of vocation is related to self-knowledge, it is also related to Maslow’s notions of homeostasis through what he called “intrinsic conscience,” another form of non-rational knowledge.

This is based upon the unconscious and preconscious perception of our own nature, of our own destiny, of our own capacities, of our “call” in life. It insists that we be true to our inner nature and that we do not deny it out of weakness or for advantage or for any other

reason.⁷⁰⁸

Maslow also described non-rational knowledge as Taoistic. In his book *The Psychology of Science* Maslow devoted one chapter to Taoistic Science which he described at length and in various ways. As Maslow considered such non-rational knowing, in certain instances, to be a path to more reliable and more veridical cognition, he considered it also to be suprarational. In general Taoistic knowing is,

...laying aside all the characteristics of our most prideful rationality, our words, our analysis, our ability to dissect, to classify, to define, to be logical. All of these processes are postponed. To the extent that they intrude, to that extent is the experience less "full." Experiencing of this sort is much closer to Freud's primary process than to his secondary processes. It is in this sense nonrational—although it is by no means antirational.⁷⁰⁹

Suprarational is certainly the way he considered another form of non-rationality which he called either B-cognition or B-knowledge. Maslow spoke of B-knowledge as "veridical perception of hitherto unperceived truth."⁷¹⁰ The impact that "veridical perception" can have on very difficult pragmatic problems had been validated, in Maslow's view, by a fifty percent cure rate of chronic alcoholics through the use of LSD. These experiments were stopped for political reasons, but Maslow felt they demonstrated that knowledge from acute perceptions (even artificially induced) can have life altering effects.

Maslow also referred to B-knowledge as "I-Thou knowledge" and "fusion knowledge,"⁷¹¹ which has echoes of Jung's *Unus Mundus*. He claimed that such knowledge is related to love as it is "knowledge from within, by *being* what we are knowing" and asserted that this is a form of Ultimacy in knowledge.⁷¹² Maslow postulated that love "seems likely to enhance experiential knowledge of the object" while its absence may "increase spectator knowledge of that same object."⁷¹³ For understanding particular persons and even people in general, he was quite certain that B-knowledge is necessary. B-cognition for Maslow was cognition that sees "as a whole," in which there is "total attention," and no rubricizing,⁷¹⁴ which re-introduces Maslow's notions of abstract and concrete knowledge. Maslow felt that,

There are substantial differences between the cognition that abstracts and categorizes and the fresh cognition of the concrete, the raw, and

the particular. ...Most of our cognitions...are abstracted rather than concrete.⁷¹⁵

One of the principal differences is that concrete cognition or B-cognition is “the purest and most efficient kind of perception of reality...”⁷¹⁶ mostly because it has not been corrupted by the “wishes, fears, and needs of the perceiver.”⁷¹⁷ Maslow acknowledged that he had no evidence for making these claims which traditional science could accept as objective, nor could he imagine what such evidence would look like. Maslow could only have the subjective reports of people who claimed to have experienced what seemed to Maslow to be B-cognition, but this lends support to Maslow’s call for an “experientially-based rationality.”

One interesting aspect of B-cognition for the present purposes is Maslow’s claim of its link to the normative. He reported that in B-cognition “the perception of the Being, the otherness, or the intrinsic nature of the person or thing” includes “the *oughtiness* of the object....”⁷¹⁸ “That is to say, oughtiness is an intrinsic aspect of deeply perceived facticity; it is itself a fact to be perceived.”⁷¹⁹ Maslow felt that the relation of “oughtiness” to “isness” is especially important in matters of personal decisions as “...the best way to discover what [a person] ought to do is find out who or what he is....”⁷²⁰ This is not an argument against Kant’s conclusion that one can’t move from an *is* to an *ought*; it is simply a denial of it.

Since a characteristic of B-cognition is non-intrusive receptivity—a perspicacity unpolled by the observer’s internal processes (e.g., wants, prejudices, etc.)⁷²¹—it follows that Maslow would feel that meaning needs to be discovered and not constructed. This can be seen as a correlative to the non-constructivist view that Maslow and Rogers had of the nature of the “self,” that it existed and was not a product of the mind.

A reductionist tends to think that the human mind *puts* meaning into nature. He looks at the world critically, with pursed lips, confident of his own superiority to this hurrying, meaningless flow of events. Maslow was a true phenomenologist in the basic sense; he felt that the world *out there* was a damn sight more meaningful than anything *his* mind could add to it. There was a strong, clear sense of a ‘central reality or essence’ that he was only trying to observe and interpret.⁷²²

Maslow felt that if it is only humans who organize actuality into meaningful patterns, one must assume that “experience itself has no

meaningfulness” and that as a consequence, meaning “is a gift from the knower to the known.”⁷²³ For Maslow, this makes no sense—meaning exists independently of humans and needs to be discovered by objective observation.⁷²⁴ While Maslow felt this is true for knowledge about reality in general, it is even more true for knowledge about people.

Any clinician knows that in getting to know another person it is best to keep your brain out of the way, to look and listen totally, to be completely absorbed, receptive, passive, patient, and waiting rather than eager, quick, and impatient. ...Freud’s term “free-floating attention” describes well this noninterfering, global, receptive, waiting kind of cognizing another person.⁷²⁵

One final note on Maslow’s notions of needed knowledge is related to his notions of good and evil.

Socrates taught that ultimately evil behavior can come only from ignorance. Here I am suggesting that good behavior needs as a precondition good knowledge and is perhaps a necessary consequence of good knowledge.⁷²⁶

Maslow didn’t specify what “good knowledge” is, but we are left to presume that it is B-knowledge.

Competence for Maslow

While Maslow didn’t have anything significant to add about the distinctions between competence based education versus performance based education, he is the first of the modern Authors to make a significant contribution to notions of judgment and values in the context of education. He did this principally through his notion of Being-values (or B-values) which he described as “characteristics of Being” and “perceived as ultimate”⁷²⁷ by people in peak experiences or who are self-actualized. He preferred the term “choosing” to “judgment,” and claimed that such values “guide one’s choosing.”⁷²⁸ Maslow felt that the student’s establishing of such values should be one of the major goals of education as this is necessary for generating positive social change.

Maslow stated that many of the social ills he saw as increasing were the result of a growing ethical relativism, meaninglessness, and loss of identity. “The churches are not much help”⁷²⁹ in answering these problems because modern man needs